

Int'l Theory of Soc Sci
 T-1 REPRESENTATION
 T-3 IO Theory

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Representation may be defined most usefully as a relation between two persons, the representative and the represented. ^{or, as a relation with} The representative holds the authority to perform various actions that incorporate the agreement of the represented. The relation is by no means simple, since practically every type of human communication and perception can be shown to be intrinsic ^{to} representation. The relation is socio-psychological. Essentially subjective, it may, however, be affected by numerous objective conditions and events.

Representation is of social interest as a concept largely in the contexts of power relations among leaders (representatives) and followers (constituents) ¹/_m whether in government, church, school, business, or the family. It may well be defined in terms of a scale ranging from non-relation (or "bad" relation) to perfect or full relation. Thus an accord of ^{not be} degree has to be achieved before representation may be said to exist; below that point, "A" is said to ^{not be} represented by ^{not} M.

A. H. C. D.

The study of representation

The simplest index of the representation is a positive answer that a person may give to the query: "Do you feel represented by M?"

What this degree of accord is to be is not standardized, if only because the very parameters of the relation are unexplored. When this writer and H. F. Gosnell attempted the last ^(such an exploration)

in 1940 ¹⁹⁴³ ~~(cf. Democracy: Threshold of Freedom 1947)~~ ^{Gosnell}, it was plain that the classical utterances on representation were commonly polemical, unsystematic, and superficial (cf. ~~1744~~ Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" 1744, Works, Vol. II, p. 12; ~~John S. Mill, Representative Government 1861; and~~ the materials presented in ~~Karl Loewenstein's Volk und Parlament nach der Staatstheorie der französischen Nationalversammlung von 1789~~ 1922; and ~~Maudie V. Clark's Medieval Representation and Consent~~ 1936; ~~cf. also F. F. Smith The Legislative Way of Life~~ 1940). ~~As~~ ^{was} soon as the thicket of representative relations ~~were~~ entered, progress became slow. Obviously representation must consist of unconscious as well as conscious relations, expressive as well as sanctioned actions, unknown as well as known actions. ^{Otherwise} ~~Else~~ one falls into the trap of regarding as determinative of the representative relation solely conscious, known, legislative behavior ^M parameters that are more often missing than present in the setting about which the scholar wishes to say "A is represented by B". This rationalistic fallacy has prevented generations of scholars of democracy from coming to grips with problems of representation ¹⁹⁵¹ ~~(Alfred de Grazia Public and Republic 1949)~~.

Today, by contrast, the study goes forward. ^{John} Wahlke, ^{Heinz} Eulau, ^{William} Buchanan, and ^{Lo Co} Ferguson (1962), managed to perform the difficult task of fitting standardized inquiries of several sets of U.S. State legislators into the real-life environment

of representation and attaching to the representative's cognitive and perceptive structures and functions a set of postures toward representation: the expert role defines the ability and reputation of a member with respect to the work of the assembly; the purposive role includes the ritualist^{and} the tribune who defends the people; in the representative role some legislators take up a trustee posture toward their constituents, other^{the} a delegate^{position} and some "politicos" are disposed to both in various ways; finally, the areal role denotes the tendency toward identifying with the elective district on the one hand^{about} and the whole state^{on the other}. At the same time, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes⁽¹⁹⁶³⁾ undertook to question samples of the electorate of various districts concerning their Congressmen.

As they have exposed the facts of representation, recent studies have also disclosed the materials upon which the long-argued ethics of representation must rest. The question "Whom should a representative represent?" can be answered in a more precise^{by} way^{way} granted always that one knows what it is that he wishes the representative system to produce by way of action or expression.

Clarifying the concept. Despite the improvement in research, the connection of representative and constituent in any setting or in society as a whole must continue to be referred to imprecisely in absolute terms ("is"^{is} or "is not"^{is not}) rep-

resented), or in imprecise comparative terms ("more representative than"). What would be required to make the terminology more precise?

First of all, a clear, scientific approach to the myth-shrouded concept is required. Considering the wealth of empirical investigation in human relations, it is odd and regrettable that so little work has borne directly upon the foremost structural problem of democracy.

The state of knowledge of representation would also be improved if translation of concepts and findings of other scientific fields were made. Since representation is a psychological condition, there are obviously numerous relevant concepts, such as perception (awareness), cognition (information), communication, stereotypes, and authority (charisma) that are to be regularly taken into account.

In addition, there ^{are many} ~~occur~~ group-behavior concepts, ~~many~~ ^{that} ~~of which~~ pertain to representation. If representation is a relation between "A" and "B", it is also a relation between "B", "C", "D", ... on the one hand, and "A" on the other, the boundary of the members being determined by the definition of the group, and that being the parlance of political science the electoral district, ^{constituency} which in turn can take numerous ^{forms} ~~forms of a territorial or of a functional type~~ and can exclude a few or most of the population.

Determining representativeness. What determines the

representation of a group's members and the selection of their formal leaders? Numerous variables do. They may be ^{either} constructed or naturally occurring variables, such as the social composition of the group ^{and} its aggregate attitudes towards ^{personality} types and public issues, ~~etc.~~ In all attempts to influence or study these variables, it must be remembered that every force brought to bear upon "A" will perhaps affect "B", "C", ^{etc.} differently. This ^{obvious} simple fact, ~~known to all~~, has highly complicated meanings for electoral study. The effects of propaganda, for example, ^{although} are difficult to measure, yet ~~that whole set of problems is~~ germane to the study of representation. For a major source of change in representation may be the propagandistic operations of parties contending for the right to be representatives.

If propaganda ^{is} ~~be~~ regarded as stimulus, intended to cause responses favorable to the propagandists on the part of the propagandized (admittedly the represented are continuously being propagandized), the chances of success of the stimulus rest upon its penetration of the more basic norms of the population. If, for example, the expectations and demands of a group are heightened by the winds of an ideology new to its members, or by re-education according to non-traditional principles, increased pressures will be exerted upon those who offer themselves as representatives. The latter will be obliged to respond by messages of a confining, or ^{more likely,}

exhorting nature.

In sum, the study of the representation of a group results from the special algebra of aggregations of individuals. Two theories of representation, one for individuals and the other for groups, are ^{not} necessary. Admittedly, if it is difficult to assess the condition of representation of a single person, extending a set of such single calculi to cover an aggregate of thousands would give findings of dubious validity. Still, counterbalancing and averaging errors of individual estimates permit the result that a statement made about the representation of a group is likely to be no less precise ^{and} or may even be more valid than one made about an individual.

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Representative government

Thus far, we have spoken of individual and group psychology in representation as being affected by subjective and symbolic determinants. There exist as determinants a great number of institutional devices to produce (or restrict) representation. Elections systems, nomination systems, campaigning systems, etc. are the devices. These devices, which may sometimes be called institutions but often are of a relatively minute nature (such as a term of office), are to be construed as recurring sets of similar actions relevant to the relation of representation -- ¹/_M habitual, routine, predictable, and enforced by specialized personnel. There is no need, therefore, to separate the study of representative government

Representation theory

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from the study of representation.

A group of institutional devices intended to produce a high level of representation in a population may be called representative government. Historically, many governments have been representative, without being representative governments, since the conditions for representation may be "ideal" without the employment of devices. One can readily point to direct democracies, which have existed in many times and places -- the ancient Greek cities, ^{classical Greece} black Africa, the Italian cities of ancient, medieval, and early modern times, the Teutonic tribes, and the New England town meetings. They need not be defended as models of representation in order to accept the premise that their peoples received on the average as much ~~or more~~ ^{or more than} representation as other peoples have received under representative governments. Actually, were it not for the fact that a largely mythical distinction is made between "true" representative government and "direct democracy", we should lump the two together ^{because} on grounds not only of the effects produced ^{also because} but of guiding principles and the machinery of choice (elections) and control employed in both: the Athenian lottery brought forth officers who were supposed to represent ^{the citizens} in the same sense as the election of presidents today.

More bothersome to theory is the absence of the devices of representative government in certain groups where a high degree of over-all representation exists, such as Nazi Ger-

many $\frac{1}{m}$ between 1935 and 1942 $\frac{1}{m}$ Augustan Rome, ^{and} ~~or~~ Napoleonic France, and, worse, the apparent absence of representation in certain representative governments, such as the United States under John Adams, ^{and} ~~or~~ the Soviet Union under Stalin.

Institutional devices.

(B) What is the nature of this cluster of devices $\frac{1}{m}$ nomination, apportionment, election, ballots, campaigns, etc. $\frac{1}{m}$ that is called representative government? Theoretically they have to be regarded as procedural constructions intended to form representation in a desired way. Thus, an apportionment that follows local cultural boundaries is expected to produce representatives colored by local ideas, and one that cuts across boundaries in a nearly random way is supposed to suppress established localism. A single-member district system with ^{in which} a majority or plurality vote determining the winning candidate is expected to accentuate the majority sentiment of each district; ~~if such exists~~ whereas a multi-member district with ^{in any} a limited vote, by which a considerable minority sentiment is bound to elect at least one candidate, is a device intended to enrich legislative discussion by presenting opposing views from ~~among~~ ^{the} same constituencies.

Thousands of such variant election systems might exist, ^{there are in fact} ~~even~~ ^{al-} though, because of imitative forces, ~~mere~~ ^{mere} hundreds ~~do in fact exist~~. Only the fool or ideologue insists that one system is the only system of representative government. Indeed, as we have indicated, it is impossible to show that represen-

tative government produces a strikingly larger representation of the population than other forms of government. However, ~~whatever the difference in history and today,~~ as representative government becomes more understood, and more controllable, its devices may be arranged to produce with fair accuracy the fuller representation of whom^{ever} the system is set up to represent.

It is important to stress that the devices of representative government are not all things to all people. They help certain people to get more representation, and this is performed almost always at the expense of someone else's representation. ~~Hence the path from non-representation to representation is never straightforward and for everyone.~~ Each successive change in history (and in the great many short-term cycles of history that occur from year to year in contemporary society) has meant a redefinition of who is "worth" representing in a people. At every turn of the road, then ~~and now,~~ ^{always} attitude, procedure, and device go together, ~~the~~ one often canceling out the effect of ^{an} ~~the~~ other. For instance, the kind of representation available to American state citizens from ^{their} state legislatures was changed by court order in Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964) to provide districts of equal population, but simultaneously the total representativeness of the legislatures was, perhaps temporarily, reduced when many unfamiliar candidates presented them-

selves to the people. In a more permanent way, perhaps, the political power of rural and small city areas was cut down. (For other effects of these cases on the condition of representation, see de Grazia 1963). Disturbing a set of relations that is premised upon awareness and acquaintanceship can easily reduce representation in the very setting where new devices are intended to promote it.

Thus the devices of Italian and German representation were modified after World War I to permit more accurate manifestations of public opinion in the legislatures. Proportional representation was employed, for example. Some of the effects were as foreseen, but the largest effect of the innovations was to promote a contrary form of representation, based upon the Duce and Führer principles, i.e., direct, controlled representation of the ~~mass~~ of people, emphasizing uncontrolled, "unrepresentative" activity on behalf of the mass (Hermens 1941). In quite another way, far from "strengthening the state legislatures" as the Supreme Court and associated opinions asserted, the aforementioned 1962 and 1964 American cases could perhaps hasten the decline of federalism and, within the states, diminish the role of the legislature in relation to the governor.

These instances permit a proposition about changes in representation. Representation is broader than the devices that regulate it. Classical speculation and debate over rep-

resentation^{here} almost always looked upon representation as a linear scale relation: a device would^{either} increase or diminish representation. This is true, or can be made to be true, ~~if~~ ^{is simplified} simplifying the question that operationally defines the relation. For example, one may ask, "Do you feel more or less represented today than five years ago?" Alternatively, representation can be confined, usually unconsciously, to a certain kind of issue: "Has your representative followed your wishes with respect to voting on the budget?" A man with an atomistic view of society may consider this an adequate test of whether representation exists. However, many changes in representation could occur^{that} ~~which~~ would not be tapped by this question^{such}, and therefore would not be measured at all, and might lead to a false general interpretation.

One must conclude that the burden of plotting and mapping the effects of disturbances and changes in most devices of representation is too heavy for contemporary political science to bear and far too heavy for the much more limited rationality of practical politics. Though each institutional device can be perceived to carry certain effects, such effects are not well-known, either scientifically or in applied politics. ^{if} its individual effects can be predicted, its indirect effects when taken as part of a system of devices cannot^{be} ~~predicted~~ the coming of other changes cannot be foreseen either, and these may be of a character so gross as to overwhelm

the effects of the initial change.

Representation is multifaceted. It is a broad relation. To define it otherwise invites continual frustration. To be useful in the traditional scope of its usage, it has to be defined as broadly as the range of expectations that people possess in regard^{in regard to} to the government, and hence, public officials and leaders (Pari passu, representation within all social organizations should be so defined). Since many traits, events, and institutional devices affect the state of representation, the represented is approachable along numerous paths.

It may, therefore, be sensed as only a small loss to him to be deprived of a vaguely familiar, "trivially" occupied district representative, when at the same time, he is receiving a new charge of emotional satisfaction from a physically remote but psychologically near national figure. It is as useless to berate him for shortsightedness, romanticism, and foolishness as to berate any other mystic who shuns the practical. Indeed, this mysticism is more practical, for it costs nothing in self-discipline.

One conclusion about this particular phenomenon may be that only a self-disciplined ruling class, inured to the presences of commanding personalities and individuals of high status, can operate a republic over a long period of time; the mass of the population must succumb sooner or later to

the seductive choice of the great over the petty, majesty over meanness, feeling over calculation. This elite need not be one of birth; ^{it} it can emerge from the great population ^{but} but it must have two traits if it is to function in the bosom of modern mass democracy: (a) it must have a means of maintaining solidarity on the principles of multi-faceted and rationalistic representation despite the surge of the mass of people towards single-executive leadership, and (b) it must have the skills to govern the masses.

The crisis of representation in the twentieth century has been precisely the inability of the old ruling class that created the rich fabric of representation to maintain its solidarity and guide the whole population. ^{Thus} ~~Whereupon~~ in Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain, Japan, Argentina, and France, to name only the important catastrophic cases, the exaltation of executive representation overcame the intricate and ramified system that had developed.

Today, after the historical experience provided by these cases, public opinion seems in a less dangerous state. Yet the United States and the Soviet Union both face permanent crisis over the mode of representation to be provided their populations. The Soviet Union depends upon an ideological elite party to ward off Stalinism. ^{single-executive dictatorship} The United States depends upon a complicated legalistic set of representative devices, and localized parties and elites. Neither is safe; neither

is advancing towards the vision of representation, developed according to humanistic principles, whereby, as John Dewey described it, a citizen lives a life of enriching communion with his fellow men in an associational society (1927^{cf.} Follet¹⁹¹⁸). (C)

The vision of a pluralistic or "mobilistic" system that represents plural types of men and plurally complicated persons, stands in sharp contradiction to the idea of monolithic, primitive, emotional representation via the central person^{or hero} of the society. It is this system that might produce the republican elite referred to above as the prerequisite to an enduring democracy. It is, furthermore, a modern concept, quite at home in a multi-group society where "human systems engineering" has become a vigorous part of industrial technology. How to implement it presents many a problem now far beyond the capacities of scientists to ^{solve} ~~devise~~ and politicians to apply. By contrast, the notion of a single-faceted representation by a hero is so powerful in the human subconscious and so much easier to implement, that throughout history it has achieved a far greater popularity.

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