IV

# [redacted] An Examination of Conscience

The theological magazine, Cross Currents, published last fall a remarkable Examination of Conscience for adults. The virtues of this ancient practice, in non-Catholic as well as Catholic settings, suggests its imitation by the Political Science profession.

Political Scientists like to recite the sins of politicians. Indeed some so maliciously enjoy this inculpation that one sees all too apparently in them the "private motive displaced onto public objects and rationalized in terms of the public advantage." Dozens of books, articles, symposia and panels have dwelt upon the morality of officials. The fancy reaches its peak in an elaboration of codes of ethics for public servants.

Expert, external moral criticism of our politicians is in general necessary and good. However, one seeks vainly for a corresponding expert and internal criticism. Do we begin each day, or each week, or each year asking whether we are morally, as well as technically, deficient, as Political Scientists? Do we ever do so? Probably not. It is likely that most of us have never considered whether there was a moral sense appropriate to and peculiar to our profession.

Yet we know, if we think of it, that we have moral problems as teachers of political science. We often commit injustices. For instance, we do not flunk enough students; we let poor students get Ph.D.'s; we play favorites; we resent bright but arrogant students; we discriminate against women students. We deliver lectures to escape from discussing problems with live students; we preserve and increase curricular restrictions; we make it difficult for students to study elsewhere. We escape physically from our students, or we surrender to them by talking football instead of Political Science; we are often unserious, immature, hypocritical, hypercritical, clannish, gossipy; we conduct campus vendettas, and squabble over $50 pay increases. We may even proscribe the works of men we envy, both in our classes and in our writings. We behave like organization men rather than like a community of equal scholars. We play to the crowd, preoccupy ourselves with the university's public relations, trifle away our energies on newspapers and semi-popular magazines and consume the years in superficially relevant civic behavior. We cease to read or to write.

Merely consider all of these faults that lie within us! University administrators will not banish them; no federal aid program will cure them; no inevitable and splendid march of Truth will grind them into the dust.

Consequently, it is forgivable and in order to ask for more self-criticism--even for bare listings of the criteria of self-criticism. PROD will be happy to publish them. Seven hundred years ago Roger Bacon wrote: "It is impossible that the mind should lie calm in the sunlight of truth while it is spotted with evil....virtue clears the mind so that one can better understand not only ethical, but even scientific things."

Editorial from
PROD-ABS Vol. I, no. 4

# 3. A Common Formulation in Politics, Sociology and Economics

**A unified, graphic conceptualization of the key variables of political science, sociology and economics is proposed. Populations (defined as reference groups) should be scored on their individuals' efforts and success at achieving power, respect and goods. The resulting distribution profiles can suggest propositions about relations among economic, social, and political practices. Myths of "demand and expectation" might also be translated into quantitative terms suited for comparison with actual distributions.**

## I. Power, Respect, and Goods Distribution Patterns

Political science, economics, and sociology center each about the study of a major value. In political science, the value of central concern is political power; in economics it is goods; and in sociology it is respect. Important problems of activity and distribution arise concerning these, and give shape to theory and research in each field. A general theory that would unite the three areas of concern by framing data in comparable form and by picturing the significant shapes the data assumes in each case could be useful to general social theory and disciplinary theory alike.

In an unpublished manuscript, this writer tried to define the relations between, and distribution of, political activity and leadership. Activity was considered as efforts toward power, and leadership as possession of power. When a population is scored on such activity and leadership, and the scores are plotted on a graph, they assume the shape of "J" curves (see figure below). The mass was relatively inert and then both activity and leadership curves decelerated very rapidly into the relatively few active and leading individuals. It was shown, too, that these curves indicated a condition sharply opposed to the widespread doctrine of participation and leadership in a democratic society, according




to which high activity and individual, shared leadership were the properties of the many, establishing a mythical J-curve that tends to be the mirror image of the reality curve.

In the suggested general theory of value distributions, power plotted as activity and achievement can be made analogous to the values of goods and respect, both also plotted as activity and achievement. The major hypothesis for the three values togeth-

er is that the achievement of power, goods, and respect is distributed in a pattern that forms J curves; power, goods, and respect activities are patterned in J curves also.

Finally, a third doctrinal curve exists, definable as the Utopian distribution of activity influence within a reference group. This curve has no universal form, and even has no monopoly at a given time in the group. It is a kind of "demand and expectation" curve in which the "sky is the limit" on the one hand, and the de facto curves may be the limit on the other hand. It is constructed by asking a population what they believe should be the distribution of activity and achievement.

From the shapes of this trio of curves might be deduced important laws of political science, economics, and sociology. Most major principles of the several disciplines relate to them. Furthermore the interrelation of the fields is exhibited in them and may be deducible from their being applied to complex situations involving the several values. In addition, the curves point the way for uniting many now disconnected researches, lending them hypothesis, judgments of importance, and direction.

## II. Criteria and Method

An understanding of the theory requires first a definition of key terms in studying activity and achievement, a set of criteria for discovering and scoring evidences of activity and achievement, and a general method for presenting the materials for analysis and generalization.

Several terms will be used to connote the major variables under study. They may be placed in the following matrix (see table below):

| | Power | Respect | Goods |
|---|---|---|---|
| Activity | Politism | Sociability | Work |
| Achievement | Leadership | Prestige | Income |
| Doctrine | | | |
| concerning Activity | $D_p$ | $D_s$ | $D_w$ |
| concerning Achievement | $D_l$ | $D_{pr}$ | $D_i$ |

Activity is measured by criteria referring to these dimensions and includes evidence and indications that person "A" is acting role $A_r$ regarding subject $A_{rs}$ with force that mobilizes $A_f$ part of his disposable energies at time 1. The achievement of A is measured by the comments of other role sharers as to his relative effects within the group or by external objective estimates of his relative position with respect to the value within the group among the role sharers.

A major step forward obtains when "A" (and all other actors) can be scored on activity and achievement. The conditions under which "A" may be said to have scores in activity and achievement are: that his role be ascertained for the scoring, that cross-references and conflicts of group belonging be taken into account, that his scores be relative to other rolesharers' scores and not be regarded as absolute (that is, his score is most valid if the curve of activity and influence scores in the group is known), and so on for his score in all other reference groupings in terms of which he acts. Some of the reference roles encountered in political study are the nation, party, neighborhood, or veteran's group (in its political frame). Some refer-

ence groups for activity and achievement directed at goods might be occupation or sub-occupation, shop or work group, local market, national market, international market, family (limited or enlarged to relatives and historically) (in its economic capacity), board of a corporation, executive committee, professional or trade association, regulatory body, agency, possibly many others not formally directed at income. Reference groups for respect activities and respect achievement might be the whole nation as perceived, town, ethnic group, religious group, racial group, occupational group, work groups, family, sporting circles.

Once we have collected the profiles of populations, we can develop principles (1) from an analysis of the shape of the curves; (2) from analysis of the empirical or postulated shifts of the curves: e.g., height of modes on ordinate, change in slopes, and shifts to right or left; and (3) from analysis of special shifts of related reference (role) aggregates.

## III. Types of Emergent Problems

Several kinds of problems that should be studied with the help of this general formulation may be exemplified.

Suppose we find that the profile of Work in the U. S. A. has become more skewed over the past century. Suppose then that the distribution of income in the past century has become less highly skewed. That is, in the case of work, the few work more and the mass less, and in income, the few get less and the mass more. Will the leadership curve have been changed the one way or the other in the interim? The politism curve? Is this a universally discoverable connection between goods activity and goods income? What types of "demand and expectation" or myth curves must have been experienced?

According to Pareto, myths (derivations) are functions of ascendent or incumbent elites and are not independently important. Does this mean that doctrinal curves can be plotted as incidents or consequences of the reality curves? Would this supposed dependence of doctrinal curves on activity and achievement curves be validated by such manageable cases as might be uncovered? Also can a considerable portion of political doctrine be usefully defined in terms of expectations and demands regarding activity and achievement?

Suppose a modal doctrine of a society or other role-collectivity asserts equal and high economic activity (work) and equal income, but work and income are not equally distributed or normally distributed. Is there a shift to other doctrines of goods? Is there a change in other doctrines of power and respect, and in their actual distribution patterns?

Suppose work and income exhibit J curves and it is shown that the correlation between the individual scores of the activity and achievement curves is low. Will the myth then be "economic activity is demeaning and irrelevant"? Are power and respect more important values under such conditions?

Suppose the work curve is much nearer the normal than the income curve: What will the doctrine be: aristocratic? redistributive?

Suppose the work curve is J and the income curve is normal. What will the myth be? "From each according to ability, to each according to his needs"? Perhaps the family is an example of this condition and doctrine.

Some trouble was experienced in the study of the distribution of political activity and leadership because of the existence of involuntary as well as voluntary refer-

ences, involuntary roles being roles that an individual is compelled to adopt, either by informal or formal sanctions, as in government or a business organization. Probably activity scores in involuntary organizations will be only slightly correlated with achievement scores. In considering respect configurations, could we expect sociability scores to be randomized in relation to prestige scores? Would the activity or sociability scores form a normal curve?

Certainly the concept of sanctions will play a large part in explaining changed relationships of curves and changed shapes of curves as we transfer our attention from voluntary to involuntary reference. But sanctions would be both cause and effect. Indeed the type and intensity of sanctions employed in a group may be a definable function of the several major curve relationships within the group and/or the difference between these relationships within the group and the prevailing, dominant pattern of curves in outside groups.

## IV. Possible Early Successes

To satisfy the voracious appetite of the above theory for data is presently an impossible task. However, the following steps could be taken to advance the empirical character of the theory and to justify its general utility.

A certain amount of quantitative data already exists regarding distributions of activity and achievement in politics, economy, and society. There are some surveys of political activity and leadership, of income distributions, of work-rating in organizations (industriousness), and of social class configurations. These should be collected, put into the framework of the theory and analyzed for tentative statements of relation.

A considerable number of qualitative descriptions of activity and achievement conditions are to be found in behavioral science and fictional writings. Many historical writings, a number of classics of political science such as the books of Pareto, Tilgher, Simmel, and Michels, and various intensive anthropological reports bear evidence that would support or undermine relevant hypotheses.

Some tests or experiments might be devised to guide the theoretical development. For instance, a panel of judges might be recruited to give opinions on the condition that would result from certain postulated distributions. They might be given a list of possible conclusions to check and asked questions such as the following: "In a society or group in which the few have high income and the many low, what is likely to be the dominant myth of the society regarding the distribution of work and income, provided that the average person in the society works at a moderate rate and values money moderately?" The panel might even be provided with a set of curves and asked to draw a "missing curve."

The theory in partial form (concerning political power) has been used by this writer for teaching purposes. A gap between its promulgation and detailed validation need not deprive it of immediate heuristic value, especially since social theory is poor in devices for promoting integrative and precise thought. Moreover, there is a possibility of developing through the theory a general model of social action that will compete rather successfully for the scarce data that is provided for all models, whatsoever their nature.

--Alfred de Grazia
Princeton, New Jersey

# 15. EDITORIAL: What is Political Behavior?

Some men who are referred to as Jews rarely call themselves such, because, at the same time that they are proud of the fact, they see nothing but misunderstanding in the semantics of the name. Some men, in the present instance the editor, have the same attitude toward the term "political behavior." Though we have been called a "political behaviorist" frequently, we rarely call ourselves one.

Political behavior is not quantification of political propositions: the extreme "right" derives a malicious pleasure from asserting so in order to demolish theoretical advances, while the extreme "left" suggests this in order to be intellectual bohemians.

Nor, for that matter, is any specific effort at new method in political study to be termed political behavior. For, if so, most quantitative studies of voting behavior would be excluded because they are tiresome repetitions of 25-year-old techniques. Nor is it the fulfillment of the theories of the behaviorist school of psychology, to which, in our mind, it would be fatal for political scientists to subscribe.

Political behavior is not realism, as opposed to idealism or falsehood. Indeed, some works reputed to be of the species, political behavior, are far more abstract than the traditional books on the same subject. Furthermore, some of the writings of "political behavior" realism are nothing but gross distortions of reality, the ashcan school of political literature, responsible for such perennial idiocies as the belief in the pervasiveness of boss rule in American local government.

Nor is political behavior an empiricism that contrasts with a deductive political science. Who among the "behaviorists" can match the empiricism of L. D. White's administrative histories? Who can match the deductiveness of Lasswell's theory of values and classifications of political practices?

Neither is political behavior the study of voting behavior. Here the trick of the "right" is to limit by definition: Let one course in political behavior suffice for a department because "Who needs more than one course on how people vote?"

Furthermore, we would not be true to our theory of language --nor would we have much effect-- if we said that "political behavior" is this or that.

Therefore, we merely prefer that political behavior be regarded as nothing save political science as some of us would like it to be. Any other view is more a hindrance than a help to political science.

Then might political behavior be a type or set of types of subject matter: party discipline, social stratification, political roles, decision-making, elites, rank-orders J-curves, policy science, informal organization, attitude-clusters, power, human relations? Behind these names lie fields of age-old interest to political scholars; in themselves the names may mean only a striving for a new grasp on the subject, or worse, a desire to make a wind tunnel to simulate rapid progress.

Is political behavior a question of interdisciplinary study, so that whatever work cites a sister social science is ipso facto qualified? Then the ticket of admission is cheap indeed, and, for those who do not even wish to pay the trifle, counterfeits are free.

We do not deny that some excellent political scientists and good students have rallied under the term, to the gain of political science as a whole. However, apart from the ethical question of using means that create important misunderstandings as a by-product, this practice may only serve to isolate the progressive element in the profession.

We think, therefore, that "political behavior" can be a mask for somebody with a claim or gripe. It can furbish the propaganda of academic struggles. It can collect crowds, paltry as scholarly crowds are. It bears the same relation to political science as the term "behavioral science" does to social science--a synonym in fact, a propaganda tactic otherwise. Whoever wants to make more of it is welcome to do so, and may use our columns for the purpose. But we advise one and all to forebear the distinction so that we can apply ourselves to the greater task of creating a better political science on whatever subject and with whatever skill and imagination we may command.

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IV

# [redacted] Academic Impasse

If a professor were permitted to be a scholar and a gentleman he might spend his time like this: He would teach six hours a week and use twelve to prepare his presentations. He would keep abreast of the tide of literature by reading five books a month; two would be new books, three would be old; if he read thirty pages an hour, he would require about eleven hours a week for the task. Then twenty-five new and five old articles would need study each month, consuming seven hours a week. The New York Times and two weekly magazines would take up about nine and a half hours. His creative literary work would consist of preparing syllabi and other instructional materials (one hour a week), and writing one article (250 hours), one book review (twenty hours), and about thirty pages (thirty days) of The Book, per year. Thus far our professor has used up 52-1/2 hours of the 168 hours in a week.

Since our professor's university is one of the best (viz. six hours of teaching), his additional duties are minimal. An hour a week for MA and one-half hour for PhD students, one hour for grading papers, two hours in committee work, one hour for personal typing, one hour of extra appearances before students and outside groups, three hours visiting with students, and two hours of professional correspondence and activities. Our scholar has now given up sixty-four hours.

Today field research is important. Our professor--alone, with a colleague, with his students--would be engaged yearly in at least one small field research project leading to the publication of an article. Whether it is spread out or is concentrated in the summer, an average of five hours a week per annum will go into it. Our man's week is now sixty-nine hours long.

So far no gentleman he. But then he belongs to a church (two hours), spends time with his family (fourteen hours), reads "broadening literature" such as novels (one hour), and listens to music (one hour). He has to spend two hours in commuting. Being an active citizen takes another hour.

Recreation and two weeks of vacation had best be counted as substitutes for some of the tasks of the academic year, for we are already up to ninety hours a week. Perhaps the family will not feel neglected if some eating time is counted as family time. But still at least five eating hours must be added. Seven hours are not excessive for personal care, nor two hours for housework and one for gardening. We settle at 105 hours per week, leaving sixty-three hours for sleep and many other activities.

Under the circumstances, any interest he might have in the problems of leisure in modern society is academic and altruistic. So persistent are the extra non-scholarly demands, that only the rarest scholar can live on this minimum intellectual level for more than a few years. Thus illness, romancing, raising infants, holding a government or private position, engaging in politics (including engaging in campus politics), heavier teaching loads (at eight schools out of ten), being a "pal" to the students, having an avocation or regular sport, army service, hyper-broad reading habits, and conviviality, will singly and together cancel out many years of an academic life.

Yet some minimum number of years, say ten, must go into this schedule or a better one in order to create a scholar, if he be such other than by fiat. Therefore, inevitably, only a platoon of men will be productive and informed scholars in a generation and these men must typically be so eccentric as to justify the populace's stereotype of the intellectual and scientist.

The highly touted planned society can hardly redeem the situation--as by wooing productive scholars into foundation and government jobs, or by convening endless committees to manage the planned reforms. The scholar himself can do much more, primarily by not trying to be a gentleman. He might also make himself repugnant to whoever steals his time--college committees, public officials, ladies' clubs, student social groups. (But so strong is the desire for charitable relations, that he may devote even more time to fringe groups composed of repugnant friends.) He might join a holy order, but God takes up more time than his wife would. He might form a bread-and-butter union to strike for higher pay and shorter hours, but this would be unscholarly. He might inherit or marry into a fortune; we highly recommend this step. But best of all is the policy of drift--let come what will come; a man can be decent and prosperous if his incompetency is in the order of things.

Editorial from Vol. II, no. 1 PROD-ABS

TV

# First Things First in Methodology

[redacted]

The aborigine who sports a top hat while stirring a witching brew is laughable. But so is the primitive in the social sciences who caps himself with some odd or end of advanced technique.

Perhaps it is factor analysis or calculus, laboriously learned late in life. Or it may be a set of courses in scaling, testing, and questionnaire construction. Or it may be "methods of group observation," or "model-building," or the construction of index numbers, perhaps even game theory, econometrics, or sociometry. All of these are intended to bring, and certainly contribute something to, proficiency in the "new political science." Therefore, all too often, the ambitious, if callow, scholar leaps for the "new methodology."

Two troubles ensue. Political data do not and cannot lend themselves easily, and rarely lend themselves completely, to management by the new techniques. Also, more fundamental and more generally useful skills are left to chance attainment. Yet the major faults of political research, writing, and teaching begin with failures in the older and more universal methodology of social science.

In the first place, all students of government should be able to understand and use the concepts of epistemology and semantics. The meaning of meaning is a crucial question in the critique of world history; it is also important in the coining of questions in a political poll.

A great many more young sophisticates have read a text on statistical methods than have read Cohen and Nagel's *Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*. Yet logic has a larger place in our science than statistics. For instance, the ability to translate from one classification system to another and to build new classifications is an essential skill. Often a classification can be statistically executed, but the statistics themselves are an evolution from logic.

Another vital area of political methodology is the choice of subjects to study and the creation of hypotheses about them. Here many behavioral scholars are weakest. They would be hard put to explain why they would choose to study one rather than another of any pair of subjects taken at random from the infinite population. By the same token, many political scientists and their students rely upon no explicit means of evaluating the relevance of data or of determining whether they are important or applicable in the context of a proposition. Nor can they form and mold hypotheses as tools of inquiry. They cannot even draft propositions of the "true-false" type (which are a better test of the examiner than of the person being tested).

Still other misfortunes come from our neglect of orderliness and style. If book publishers were not so polite or mercenary, they would boycott social scientists. Most publications read as if people were to be forced to read them (partly true), or to read them not at all (also true).

Surely there must be a department or college so bold as to insist upon its students acquiring these fundamental tools of political thought and research. We need a deep inquiry into the methodological aspirations, failures, and needs of political study, if we are to raise a superior new generation of experts on government. The study must begin at the beginning, must be idealistic, must go down into the grammar school and high school, where the social studies, no less than the natural studies, begin. Unless we appreciate how innocently savage are the minds of our adult graduate students in political science, we will continue to expect something great of them if they will "take a course or two in statistics." If we *do* appreciate their predicament, we can lay a solid methodological foundation for political science that will formally introduce the old techniques to the new, and unite them wholesomely.

IV

# The Environment of Political Science

(from Editorial)

Political scientists dwell haplessly in the border marches of human science, suffering from domestic and foreign turmoil. Our external environment seems particularly to be pressing for attention now.

The National Science Foundation has just determined that it will support social science other than Political Science. So we must decide whether to combat this theoretically illogical policy or to turn to Congress or another group for independent recognition. *PROD'S* view is that the policy-science portion of all social sciences may be best sustained in an autonomous position connected to the legislative branch of government. (I, 5, May '58, 42-3).

Opportunities for travel and residence abroad will continue to multiply, tending to disorganize faculties and deprive students at home. Inquiry is needed on the optimal size of Political Science groupings, into the dogma of the "balanced department," and into curricula that produce inter-university barriers by monopolizing students.

Research opportunities will also continue to expand. How can justice be done to teaching? How can we avoid giving over teaching to those who cannot tolerate research? How can inquiry be freed of dictation by sponsoring groups?

Classrooms will be more crowded. Teaching standards in most schools will deteriorate. More foreign students, coming under political auspices, will become the enervating wards of our faculties. Government funds will add ever more mediocre students to a student body that is, in Political Science at least, already too low in quality. (Even now, departments that boast of getting better students might correctly brag of their increased ability to bribe students away from other schools and departments.) Can the profession resist the trend to keep Johnny in school until he has fathered a typical American family?

Legislative investigating committees are not now threatening, and political scientists might examine this weapon's possibilities when its muzzle is turned the other way: governmental secrecy snatches the "specimens" from under our "microscopes"; radio and TV need constant testing of their bizarre notions of the public interest; good studies of executive agencies are as rare as whooping cranes.

No cure for the cramp in publishing is in prospect. An idea or monograph should be publishable if it will appeal to 500 responsible persons. But no commercial publisher can use this formula. Most university presses are replicas of the commercial houses. Seeking an outlet for one's writing is so burdensome and time-consuming that the APSA itself should provide an authors' agency for its members.

External professional communications need attention. Intelligent criticism of the other social sciences should occupy more political scientists. Our policy science function would demand this presumptuous effort.

We need more systematic data-gathering, translation facilities and intelligence-sorting machinery. Quick and cheap means of knowing what is going on, and of tuning in to desired activities, are required.

Should all of these environmental problems be solved at the convention of political scientists next week, we would return with a list of internal problems in the next number of *PROD*.

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IV

# Should "Policy Science" Take the Stage?

(AN EDITORIAL)

Each social science has an aspect that may be called policy science. One can maintain that political science's only authentic and unambiguous mission is to synthesize these portions of social science. Moreover, it may be asserted that the next general task of political science should be to develop policy science.

The scope and method of policy science have been set forth most ably by Harold D. Lasswell, and indeed no one else seems to have used his concept fully. Some affirm that we have always studied public policy and little else. Others call the concept mere verbiage. And many empiricists feel uncomfortable in the presence of a thing so close to political ethics. It is notable that the book called *The Policy Sciences,* though valuable, is barely concerned with the study of the policy orientation. Moreover, we know of no courses that go by such a title.

Furthermore, it would appear strange to advocate policy science inasmuch as contemporary policy science is reacting against the old concentration upon public affairs. But the reaction has really been against legalism, against propaganda, against ethical confusion, against a lack of system, of science and of empiricism. Few would deny that public policy itself was a primary concern.

So the new policy science must begin with a belief that a level of method and theory have been reached that will permit a new preoccupation with policy to prosper without losing the values of science. Recent work on decision-making, the increased sophistication of elite theories, and the methods of case studies and sociometry assure more substance to the policy approach.

The risks are great. We may not have the ability now to improve the state of policy science and may cause a general decline in science in the attempt. But the emphasis upon interest groups as sources of theory is wearying. What don't we know about them, and more important, are we in the least likely to find it out? Little fundamental fact and theory are coming from sample surveys *per se:* we need more and more data on people's habits, but it may be the policy science approach that would make best use of the data.

How policy is made seems broader than these subjects and probably is more important as potentially applied science. If we could say in operational language how public policy is made then we could do better toward its making. Political science could then become more like the master science that Aristotle claimed it to be. Its impact on society would be greater, its practitioners more influential, its students and devotees more numerous and intelligent.

It is not sheer ambition that supports this hope; there is some evidence that the respect with which a science's problems are treated determines the general accomplishments of the science as science. So went the career of theology and metaphysics, so went mechanics, both celestial and mundane, so have gone psychology and economics. Let no one be fooled by the romantic agony that summoned great literature from garrets: Byron, Proust, d'Annunzio, Gide, Joyce and O'Neill cut great swaths in life. They had coteries and petticoats, fame and fortune sufficient unto the occasion.

To think that political science will become great if only because it is held in contempt and cares for problems no one is interested in is to fall victim to the beatnik *weltanschauung.* "Until philosophers are kings, or kings . . . have the spirit and power of philisophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils. . . ."



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IV

# No Prescription Without Diagnosis

(AN EDITORIAL)

The clear distinction often has tactical defects, but logically it remains: in practical affairs, man speaks the language of applied science or that of rhetoric. If he plays the scientist, he follows certain rules of expression, such as "no prescription without diagnosis."

An engineer does not build a bridge without surveying the site; a physician does not prescribe medicine without examining the patient; a social scientist does not advise greater economy without investigating the problem for which economy is to be the remedy.

*Does not* probably had better read *should not*, for political scientists. They are prone to prescribe first and investigate later. A professor will say "delegate work" without reference to what work and whose work; he will say "more people should vote" without reference to the community at issue; he will urge the "merit system" on every type of government. Several explanations of this behavior may be advanced.

One is that social science is so advanced that it does not need the aid of empirical study of the unique case for which the cure is needed. But save in a few areas, there is no evidence of this perfection.

Another is that social science is strong in general principles, weak on specifics. It knows that most delinquency comes from the environment, but not the source of specific cases of delinquency; therefore it will make sense in general but not in the particular. This is nonsense, since its big failures are as common as its small ones.

A third is that social science language makes it merely seem as if diagnosis has been omitted. Sometimes a man knows the case at hand but speaks of it in the abstract, as when, knowing that a bank in trouble needs more honest officers to get more depositors, he declares that all bankers need to be honest.

A fourth is that social scientists may not or cannot speak in a complicated, quantified language and therefore do not express different probabilities. They say, "City manager government is good for Pawtucket," without knowing anything about Pawtucket, and really mean, "Sixty per cent of all towns could use the manager plan well," or "The manager plan is good for anyone who is rich and only interested in money and I use his preference system."

Still another is that the scientist is deluded concerning one or more of the above. That is, he doesn't know how bad the condition of his applied science is.

Also, social scientists may regard themselves as rhetoricians, guardian angels, as Authorities, as powers, as circus players, etc., and as such are all alike. They consider an applied-science approach a silly thing. They express themselves in the guise of scientists to achieve other goals.

Furthermore, they may be so regarded by their audiences and cannot resist the pressure to be unscientific. "If the ladies' society wants an endorsement from an Authority, why not provide it and make the girls happy?" In any event, he may be sure his advice will not be heeded and he need not be responsible. He will not be paid $1,000 or $10,000, either, to study the particular problem before giving advice on it.

Finally, he may dream of a thoroughly correct applied science, but cannot hope to find the data to guide his generalizations. World government, war and peace, capitalism and federal aid to education are big problems that invite wild formulae.

Under these circumstances, every policy scientist (and every applied social scientist) must commit many an offense against science in his lifetime. But to know the reasons therefor suggests how to relieve the habit: reject popularity; specify, and identify with, one's clients; apply the rules and language of science; state the indeterminacy of the counsel; and, by all means, try to examine the patient before prescribing the cure.

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# The Reform of Publishing

( AN EDITORIAL)

From beginning to end, publishing today is miserably astraddle medievalism and commercialism. Its rationale and organization are obstacles to research and scholarship.

In a quip that few bothered to understand, Robert M. Hutchins once said that we should give the college diploma to anyone who applied and paid a fee. We are reminded of this when we consider the problems of "scholarly" publication. Since today almost anyone can publish his ideas, and often the quality of the work is inversely proportional to its easy publishability, we must also say: "We should publish anything a scholar wants to publish, no questions asked." Let any social scientist who has the nerve to write be assured that his writing will be available to those who might be interested in his ideas. Let him bear the praise or blame, as he will in any case.

There would be no waiting while overworked editors read a study and arrive at a questionable decision about it, no need to pretend that many of the heavy costs of publishing are more than a waste, no reworking of a piece to satisfy the eccentricities of a succession of journals and publishers. We venture to say that no decline in the quality of writing overall would be apparent, and only a moderate increase in quantity. (Consider that currently much bad writing is done to persuade academic superiors of a person's merit. If *anyone* could be published, this spurious activity might diminish.)

Suppose the several journals that form the bulk of a discipline's publishing joined their resources, and set up an inexpensive format, in loose-leaf, with standard typefaces and sizes. Counting on a continuous flow of manuscript, a most efficient printing operation could be set up. Whatever manuscript came in would be printed, if its author said it was ready to go. Books and monographs could be handled in the same way. Can anyone familiar with printing and publishing doubt that this complete enterprise would involve less cost than present professional publishing? Are not the present expensively bound, miscellaneous collections of studies an anachronism and an enemy of orderly research?

How should we account for differing demands? First by permitting each author of the group only a certain number of copies free. He might either designate the recipients or instruct the center to fill all requests until his quota was exhausted. Meanwhile, all members of the group would check on a monthly list the items they wanted until a yearly quota was exhausted, after which they would pay for items. No longer would they perforce collect pounds of useless material for every ounce they used. The author could also pay for extra copies, as he does now.

For those who wished a more exotic garb for their work, a central service would reproduce and send any member's work to a list of journals and publishers simultaneously. The first offer received by the author, returned on a standard form accompanying the manuscript, would be accepted. This method would both save the author's energies and time, and hasten publication. Opposition would come from author's agents and publishers, both of whom like to have sole option on a work. However, particularly for scientific writing, their policy is against the author's best interests.

Those not liking either plan may be consoled with the thought that an author would not be bound to the plans and could use traditional channels. Nevertheless, the impact of the two phases of the new plan would be likely to break up many frustrations that serious authors today encounter in persuading others to publish their work, in getting their ideas to the few who might use them, in preserving their time, energy, and money for their principal *raison d'être*—scholarship—, and in cataloging and using the large variety of published materials.

Vol IV

# The Core Course in Political Science: Yak

(AN EDITORIAL)

Naturally, students of social science need not know how to write. Nor must even philosophy students be required to think.

But students in sociology learn that society has depth, and in economics how to deduce the behavior of too few and unempirical variables beautifully to the *n*th (or $n_1$ . . . *n*th) degree; psychology students can test anything at all, and even nothing at all, for significance. Anthropologists are taught to observe with the passion and memory of the *voyeur*. And, we may assert pridefully, no students except those of political science learn to Yak.

The noun, Yak, refers to the field of learning in which non-systematic and irrelevant oral expression is devoted to serious topics superficially defined.

Now it must not be thought that Yak provides material only for a freshman course. The political science student must take Yak 1, Yak 2, and Yak 3 to Yak *n*, depending upon the university attended and the final degree achieved. It is the core course, equivalent to six years of mathematics for the mathematics student, six years of French for the French scholar, and six years of piano instruction for the would-be concert pianist.

There is an obvious difference, however. Yak is called by various course titles to oblige the several professors specializing in its different forms. Thus, in the freshman year Yak is usually called American Government 1-2; as the years pass it typically progresses through courses with heavy concentrations in citizenship, civics, current problems of politics, civil liberties, and international relations.

The candidate for the Ph.D. in Yak is a pleasure to observe at his oral examinations; he has by this time managed not only to get straight "A" grades in all the courses in Yak, but he has been guest speaker at numerous youth councils, businessmen's lunches, local political party groups, and coffee hours. He has lent his effervescent presence to model U.N.'s, mock parliaments, and student governments, and has also been a fellow of the Foundation to Provide Capital Punishment for Non-Voters. He is superb on such subjects as, "If Democracy were Alive Today," "The South and the Negro," "Everyone Should Belong to a Party," and "Politicians are Not as Bad as You Think." It is a shame that on these oral examining occasions he must digress for a moment to defend an abstract, exacting thesis, with a title such as, "Soviet and American Ideas in the March Debates over Guatemala as Reported in the Swiss Press."

No wonder, then, that our students should be in such great demand afterwards. They can be placed wherever job-descriptions cannot be agreed upon, and in an emergency a position can always be found for them in Yak 1-2.

ABS Vol. III, no. 6

# A Pluralist Approach to Research Support

(AN EDITORIAL)

Who threatens good and free research? In this issue of *PROD*, a Civil Liberties Union subcommittee warns of business and the federal government. We look back in history and say, "Everyone in sight, including the academicians themselves." Deans and Presidents are primordial enemies of scholarly independence. But abstract principle needs more distance; so the theory of academic freedom was scared from professorial throats by "outside" rulers of universities—by kings, clerics, and powerful boards. Legislatures, first State and now federal too, succeeded to royal powers. And today we must contend with modern business corporations and foundations.

Questions of power are tied to problems of support. It is further stated that research is either under-financed or over-financed, and in either case is a victim of misallocation of resources.

We share these beliefs in their *general form*: many good sectors of study are starved; many are pampered; and to errors of judgment are added the unbalances caused by lack of plan, whether by the "invisible hand" or the "iron fist." We emphasize, however, "in their general form." That is, a lot of nonsense is being spoken on the essential wickedness of one or another agency of society. To oppose foundations for interfering in university business assumes that universities ought to be sealed containers or that university administrators are ordinarily righteous and brilliant but weak, both patent absurdities. There is no question that government agencies of all types are aiding education and research, imposing restrictions, influencing priorities, and otherwise disturbing a certain previously existing equilibrium: of what value to indict this relationship in itself? As for business corporations (and labor unions), they interfere too much or too little. They usually specify highly applied projects, or give grants, as foundations do, "to keep the ball rolling." They should think more about what they want their money to do. (They would learn more, too, and giving as well as receiving should be educative.)

We are convinced that education and research will gain if all elements of the community assist and criticize their enterprises. We say that educators forget too readily the degree to which their work is hampered by their own university. They readily fall victim to the vacuity at the bottom of the doctrine of academic freedom. They still display the worn-out socialist (and pre-capitalistic) bigotry that business is by nature corrupt.

We assert furthermore that research and education need support from all sides. If commercial corporations, non-profit agencies such as unions and welfare groups, foundations, local, State, federal, and international governments, and wealthy and energetic individuals want somehow to give and receive from the institutions of education, they should be obliged. A relation with one of them alone would be disastrous. Their variety, number, and counterbalancing forces compose society's structural support of education. Together they give us a valid possibility of freedom through pluralism where this may matter most — in the building of men, ideas, and knowledge. How well the particular bargains over control and content are struck, and how much the plural forces and the community of knowledge receive from each other, are a measure of the worth of university administrators and scholars. Inasmuch as we presume to teach others the ability to choose and reject, we should welcome the challenge to do likewise ourselves.

IV

# Law and Behavior: A Unified Approach to their Study

*In seeking a position from which all political phenomena might be viewed, political scientists are frequently blocked by the intransigence of legal materials. Some scientists impatiently consign legal data to the age of alchemy. Most of the same people, probably for similar reasons, banish values as unfit company to behavioral science. Certainly those who attend strictly to behavior without concern for evaluational and legal contexts can answer questions that for long were buried beneath social and legal myth. Yet this primitive progress of political science should not continue indefinitely. New modes of assimilating legal and evaluative data are suggested as cures for naive behaviorism.*

It is sometimes claimed that there is an inevitable conflict between the study of legal and behavioral data. This depressing theory grew out of a reaction to the juridical preoccupations of an inadequate political science of some decades ago. Consequently most recent advances in political science have come from without, a development that probably was inevitable. Those who have contributed most to political science have tended to approach their subjects with the prejudices of behavioral or psychoanalytic psychology.

Yet one does not have to reject the problems in order to reject the approach. Narrow behaviorism, although it may justify itself by real advances in several areas and by the confessed desuetude of ancient theories in other areas, encourages the persistence in legal and philosophical study of hostile and inept doctrines, and gives an inappropriate meaning to behaviorism. Behaviorism, if the term has to be used at all, ought to mean science, that is, an attempt to give a parsimonious, generally agreeable, and factual statement of political relationships.

In the view of "behaviorism" or "political behavior," legal and philosophical problems stand on the same ground as problems of elections, political parties, administrative organization, public opinion and the other subjects of political science. Political science studies law in order to discover "behavioral" or "scientific" facts that cannot otherwise be learned. It studies values for the same reason. When legal facts are irrelevant to political inquiry, they should not be studied; judges, lawyers and other principals may perhaps be interested in them.

## Law and Behavior Defined

The law consists of directives to a certain grouping of persons to act in a specified manner lest they be compelled so to act or be punished by public officials. Now whereas behavior is composed of all acts of individuals, one's study of behavior may be limited at any moment to the behavior described in a law. Thus, if a law directs men how to become candidates for office, one may take as his own scope of behavioral study those persons within the purview of this law. The relevant behaviors then would be the actions of men interested in political candidacy.

## Conditions of Perfect Correspondence between Law and Behavior

Under certain conditions a perfect relationship might exist between law and behavior, as follows:



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| | | BEHAVIORAL SPHERE | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | (3) Implied Behavioral Directive (Applied Science of Behavior) | (4) Behavioral Statement from Observation |
| LEGAL SPHERE | (1) Legal Directive<br>(2) Implied State of Lawfulness | To achieve $A_1$, do $x_1$ | All men who have achieved $A_1$ have done $x_1$ |

The conditions of the perfect correspondence are first that $A_1$ (goal) and $x_1$ (action) are defined identically, in all four categories of actions, and, second, that the legal directive is inescapable (*i.e.*, enforcement is complete). Under these conditions, the law is practically behavior. On an empirical first level of science, to know the law would be to know the "science of behavior." And, to adapt this idea to a common worry in pedagogy, one is teaching behavioral science of a sort when one is teaching law. So long as the law rather completely describes behavior, one can teach the law as a model of behavior, using "model" as Max Weber uses the term, to designate an abstractive, heuristic device, rationalizing reality.

## Non-Correspondence Between Law and Behavior

Under other, more usual conditions, the law and behavior differ and the law may be taken only as an indicator of behavior, having unknown validity.

(a) $A_1$ (goal) and $x_1$ (action) are not defined the same in all cases:
—inadvertently;
—because of vagueness in either category;
—because (1) and (2) are too detailed for the purposes for which (3) and (4) are defined;
—because different time and space dimensions are being used for (3) and (4).

(b) The legal directive is escapable.

(c) Additional behavioral statements must be made to describe more fully the legal action $x_1$. If these additional actions are called "y", then the implied behavioral directive becomes: "to achieve $A_1$, do $x_1$ and $y_1$." (Since we are using the law here to define our scope of behavior, we ignore behavioral statements that cover actions a law does not cover.)

Therefore, we see that a perfect correspondence between a legal and behavioral statement may exist when definitions are the same and enforcement is perfect or nearly so. In such cases, law presents no problem in being studied as behavior. We also see that, more frequently, the law as a statement of behavior is insufficient: because the scientist often has reasons for defining an action differently; because the law is escapable and not enforced; and because behavioral statements are richer than the law in explaining what happens in a given case.

## Utility of Law as a Behavorial Hypothesis

But the behavioral scientist should not lose one advantage in gaining another. In deciding to operate according to the hypothesis that the law is almost always and at best a partial indicator of behavior, he should not ignore the problems raised by this very fact. For these problems are some of the most important in political science; they would include these questions, which are implied by the conditions stated above:

(1) Why is behavior sanctioned? Why does every law embrace a "tendency" to become a "natural" law?

(2) What social controls cause legal and behavioral statements to coincide?

(3) What forces and institutions tend to increase the gap between law and behavior?

(4) What ideology underlies and supports the law, when it departs from behavior?

(5) What social or individual utilities tend to maintain the discrepancy between law and behavior?

(6) What are the respective parts played by law ($x_1 + y_1$) as determinants of $A_1$?

In brief, the political scientist who discovers that the transfer of data between law and behavior is not perfect should not abandon the discrepancy as a proof of the irrelevancy of law, but rather accept it as an invitation to the study of crucial political problems. A law is a behavioral hypothesis, at the very least. It suggests that such actions as it describes may exist and it affirms that the actions are important to know about (helping us therefore to select our research problems), since some groups of men have devoted great energy to its enactment.

We translate law into behavioral terms in order to treat of actions excluded from the law or contrary to the law. This development can be seen in American political science where "realistic" political analysis has superseded "legalistic" analysis. We can assert again, however, that the succession has not been rationalized: it has often been an impulsive reaction against formalism and unrealism, without a logic or vocabulary.

Also, law must be translated in order to manipulate the behavioral materials represented by the law with propositions that are based on behavioral universals. Thus, if we wish to generalize about candidacy for public office among diverse cultures, we must select a behavioral concept of candidacy in order to include in our studies important cultures that have no laws of candidacy. As political science loses more of its Western European focus, the translation of law to behavior must move apace.

## How Courts Translate Behavior to Law

Law has been defined strictly here, at face value, for translation into behavior. We ought also to consider a common approach to the study of legal materials that goes beyond the face value of the law and mitigates some of the criticisms of legal study put forward by behavioral science. It is the practice of many courts and legal scholars to search out the origins of laws, the character of their enforcement, and the nature of their consequences when and if enforced; this they do in order to understand the behavior of men *vis-à-vis* the law. Many judges and scholars look behind the laws to their social setting, whether or not their legal philosophies grant or forbid such sociological license. If a case concerns the duty of a State legislature to reapportion legislative districts periodically, the court may well determine from other cases whether the judiciary is "allowed" (by custom, precedent, political circumstances, etc.) to order the legislature to cause such an apportionment. Or, if the behavior of people in an area within the scope of a law has altered from the time of the law's enactment (*e.g.*, early laws establishing the right of Negroes to vote) the courts may use that altered behavior to "alter" the law (*e.g.*, deciding that the early laws canot be now enforced since they have long been out of effect).

Can political science be satisfied with this kind of legal study? In what senses does it obviate the need to translate law into behavior? If I may be allowed to generalize the juridical and research procedure just described, I should put it as follows:

(1) The legal directive used in the cases coming before the courts or juridical scholars takes one of the following forms:

(a) To achieve $A_1$, do $x_1$.

(b) To achieve U do $x_1$ where U is an unknown goal.

(c) To achieve $A_1$ do Q where Q is an unknown action.

(2) The "research" procedure of the courts and juridical scholars is as follows:

(a) In the case of (1a) above: Expose the insufficiency of $x_1$ to achieve $A_1$. That is, employ the formula: To achieve $A_1$ do $x_1$ and $y_1$ where $y_1$ is non-legal behavior. This has already been treated above; and in effect, as we have said, it uses the law to provide the behavioral hypothesis ( defining scope and nature of the behavior), and goes beyond the law to describe the relevant complementary behaviors. As we have pointed out, this is quite adequate for limited purposes, and especially for vocational instruction, but allows "law" to "choose" our political theories.

(b) In the cases of (1b) and (1c) above:

—$A_1$ is missing because: the law is poorly defined, or ambiguous, or the researcher supplies his own value to the law;

—$x_1$ is missing for the same reasons.

Also, in both cases, the researcher may add complementary behaviors (y) to his scope of study. In these cases, the comment made above regarding (1a) applies. In addition, we have new research conditions arising from the probability that the researcher is introducing personal preferences (not of the law nor of a general character) to his study. This is appropriate political science in the case of U, if the preferences are made clear and the distinction made that the law is ambiguous or that the substitute preference is being inserted. In the case of Q, however, the researcher is allowed by the rules of scientific procedure only to estimate how much of Q is $x_1$ and how much y, because the solution of Q is a scientific problem. (It is not permissible, we may add, to enlarge or diminish the scope of the law portion of Q, *i.e.* $x_1$, by preference, because though $x_1$ may be unknown or vague, it is nevertheless a factual problem, not an evaluational one.

To sum up the several preceding paragraphs, therefore, it is believed that those more sophisticated renderings of the law that probe into behavior, represented by the work of such men as Holmes, Cardozo, Brandeis, and Pound, are subject to the conditions of research that were originally stated. They are complex versions of the translation problems treated earlier, and introduce no essentially new problems. The logic of research into law and behavior remains essentially simple. Legal materials do not involve a third language; they are soluble in the languages of axiology and sociology.

## Failure of the Law in Broadened Generalizations

In extending a proposition of political science to cover larger units of time and space, one finds less and less use for law as meaningful statement. It is understandable that anthropologists have scarcely any use for the rubrics of statutory or documentary legality. This writer discovered in 1954 that the Human Relations Area Files of Yale University, an extensive cross-indexing of materials on the world's cultures, was of little help to his comparative study of election-systems because of present gaps between the Western specialized election vocabulary and the diffuse, uncodified systems of selecting public officers that prevail over much of the globe. In moving outward in time and space, the laws, whether of election or of other subjects, lose their concrete behavioral referrents. The greater the distance the more profitable it is to study laws as ideational conglomerations, *i.e.*, as ideologies or institutions. We can intelligibly compare the election laws of France and Germany or those of the

United States and the Soviet Union in order principally to compare ideologies, or the tendency of clusters of laws of similar type to have *some* behavioral effect. In discussing a single jurisdiction, we can study the laws in greater detail as synopses of decisions, evidences of concern, determinations of moral impulses, and hurdles or barriers for specified behaviors.

Extensions of the generalizations of science tend to produce the following effects upon legal generalization, as contrasted to applied behavioral science.

| Level of Generalization | The Law | Behavior |
|---|---|---|
| *Low* | To achieve $A_1$, do $x_1$ (*e.g.*, to become a candidate for election in district I, one must file a prescribed petition of candidacy with a certain number of signatures). | To achieve $A_1$, do $x_1 + y_2$ (*e.g.*, to become a candidate for election in district I, one must file a prescribed petition of candidacy with a certain number of signatures, *and* one must bring witnesses with him to the clerk's office to assure that the petition is duly registered, admitted, and unaltered by the political opposition). |
| *Middle* | To achieve $A_1$, $A_2$. . . . $A_n$, do x (*e.g.*, to become a candidate for election in county I, one must file a petition). | To achieve $A_1$, $A_2$ . . . $A_n$ do x + y (*e.g.*, to become a candidate for election in county I, one must file a petition and take steps to prevent the petition being ignored or voided by actions of the political opposition). |
| *High* | To achieve A, do X (*e.g.*, to become a candidate for election, one must fulfill existing laws of candidacy). | To achieve A, do X + Y (where X=O, to achieve A do Y). (*E.g.*, to become a candidate for election one must have fulfilled any existing laws of candidacy and must have access to or power over the officials who control admissions. More simply, one must have access to or power over the officials who control candidacy.) |

These examples indicate that, as the scope of one's generalizations increase, it is increasingly less useful to consider the law *qua* law. Rather, one tends to incorporate the legal directive into the behavioral one. The same process occurs in the case of the *implied state of lawfulness and the behavioral statement from observation.*

We should also add that recording the very existence and extent of laws over time and space may be useful in generalizing about the ideology of a group of societies or historical periods. In certain connections, the "law-making compulsion" is an important fact about cultures. Ordinarily, however, one is not confined to a particular functional branch of law (*e.g.*, electoral law) to demonstrate a characteristic "legalism" of a culture or group of cultures. The researcher may select some example of the laws or some branch of law whose development is closely related to the ideological facet he wishes to describe.

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Vol IV

# Fact and Value in Teaching

*Using illustrations principally from the teaching of American government and politics, the author lists five common ways in which the objective and moral worlds are dealt with. The systematic presentation of general factual statements, supplemented by methodological and action training, is the preferred mode of instruction. University authorities should provide a general moral program, rather than relegating the burden to political scientists.*

Education is a communication, a transaction that comments on the "objective world" and connotes or denotes a moral. A question that faces every reflective instructor in political science or another social science is: How should the objective world and the moral world affect the communication of my subject?

The practical answers to this question can be observed in the following procedures, which take courses in American national government for purposes of illustration.

(a) Only facts of a relatively low order of generalization, grouped around institutions such as the Constitution, the judiciary, the presidency, the political party, etc., are taught students. Students are made to be so busy learning facts that they do not query the meaningfulness of their activity.

(b) Assertedly "non - controversial values" are injected into teaching, such as, "The government ought to be well administered," "The cities ought to be fairly represented in State legislatures,"

"A political party ought to stand for clear principles," or, "A citizen ought to be staunchly active in the affairs of his government."

(c) Facts of a high (as well as low) order of generality are used to avoid value-judgments and at the same time maximize the utility of the instruction for later life. Examples would be the use of such concepts as "oligarchy" in the study of parties, "apathy *vs.* involvement" in the study of citizen participation of leadership, or "interests" in the study of parties. Students are taught *about* values, as well as facts, but are not indoctrinated with values.

(d) "Process of thinking" is emphasized so that the student is not told what to think but rather how to think. He is shown how to work his way through the broad and deep stream of information on political subjects. He learns techniques of library reference, of simple content analysis, of detecting political fallacies of a logical character, or of observing the changing character of institutions and politics.

(e) "Process of acting" is emphasized. The student is placed in the political process to learn by doing. He is encouraged to join or observe organizations such as parties, pressure groups, mock legislatures, newspapers, and courts, and is not supposed to be told that any one phenomenon is better than any other.

Pedagogy probably has improved to the point where one need not discuss why the teaching of facts of a low level of generalization should be held to a minimum. It conveys no meaning, is easily forgotten, and is conducive to moral apathy.

What is to be said of the "non-controversial value-judgment" approach? Is it to be used or not? It presents a most difficult problem, for several reasons. First, its vapid morality passes easily by the watchful guardians of academic morals in our day. In addition, students like to hear such moral strictures because they do not violate what they have heard before, because they satisfy the appetite for value-judgments, because the professor is supposed to be a superior moral being, and because the professor of political science is presumed to be an expert on matters of good or bad political morals.

Yet the disadvantages of the method are great because usually these value-judgements are superficial. If one pursues the direct and indirect consequences of any such statement of preference, he begins to uncover differences of belief among students and instructors. For example, although the belief that "political parties ought to have clear principles" is serenely accepted by most people, it actually covers up explosive issues in our political life. It is the kind of statement that excites a faint elation, for who can be against "clear principles," but it conceals warring ways of life in the value-structures of individuals. So with the value-judgement that the "government ought to be well administered." By whom? For whom? One can recollect administration which is hateful to the degree that it follows the textual principles of hierarchy, control, and effectiveness. If I were a politician, I should spend a fair share of my time hampering some administrative efforts towards machined perfection. I should also resent the sloganized morals of faculties and their students, since I would regard them as frustrating a "better choice" of official conduct. If some political scientists realized the extent to which they were prey to professional slogans and ideologies, they would not so blithely advise students as to the best administration, the best citizen, the best foreign policy, or the best political party.

Rejecting the preachment of "non-controversial" morality leaves one with practices that are assertedly objective, *i.e.*, the teaching of general factual principles, of correct political thinking, and of techniques of political action. Let it be admitted here and now, however, that these are value-free only in a sense.

The first value-judgment is, of course, to choose these ways of teaching. The

second value-judgment emerges from the fact that what is learned may be used *against* one as well as *for* one. One elects to arm his enemies. That is, teaching students how to do what they want in politics, without previously indoctrinating them about what they ought to do, sets up a risk that they will not do what one wants. (In fact, however, the classroom at the college level is not a very effective propaganda vehicle. If we were more modest, several generations of observing the dissimilar voting behaviors of alumni and faculties would convince us of this point.)

The third value-judgment, or realm of many such judgments, lies in the selection of concepts to teach and of tactics to prescribe. For example, should one devote his time in class to teaching students the principles of gaining office in the government of the United States *via* elections, or of influencing politicians with cash and otherwise, or of subverting the government? Obviously, there is a range of morality, into which different objective tactics fit with different utilities. To clarify by impractical hypothesis, one way around this dilemma would be individual instruction: each student would be asked initially to clarify his political goals, and instruction would be designed to assist his attainment of those goals. At 8:00 A.M., one would teach a student who is to be a businessman how to tell whether or not a "five-per-center," who in effect promises favorable government action on a contingent commission, has influence; at 9:00 A.M., a communist how to demoralize the Department of State; at 10:00 A.M., a fascist how to demoralize the State department; and at 11:00 A.M., a future foreign service officer how to administer the State department "well." In doing so, one would be practicing essentially the form of pedagogy used in the natural sciences, and indeed following a pattern that is a substantial part of all education. We would fit a person for *his life*, not our life. It is partly because of the frequent joining of "non-controversial" morals with the action approach that incidents such as the following are not more common:

> The University of Maryland came under fire yesterday for its plans to sponsor a discussion next week on "legitimate ways to resist a union drive" at its 11th annual Office Management Conference.
>
> J. C. Turner, president of the Greater Washington Central Labor Council, sent telegrams of protest to University officials and Gov. J. Millard Tawes. Complaints were also received from unidentified Maryland Legislators.
>
> "We protest most vehemently the use of facilities of the University of Maryland for the purpose of defeating the legitimate objectives of free trade unions in this country," Turner said.[1]

The practice of turning students loose in all kinds of political organizations so that they may learn from within is only another way of doing the same thing; without having said so in so many words, one guides the student to find his own milieu in politics. "Are you interested in cooperatives? Then visit one and follow its activities. Let me have a paper on it before the semester ends."

It appears that certain kinds of value-free teaching of a "know-how" type can easily get out of hand. One should approach value-free teaching with different principles for settling on the materials to be taught.

The contemplative (rather than action) mode of teaching, which is involved in the idea of teaching general factual principles, needs to be looked at more closely. The statement of factual principles is in one sense a sophisticated avoidance of value-judgments: one is telling people what *is*, rather than what *ought* to be. But such is not the true meaning of a factual statement, for any factual statement is a selection, from infinite phenomena, of one condition or series of events on one of the following grounds:

(a) It relates to one of my values and will put me in better control of my values. (To illustrate: I may not wish to tell people that I like the probable effects of nationalizing the decentralized American national political parties. That would be unjust to my listeners, I feel.

[1] *Washington Post*, October 23, 1959, p. 38.

Yet, I *am* interested in the problem, so I systematically delineate the conditions that produce decentralized or nationalized parties and describe the effects of each mode of party organization.)

(b) It relates to other people's values and will put them in better control of their values. (Suppose that I am not at all interested in this question, but I see that my audience wishes stronger national parties; so I go through the same process as in [a].)

(c) It relates to a consensus of concern among people who are in conflict. This fact is deemed important to all of them. (Suppose that I observe a great conflict on this question of nationalizing parties; I therefore go through the same systematizing and generalizing process on grounds that each participant in the controversy will derive what he needs from the discussion.)

(d) It relates to existing facts that have been built into a "field of science" because they have been related to (a), (b), or (c), above. In this case, its selection can be indirectly attributed to (a), (b), or (c), which thus can be kept as the models that exhaust the reasons for the selection of facts. (Suppose that neither I nor many others have any interest in this problem, but that "decentralization" and "centralization" are key concepts in the study of government administration; thus I bring them into the field of political parties in order better to understand the concepts as they operate in spheres other than government administration.)

These categories and the extended example show the ways in which factual statements originate from values; they also may partially reveal how values do or do not influence pedagogy.

In this sense of objectivity, the teacher takes it upon himself to reject temporarily his own values, to select factual generalizations as his aim, to satisfy warring social elements, and to contribute to a striking social phenomenon: the development of an integrated and systematic body of political science. Indeed, to diverge from the main argument for a moment, the leading concepts of any science are, in a sense, the residues from the social process whereby value-judgments are reduced, modified, subjected to a new logic, and given a lease on life in a strange environment where other reformed convicts dwell.

It is thus maintained, on the basis of the analysis, that the systematic presentation of general factual statements is significantly different from the statement of value-judgments. And, furthermore, it is suggested that the nature of these differences arbitrates against the value-judgment practice and on behalf of the organization of teaching around general factual statements. The following is a résumé of the reasons for this belief:

(a) The professor controls students' attention according to professional (*i.e.*, conventional "scientific") standards and, at the same time, fosters the development of such standards.

(b) There is a consensus, professionally defined, as to the importance of matters under discussion.

(c) Loose talk, and time-consuming and emotional debate, are avoided.

(d) The analysis of direct and indirect consequences of events is built into the pedagogical process, for scientific inquiry requires a full awareness of consequences in discussing events.

(e) The students are given an opportunity to reformulate their position on neutral ground, rather than being required to accept or reject an opposing position. This procedure allows them to return to their previous value-judgment or to form or accept a new value-judgment. (Often, too, professors have been so proud of the few students they have aroused to activity by their exhortations of values that they overlook other students who have been reduced to resentful or cloddish apathy.)

It is asserted that this method should be the fundamental one; it should be amended to a certain extent, however. The teaching of correct political logic

and of correct political practice are two methods that are greatly beneficial, when controlled, and should be incorporated *into every course* in political science. They are essential tools of the operating political scientist and citizen, and greatly promote the assimilation of materials presented in a systematic, general, factual manner. The only reservations are that they should not remove the course from the integrity and scope of its materials, from the control of the professor, and from the dispassionate approach that students are supposed to imitate.

In general, therefore, there are important reasons for preferring the method of general, contemplative, factual statements to other modes of conducting courses in social science, including American national government. It is assumed that no one will say that this method is antithetical to moral teachings or that it will produce amoral students. Neither is true, and to insure that neither is believed true, an additional recommendation is to be made.

American educational institutions, with some notable exceptions among denominational schools, run without moral direction. Probably the main reason for this anarchy of morals rests in our fear that another kind of morality may take precedence over our own. Hence we tend to justify the hubbub of insignificant activity and the resulting moral indifference of our educated population on grounds that they reveal the essential strength of our many-sided morality and democracy: everyone believes what he wishes and that is good. But by origin and temperament, university presidents are increasingly administrators, who appear to be conducting a circus for its own sake, or public relations men, whose goal seems to be to help outsiders to enjoy the circus. Such a morality is scarcely to be applauded; educational institutions ought to be as morally guided as governmental institutions. Differences in governance in school and state ought to result principally from the differences in mean age of their inmates.

University presidents and trustees cannot avoid responsibility for neglect of morals; neither can they expect political scientists to convert their classrooms into churches to fill the gap. Most of the moral problems of life are not political in the professional sense of the term. Biology, chemistry, physics, physical education, English composition, and, in fact, every discipline in the college, has as much or as little to do with morals as political science. There is no more reason to ask a professor to pour out his hatred of racial discrimination in a political science class than there is to ask his colleague in an astronomy class to describe at length his great love for the God that inhabits the heavens.

Such responsibilities should be centrally organized as the responsibility of the university community. If there are good things about American government, the board of trustees or president should expound them at length and at will to the students in the proper places at the proper time. Chapels, student associations, and the many other fora for such moral instruction should be rescued from what is often degenerate triviality. Some universities may ask their faculty to give some fraction of their time to moral exposition in the context of their courses. And the exposition of moral views ought not to be limited to politics. Sex relations, family relations, religion, and business ought to share a school's evangelical energies. These methods of reconciling American institutions to the diversity of American moral codes is preferable, in the opinion of the author, to each college being all things to all men but nothing of importance to any one.

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# Scientific Progress Through Translations

## (AN EDITORIAL)

Beginning with this issue, *PROD* will publish translations of articles from abroad every two months. What do we hope to bring home from these excursions to other lands?

Certainly the American output of meritorious social science on political subjects is as large as that of the rest of the world. A fringe of countries in Western Europe provides most of the balance: Belgium, England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway, to be aphabetical. Japan, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and India also make a number of contributions. Scholars from other nations are heard from occasionally.

Yet, whatever the distribution of scientific productivity, unquestionably American scholars are not benefiting from more than a fraction of the output of social science overseas. At least three reasons explain this fact: linguistic difficulties, lack of screening facilities and the tendency to read what others are reading. *PROD TRANSLATIONS* can help overcome these problems.

Besides, even when our foreign colleagues are not besting us at our own game, they remain the most important instrument of our self-improvement. Our political and social science has prospered because of its instrumentalism and vulgar empiricism. But to these have been continuously added the leavening theories of Europe: general social theory, positivism, Machiavellism and psychoanalysis. Europe's great figures have been greater than our own. It is simply because science is a form of administration as well as a form of poetic imagination that U. S. scholars have done so much; Americans have been wealthy, efficient and assiduous administrators of science.

Also, whether the free Europeans write in the style of their fathers or in the jargon of social science, they maintain a higher level of literary quality in their work. In general they are better logicians. They are also cleverer at drawing inferences from data. Furthermore, they think more in historical terms; they can better adduce evidence from the past, and they can judge better the creative value of current hypotheses. These superiorities of overseas scholars can become our own only if we study and understand ~~them~~. *PROD TRANSLATIONS* are intended to help us do so.

*PROD TRANSLATIONS* have a second general motive. The very materials of foreign scholarship can aid our progress. We need not talk of superiority here. It is good and sufficient to know and possess concrete studies of the same general phenomena occurring in different cultural and institutional settings. Aristotle, Mosca, Bryce and Weber soon will appear to us to have been the brilliant precursors of a massive science of comparative politics carried on with systematic and mechanistic rationalism.

*PROD TRANSLATIONS* are only a first attempt at intensifying communications among social scientists. Profiting from the momentum and suggestions they provide, we hope to discover and apply more radical innovations in communication methods in time to come.

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# 8. The IPSA Congress at Rome

Several hundred political scientists from different lands gathered at Rome the week of September 15 for the fourth triennial Congress of the International Political Science Association. They held formal discussions on interest groups, public enterprise, executive-legislative relations, war, local government, and theory and practice in Political Science; informal discussions dealt largely with how each had luckily managed to be on hand, with the beauties of Rome and Roman women, and with the relative excellences of the restaurants.

The contrast between formal and informal topics was a little sharper than is usual at American national gatherings because the formal diet was thin and the informal fare was rich. Since a measure of the interest of a meeting is the correlation between formal and informal discussion, changes would have to be introduced in both respects if the next meeting is to register an improvement.

It would be easier to adjust the informal than the formal setting. Both the external and internal milieu of the Congress were aesthetically superb and quite comfortable. Few men have seen enough of Rome to ignore it during a conference. Not only the Americans but many others ventured over the city by day and night; they went into session only to count away the hours like time-servers. But even inside, the murals, draperies, floors, windows, carved chairs, and rugs carried the eye and mind of men from the less profound verbal passages to the creations of the long dead.

Supposing an improved political science to be the object, it would perhaps be better to hold international conferences not at Rome or the several places like it, but at other beautiful places less stimulating to the intellect--Grenoble, Strasbourg, Turin, Edinburgh, Geneva, or Palermo. Why go to Rome to talk about specialized subjects in unfamiliar tongues with strangers, while every fountain, church and statue is ready to speak

on universal topics omnilingually, as a friend?

If political science were to depend upon its international meetings, it would move ahead very slowly. Few men--let us say less than a quarter of the one hundred best political scientists--can follow a paper in a language other than their own. Simultaneous translation helps considerably, and was employed at Rome. Advance mimeographing of formal presentations also helps the one-way flow of formal thought, and this too was done at Rome. However this has a major drawback; when confronted with the full modern effect of rapid reproduction of thought, even professors who have a medieval attachment to the lecture behave logically--at least with respect to others than themselves: they read the advance paper and do not attend, whether in body or in mind alone. Only informal discussion can liberate the academic congress from the appalling thralldom of printed papers combined with formal lectures. The Rome Congress met generally in two, large, simultaneous sessions. Discussants followed the speakers in the order in which their written requests were received. They were not foresworn to relevance, nor were they lined up topically; that is, with good reason, given the undisciplined nature of our colleagues in this respect, a sheer chronological order substituted for the better principle of speaking to a point.

How much more instructive and interesting would have been the meetings if small discussion groups had been the media of communication! Suppose that twenty tables, instead of two halls of desks, were the means of exchange. Perhaps from five to twenty men would cluster around a table at a given time, some sitting, others standing, with a constant movement from the fringes of one group to another. Men of different countries would have numerous chances to become acquainted with one another. They would rub elbows. Nobody would be stuck in a bad session without recourse. Language difficulties could be adjusted pragmatically: by speaking slowly, by participants interjecting scraps of translation, by the better linguists speaking summaries in another language or two. All the nuances of communication that are lost in a large gathering, such as gestures, smiles, grimaces, expressions of comprehension, can help men understand one another in a small group and help them move from idea to idea: the very poor linguist can risk his halting speech. Points can be repeated. A man may even have his own translating assistant with him to whisper significant passages into his ear. A number of underemployed but willing Italian students were assisting the administration of the Congress. Judging from the cordial interest some of the members displayed toward the fairer of the assistants, they might applaud the occasion for this more functional relationship (and could "rationalize it in terms of public interest.")

The American Political Science Association and other American groups have by no means adapted the logical and psychological conclusions of the science of communication to their own conventions, but generally they have moved further toward achieving the expressed goals of the convocation of the brethren than has IPSA.

The content of the papers at the IPSA Congress was on the whole poor. The best men were not certain what they should give to the audience; the mediocrities were sure they were giving the audience what was best for it. The United States contingent was numerous. Negotiations between James K. Pollock, President of IPSA, and the Carnegie Corporation and SSRC had eventuated in a generous program to bring a number of American scholars to Rome. The Americans were also of high calibre, but with a couple of exceptions, behaved like the Yankees in spring training. They were rusty of language; they were serious, dominating, but a little nonplussed at the formalism and impersonalism of the gathering. They bunted for fear of knocking the pitchers off the box; they were seeking without success the brilliant players on the other teams; they clubbed together

foundations and associations have had much experience in this type of scientific developmental work. The type of conference that might do best might be something like the Conference on Political Behavior sponsored by the Social Science Research Council at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in 1949. To the conference might be invited a group of generally known and intellectually compatible writers and researchers on political subjects, each of whom would be asked to invite another unknown, presumably compatible person. From such a conference might come a greater intimacy and exchange among people who are interested primarily in the substantive knowledge, rather than in the conventional social structure, of the profession. Research ideas, interdisciplinary contacts, and opportunities for international projects would be some of the results to be expected. Perhaps the conference might act also on the growing problem of the translation of articles and books, especially to benefit the unilingual Americans.

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