

A Tower of Force for Vietnam

1969
690009

Bridging The Chasm Between War and Peace in Vietnam

have
thus far

~~While~~ The negotiators in Paris ~~have~~
earned for themselves ^{thus far} ~~only~~ a ridiculous
page in history for their famous ~~struggle over~~
~~have~~ seating each other. Indochina still
is burning. ~~And we cannot~~ ^{cannot} well judge
the ~~internal~~ morale of ~~North Vietnam~~
The ~~masses~~ ^{of} civilians and soldiers ~~are~~ ^{involved}
~~fact is~~ ^{may be} ~~is~~ ^{constant} ~~lowering~~. But the
morale of ^{the} full range of American
leadership, stretching from the military
~~to~~ and diplomatic in the field to the
military, politician, and press at home is ~~is~~
~~highly~~ alternately apathetic and deeply
disturbed.

The ~~Nixon~~ ^{Nixon} Administration ~~is~~
can no longer plead "the rights of infants"
and must face up to the fact that it
~~came into~~ ^{won} office with nothing but
a pledge to "do better" in Vietnam.
~~And~~ ^{By} now, the new men must feel
know ~~at least~~ ^{keenly the horns of} these ~~these~~ premises
~~and~~ ^{for} conducting the nation
into a settlement of the conflict.

To. The American ~~half~~ ~~The American action~~
~~no more than~~
public will ^{not} accept a conventional ~~will~~
formula for victory in Vietnam, with its
implications of an aggressive diplomacy ~~and~~
~~and~~ defying world opinion and a military
machine ~~that~~ that insists upon ^{crushing}
the enemy by all means. Nor will it accept,
for many reasons, a prolongation of the ~~fact~~ war.
If ~~the~~ North Vietnam, knowing that,
this, will not concede an acceptable and
assured arrangement for ending the conflict
unless ^{it feels} more pressures and ~~threats~~ more
intimations of defeat.

3. ~~A prolongation of the conflict~~
prosp many well known difficulties. ~~The~~
in Vietnam and American people ~~to~~
an escalation of the conflict will aggravate
the difficulties.

2. D. Vietnam and

II. But a surrender of South Vietnam and
Laos to ~~the communist~~ North Vietnam will have →

Cubik is
now
clearly "a
second
Vietnam"

move to
the next
page

It is, of course, precisely ~~this~~
~~dilemma~~ ~~pressures~~, rarely articulated, that have
underlay ~~the~~ ~~proposed~~ ~~agony~~ of
~~American intervention in Vietnam~~
Unless a ~~settlement~~ ~~can be~~ ~~agreed~~ ~~be~~
framed in accord with them, it will
not abide or the repercussions will be
as severe as the war itself. ~~the~~

domestic and international

~~unwilling~~ complacency of ~~the~~ world
quinn, as it settles back to watch
an American surrender in Vietnam,
will be cruelly shattered by the ~~sempre~~
of ~~the United States~~ after its ~~surrender~~ ~~rather~~
~~than~~ ~~just~~ ^{aside} leaving the ~~proposals~~
proposals for Japan, Britain, The

from very widespread,
numerous and important
perspectives

→ unacceptable ~~equally~~ effects upon Vietnam, the
United States, and world stability. ~~Further~~
Reprisals may be expected in ^{South} Vietnam; ~~probably~~
~~outnumbering~~ ~~in~~ deaths and disturbances ~~are~~
over the next ^{would probably outnumber} four years ~~all~~ ^{that have occurred} of the
deaths and disturbances in that country
~~since~~ over the past four years. In
at least five ^{additional} countries of that ~~same~~ same
General geographical area, the pace of
killing and disturbances will be stepped
up considerably. The ~~theory~~ ^{relation between Vietnam and} of continuous

~~The acceleration of~~
the effusion of communism throughout the
^{Southeast} East and South Asia is ~~too well known~~
~~despite~~ ~~it~~ ^{is} a famous article of debate, but
few will deny that disorders in Southeast
Asia and Japan will increase ~~rather than~~ A few
may go so far as to agree with this ^{writer} ~~writer~~ that most
of ^{many} ~~the~~ Australian and New Zealand ~~population~~ ^{population} would ~~be~~ be
evacuated within another generation.

United Kingdom, and other countries,
it may be sufficient here to point to
The Soviet Union, which will have won
some small victory (for who will say,
from a Soviet viewpoint, that ~~the~~
~~North Vietnamese~~ victory will do more than
make the Soviet position in the Far East less
tenable?); The Soviet Union can expect,
largely as the result of an American defeat
in Vietnam, to pay out the equivalent
of \$50,000,000,000 in anti-ballistic
missile defense over the next five years!
For, if America retreats from the Far
East soon, it will carry ^{as it leaves} ~~with it~~ a
defensive psychology fortified by the
psychology of defeat, and the ABM
defense system is a perfect rallying
point for this intense, confused, ~~and~~
sentiment.

It is, therefore, not arbitrariness or
pig-headedness that explains American
persistence in ~~South~~ Vietnam at great
cost; rather, a ~~heavy~~ ^{weight} ~~burden~~ of
~~fast~~ ^{preserving} rationality preserves
the involvement.

Still, whatever the rationality,
the American intervention will ~~not~~

similar allusions in
present policies.
~~there~~ reiterations. Of ~~the~~
documents. They must ~~also~~ have the
full support of the National Security
Council and of the Congress, as well
as of all the people in Vietnam and
America whose support is needed.

Public acceptance for a new Vietnamese policy is essential. The record of the war thus far ~~fairly shows~~ ^{shows} the fact ^{not only the usual}

The policy needs, too, ^{not only the}
coordination ^{of efforts!} ~~and perhaps even~~ ^{the} ~~even the reorganization~~ part of
the agencies of government. It
~~demand~~s a ~~that~~ special reorganization
of leadership and responsibilities in
Vietnam.

The ~~past~~ measures must have the maximum possible impact on the people of Vietnam and ~~at~~ abroad, while ~~not increasing~~ ~~the~~ new risks and violent reactions politically and militarily.

Under these conditions, the proposed Tour de Force can succeed, it need employ ~~ten~~ measures to achieve its goal -- the ~~rapid~~ transformation of the Vietnamese War into a workable arrangement ~~peace~~ that ~~will require~~ no ~~side~~ to this point.

~~success~~ ^{cannot} fail unless it is ~~completely~~
largely transformed. The USA cannot
win by ~~the usual~~ warfare. ~~it~~
cannot (and, even from a
world standpoint, should not)
surrender. It must, in the
absence of helpful allies ~~and~~ or foes,
reformulate unilaterally its strategy
and, within the shortest possible time,
accomplish a tour de force.

The tour de force
consists in transforming
the Vietnamese conflict from a
90% military dynamic ~~to~~ into a
20% military dynamic. The ~~transformed~~
energy ^{differential} is to be converted into new
~~for national~~ psychological, economic,
organizational, social and neo-
military systems. The ~~the~~ end
in view after a year's time should
be a Vietnam, possessing the
likelihood of unity or neighborliness
and directed vigorously towards
reconstruction and eco-social
development. The measures
that are required for this ~~large~~ ^{tour}
de force ~~the~~ cannot be weak or
vacillating. They cannot be

360° conflict will ~~be~~ have the
~~under~~ force and morale to disrupt.