

Comments on Professor Morgenthau's Paper

By ALFRED DE GRAZIA

IT is nice to think of difficult problems being mastered by cool minds. But the history of science, like the history of man in all other fields, is an account of intense emotions cracking against the stone of existence. Isaac Newton's equations, in their impersonality, have misrepresented for centuries the frantic mind of that genius wrestling with nature. Machiavelli's cool *Prince* came from an impassioned mind, which, if it had been less emotional, would have written just another humdrum manual of statecraft.

We should not, therefore, be put off by Professor Morgenthau's indignant assault on the stone of existence. His paper contains an anguished cry against the eternal failure of a society to love people who say what they think about politics. This wholly understandable sentiment neither proves nor disproves any statement about political science. Let us take it, then, sympathetically, and go on to examine the validity of some of Professor Morgenthau's theses.

One major proposition is that the science of international relations treats a large area of uncertainty where what it says about behavior is likely to be as nearly incorrect as correct. Scientific study can expose more and more of the elements at work, however, and this exposure has some uses in orienting thought.

We would agree, but would say that the science of international relations is, in these regards, only like every other science. Every science has more failures to know than successes; every science, where it cannot be complete in predicting and controlling, has at least an orienting value. It positions its people to say more intelligent things than other people can about what matters within their ken. Any science can be made into a "failure" by giving it impossible tasks. If we asked for the earth to be moved into a new orbit, the applied physicists would

be in trouble. If we asked the physicians to resurrect the dead, they would be aghast. The limits of science do not remain the same nor do the questions that science is asked by society to answer.¹

Professor Morgenthau then also pauses, as so many natural and social scientists do, to marvel at the ability of the human mind to comprehend and make correct propositions about non-human nature, as contrasted with human behavior. I do not believe this to be demonstrable, even while so many will agree to it. One has to judge this question by criteria of some kind; few are ever advanced. In one of my own studies, I cast doubt upon the easy acceptance of the "innate superiority" of the natural sciences over the social sciences.² The pyramids were built upon *administrative inventions*; so was the Roman Empire; so is the manned space craft orbiting as I write these lines.

This common error is related to yet another misconception, that fails to distinguish between applied and pure science. Pure science states relations only; applied science postulates a goal (a moral preference) and states how to manipulate relations in order to achieve that goal. The more a political scientist works in the format of applied science and the more he works on problems close to strife and conflict, the more likely is he to be hated and loved. So it goes in any field of science.

All science is "social science" in the sense that it is ruled by laws of sociology to some considerable degree.³ Instead of saying that "the truth of political science is of necessity a partial truth," Professor Morgenthau might say that "all truth is of necessity a partial truth." This point is critical to the next, wherein Professor Morgenthau indicates that, in political science,

¹ I do think, however, that the example chosen, the Munich Pact of 1938, was unfortunate. Most American social scientists, to my recollection, were deeply disturbed by the short-range thinking that supported it. Several other factual assertions of the paper about history strike me as questionable, but I am not dealing with them here.

² Cf. "The Science and Values of Administration," 5 *Administrative Science Quarterly* (1960), pp. 362-397, 556-582. I cite here and elsewhere in the notes several works that detail my views on points to which I can only allude here.

³ Cf. my "Social Invention in the Age of Controls," 4 *American Behavioral Scientist* (1960), pp. 36-38.

the pressures for conformity will tempt the distortion of truth for social advantage.

The same pressures are present in every science. The publics may be different—they may consist of one's colleagues alone instead of one's colleagues plus the front pages of newspapers plus the bureaucracy—but they are present, nevertheless. I have demonstrated elsewhere in some depth the kinship that such pressures in natural science have with the pressures in the political sphere.⁴ I believe the milieu with which heretical thought must contend is basically the same in every field of knowledge.

Furthermore, there is a problem of the social utility of myths. Now, here Professor Morgenthau is correct in saying that "a political science which is faithful to its moral commitment of telling one truth cannot help telling society things it does not want to hear." But he tends to cover up the fact that lots of truth can be told that society *does* want to hear. Still he is correct in part. Some truths cannot be suffered. Physicians have experiences of the same kind, and have a number of ways of concealing their diagnoses of illness.

Now, the aspect of this matter that Professor Morgenthau does not touch is *the need of every society to tell itself some untruths*. Social morale, on which a great many things hang, apart from a position on any given issue, requires that certain truths be taken hard indeed. For example, a man had better have a full sense of alternatives and a well-developed sense of social responsibility before he takes it upon himself to tell a society it is morally rotten. If he were a physician, he would think twice before putting out flags and declaiming before a patient's family and creditors that the patient is about to die a horrible death. A great deal of emotion is, must be, and should be locked into the fundamental myths of a society and its component institutions. If a society pays no attention to prophets of its doom, it is already dead. If it smiles at them, it is either very healthy or very sick.⁵

⁴ Cf. "The Scientific Reception System and Dr. Velikovsky," 7 *American Behavioral Scientist* (1963), pp. 556–582.

⁵ Cf. my article, "The Hatred of New Social Science," 5 *American Behavioral Scientist* (1961), pp. 5–13.

Professor Morgenthau next analyzes the present society and finds it to be pluralistic, composed, that is, of religious, political, social, and economic groups, all "committed to a particular social 'truth.'" The political scientist, he says, has to deviate from one or more of these in search of "*the* truth of society altogether."

He evidently assumes that there is an entity called "*political science*" and an entity called "*the* truth of society." Actually, political science is pluralistic, and so is the nature of this "truth."

Political science contains many men, many schools, many traditions, many methods, many issues. At any given moment of time, some are in trouble for their version of the truth and some are in clover. For example, just to take several areas of political science, at present those political scientists who believe that to continue the war in Vietnam will have generally favorable consequences given a set of standards are content with the social recognition of their truths; those who disagree are not. Political scientists who think that they know that reapportionment will bring certain beneficial results to state and national government find the going easy; those who disagree do not. Those who dedicate themselves to expressing the Brownlow theories of administration in government find an appreciative audience; those who pursue a Dewey-Follett line of criticism find incomprehension and irritation.⁶

Now it would be an intellectual sin (which, I fear, Professor Morgenthau may be encouraging) to believe that the only test of whether you are talking truth in political science is whether you are hated for what you are saying. He does say: "A political science that is mistreated and persecuted is likely to have earned that enmity because it has put its moral commitment to the truth above social convenience and ambition." I would say: sometimes yes, and sometimes no. And, conversely, scientists who receive social adulation are sometimes speaking truth and sometimes not. Is it not better to assert that truth-finding and truth-saying are irrelevant to social applause? Heretics are burned, not for telling the truth, but for annoying people.

⁶ Cf. my paper on "Research in Voters and Elections," pages 104-134 in *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1955), on the roles of practitioner and scientist as they interact.

Why is this so? Why is the connection between truth and acceptance so tenuous? There are at least several reasons.

1. People may be ready to receive truth (ideas) and be longing for it.
2. Some people are ready for any truth: every assertion will find some friends; and for many scientists, a "discerning few" is better than the "fawning crowd."
3. Some truths have such indirect consequences that their potential threats to pomp and power go unnoticed.
4. Truths can often be put as seductively as untruth.
5. Truth-sayers may be associated with power-holders.
6. A great many truths have to do with areas of activities on which the goals of people are nearly unanimous.
7. The truths may be stated in scientific jargon that few understand.
8. The truths may be put contemplatively rather than manipulatively—that is, they are pure propositions, rather than applied ones, and since people are not being urged to act a certain way, they do not mind hearing dissident thoughts.

There is, in brief, a complex field, scarcely developed, called "The Sociology of Political Science," and Professor Morgenthau's eloquent paper is a quick and intriguing lift of the flap to induce us to enter its carnival tent.

Why is Professor Morgenthau so partial and exaggerated in dealing with so large and diverse a set of problems? One might essay biography, but I would like to avoid the responsibility of making *ad hominem* statements about a friend whose character, for all I know, may be too much like my own. Let me instead argue on a phenomenological level.

Professor Morgenthau, in his worthy rage, has, like the painter Gauguin and the philosopher Rousseau, given us a "Noble Savage," the political scientist uncorrupted by society who pursues the simple Truth single-mindedly and is misunderstood and condemned by society. I say that this model—and it is a model—is simplistic. It violates reality in so many ways as to introduce more problems than it solves.

Professor Morgenthau, as we follow him through the jungles of politics, uncovers two enemies of the Noble Savage. These are the "Apologists" and the "Formalists." The Apologists are those who earn the praises of the elites by flattery, servility, and turning their backs to the truth. The Formalists avoid political commitments, study trivia, and in many cases turn their formalism and triviality into practical virtues by proclaiming a new, objective, and morally indifferent behaviorialism.⁷

By contrast, Professor Morgenthau would have political scientists act as counterpoises to cant: whenever a new theory becomes old and is accepted, they would show what is wrong with it. (This does seem to contradict his earlier model of the single Truth.) He believes especially in a *practical* political science: "It ought to be the conscious purpose of the political scientist to influence the solution of political problems in the light of his theoretical insights."⁸

I would guess that the Noble Savage, by his very nature, is going to have a tough time proposing *practical* solutions. And he will be especially baffled because his theoretical insights are based upon an idealistic, nonpluralistic obsession that there is a Truth of politics. I do admire, however, the way in which Professor Morgenthau casts himself against the stone of existence.

⁷ Cf. my remarks on "First Things First in Methodology," in *II American Behavioral Scientist* (1959), p. 35 and on "What Is Political Behavior?," in *I American Behavioral Scientist* (1958), pp. 42-43.

⁸ Cf. my "Fact and Value in Teaching," *3 American Behavioral Scientist* (1960), pp. 14-18.

ever stand still long enough to accept it. Thought and action, induction and intuition, the exercise of power and self-restraint, feedback and self-criticism, appraisal and invention—all these are fused in their very being and every action. (And why not declare them professors, with students attached to them where they live and work?) One of them is the Reverend Leon Sullivan, the Negro minister of North Philadelphia who is scoring a theoretical and actual breakthrough in integrating the simplistic force of the civil rights movement with the complexities of a sophisticated, bureaucratized, and refractory society. There are many such others, but still not enough.

Well, I began by admitting my bias as a social engineer, a genial Scandinavian, and a rebel against doctrine—pragmatic, eclectic, one foot out of any batter's box. This was the spirit in which I reacted to Morgenthau's presentation—to what I thought was narrowness, an orthodoxy which freezes the kind of ingenuity a political engineer and, I think, a political scientist ultimately have to have if we are broadly to define the ultimate role of political science as one of improving the human condition.

These are some disorganized comments, but they reflect a feeling, and feelings are probably as important as reason and analysis in the particular science with which we are concerned. Professor Morgenthau's paper is heavily charged with feelings—among them, the anguish of a man who has chosen what he too quickly concludes is a lonely and unpopular position on Vietnam. Frankly, I am more taken with his feelings than with his analysis, and I would venture to say that we have more to learn from the whole man than from what he has attempted in this case as an exercise in pure reason.

DE GRAZIA: As Paul talked I was thinking of the problem of the Morgenthau temperament and then the Scandinavian temperament, and I recall being in the University of Gothenberg last year and meeting a young instructor who had been waiting for two years for housing. It is presumably the best organized, most advanced, and most prosperous country in Europe, if not the world, so that I had the feeling that maybe the instructor had become too used to *smörgåsbord*, and picking up whatever happened to be left on the table after everybody had filed

through, with labor unions going through first, of course, taking what they wanted (*laughter*).

I was going to denounce Morgenthau's position. Professor Morgenthau is really being blasted by his own petard, I think. He gave me some diabolic satisfaction in the reading of his paper. He has been talking about the national interest so brazenly and so long in terms which are essentially meaningless to me that I am glad to see that the "national interest" has finally caught up with him and is "giving him what for." It has always been a rather amoral concept, it seems to me, a concept of a medieval kind. My predecessors mentioned the old-fashioned character of his theories, of his book, and I quite agree—the search for ideal truth that exists somewhere is like the search for the Holy Grail.

Because of the rather military conversation at our table at lunch time, I was reminded also of Cassino one day in 1943 when we were removing several newly taken German prisoners from the line in order to interrogate them. The outfit was the Thirty-sixth Division, the Texas National Guard Division (not a very well-organized division, because Lyndon Johnson had been sent to the Pacific, I guess), and a lieutenant wanted to kill the prisoners because, as he said, we had been getting artillery fire from them all afternoon. Well, how does one explain to such a person that, really, one cannot expect honied words from the enemy? I mean, they are there for a reason, too, and if one is going to have a war, one has to expect to get hurt. I feel that Morgenthau's complaint here is in slightly bad taste. If he is going to get into this war, he had better expect to get hurt.

The national interest has always been to me whatever the policy-makers have at any given moment decided that it should be, and so it never bothered me as a concept, and I have always discouraged students (I hope that I do not offend too many of you here) from concentrating upon it. It is a Platonic concept. I would much rather that students simply make empirical statements about who believes what, among the elite and among the masses, if they can measure it, and who has the power to carry out what they believe in—and whoever that may be can be conceived to have a kind of monopoly of the national interest insofar as their propaganda may be rendered effective. Any concept of

the national interest beyond that, so far as political science is concerned, I would regard as rather medieval.

If there is one problem raised by Professor Morgenthau's paper (which in other respects does not raise problems), it is again the ancient but yet unresolved problem: the duty of statesmen to pursue truth as opposed to the ruling formula. We waver as a profession in assuming a position on this issue. We recognize, although sometimes we try to hide it from ourselves, that one has to be somewhat of a liar, a cheat, and all of that, in order to carry out policy.

This necessity is partly owing to a basic conflict between truth, or truths, or the search for the same, and the myth which is necessary for ruling a society, and partly a sheer matter of technique. One cannot reveal truth with the same phasing, same timing, and same pattern as one can reveal policy. Regarding the present moment, I, for one, am rather doubtful about the thought that our own leaders, on the question of Vietnam, may really be sharing my opinion about the situation, but I have no way of knowing it, and, in fact, I may feel that I should have no way of knowing it, and if I were in their position, I would not be telling persons such as myself that I had such a policy.

Professor Morgenthau does not direct himself to that question, but it seeps out of his pages. We need to know, as political scientists, what kind of ruling formula is demanded if we are to have certain stable social conditions or certain conditions for political equilibrium (however you want to use that term). We have to know or to have some idea of what it should be, I suppose, in order that we may build an applied political science, because we have never quite solved this problem of applied political science, concerning the *ruling myth*, which is a series of practical fictions, and the necessity to work on *truth* within that framework. As political scientists, we tend toward the position which Professor Morgenthau takes in a whole-hearted and rather exaggerated way—that whatever truth is must come out; it must be public property—while, on the other hand, we recognize a secret knowledge, which, I think, political scientists possess more than any other field of the social sciences, knowledge of certain things that cannot be told lest the whole society should fall apart.

EULAU: I do not want to address myself to Professor Morgen-

many of us have been persuaded that the best economic theory comes from activists like Keynes and Heller and the rest of those who tell the government what to do, who do not just stand off and talk *about* economic policy. They are *in* economic policy, and that is how they justify their existence. I submit that the political scientists in the United States are lacking in courage and clear purpose.

SPITZ: Careful now, you are talking as a political theorist, not a political scientist. You are talking the language of at least some political theorists; you are advocating a retreat from what our behaviorists call political science.

CHARLESWORTH: Well, I do not want to advocate anything here. I am just raising questions. Do you think that it would help our total discipline if we separated public administration and all the *do* subjects from the *think* subjects?

DE GRAZIA: It depends a lot on whether you know what you want to do in public administration. I would be very much against the separation as long as public administration is essentially an antiquated army type of discipline——

CHARLESWORTH: Will you let me try to define public administration for the purposes of this discussion? In my opinion, it is the realization of legislative intent.

GUETZKOW: As long as we separate public administration——“do” contents——from political science——“think” contents——we shall be giving a rather routine kind of treatment to public administration, as is current among many who have been practicing and teaching over the decades since the two contents were prematurely separated. I do not wish to subscribe to such a public administration, and therefore I would not separate this child from the parent until it is better instructed—if ever.

DE GRAZIA: I wonder if public administration has not, to a very large extent, departed from small-group work and from the organizational theory that is being done in business groups and international development programs.

GUETZKOW: I think that we fail to make critical distinctions, especially the one between the degree of generality and particularity, and the distinction between pure and applied. I believe we can have pure theory—a “think” theory—about particulars as well as an applied science—a “do” theory—about these same par-

ticulars. Conversely, we can have both a pure theory of subject matter at a high degree of generality *and* an applied theory at the same high degree of generality. It is not fruitful to believe that there can be a long-enduring separation between pure theory or generalities—“*think* subjects”—and applied theory of particulars—“*do* subjects.”

DE GRAZIA: I was only referring to the development of organizational theory outside of political science. It has been my impression that more sophisticated theory along that line comes quite outside of political science's sponsorship.

VAN DYKE: I would like to mention a question that has not been mentioned here this afternoon. I do not know whether you would be interested in discussing it or not. I would be interested in hearing a discussion of it. David Easton takes the view that the purpose of political science, if I understand him correctly, is to study the conditions of the persistence of the system.

EULAU: And changes.

CHARLESWORTH: You mean as a spectator?

VAN DYKE: No, not as a spectator, as an analyst, a person who tries to identify the conditions of persistence and change.

EULAU: I shall go back and pick up a few things. You said [Charlesworth] that the economists are telling the government what to do, but we should ask: Why do the economists tell the government what to do? Because the economists over two hundred years have developed a highly refined set of models in terms of which they can make reasonably reliable forecasts with regard to outcomes, given certain conditions, and we political scientists do not have these.

DE GRAZIA: May I suggest a more underhanded kind of explanation here? It is that the economists are used because the government is hoodwinked; people are hoodwinked by the economists. They believe that the economists are giving them answers, practical answers, but in many cases the proof is quite absent, just as the psychologists are called on to give advice on international tensions and the like, and they will put on their white coats and do so.

EULAU: Put two psychiatrists in a corner and they disagree, obviously. I think that a discipline is made up of discipline;

bringing diverse opinions together and using them to reach judgments which one is then prepared to enforce by public authority is the political process as I see it.

The political scientist's own contribution to this process is indicated by the traditional core of foreign-relations studies: treaty-making, diplomacy, and the foreign service as a special case of bureaucracy. The focus is always on the point at which an authoritative decision is being reached. It is there, I think, that the political scientist as political scientist has something to say about foreign relations and policies.

DE GRAZIA: I wonder whether you were not introducing another subject-matter category? The words "decision" and "decision-making" and the processes of how to decide policy or foreign policy in relation to Vietnam may seem to be subjectless categories, but are they not merely another way of slicing the same materials of political science? The fact of the weather in Vietnam is very important. Political scientists are properly afraid that, because of their training purely as political scientists, they might know nothing about the weather and therefore botch some kind of strategy for the country. You say that others ought to worry, but they do not know about decision-making, which you know something about, and, therefore, these others should call in some of your students if they are making policies involving the weather in Vietnam.

WATKINS: Somebody should know what you can get away with, with the American public.

DE GRAZIA: But is that not another species of *subject*, really?

WATKINS: Oh, yes, I am not trying to say that political science has no content; the content is the particular process by which authoritative decisions are reached and implemented.

CHARLESWORTH: I wonder if you [Watkins] would like to expand a little on the analogue you made in your paper about the economist? He is interested in the oil business, say, but he does not know anything about petrography. Why do we not also arbitrarily limit our province?

WATKINS: I think that if you will look at the actual content of the political science courses, you will find that we have limited them.

VAN DYKE: You use in your comment a statement that is

one is saying that there are certain things outside the purview of a limited state.

YOUNG: There are authoritative values outside the state?

SPITZ: Yes, that is why I deny the adequacy of a definition of politics as the authoritative allocation of values.

WATKINS: You are forgetting one thing, though, which is how Easton puts it, and, as I emphasize at the end of my comment, this is a function of every society, not just the state.

SPITZ: Well, of course. In effect, what I am doing is stating, perhaps in a more tortured way, the old distinction between culture and civilization. We do not use that distinction very much today, but essentially a society has certain values or goals—conflicting goals, if you will—that we denote by the term “culture,” and civilization consists of those means or instruments or associations which men construct in order to achieve those goals. The political association is only one of many such associations.

WATKINS: You are assuming that every organization has a political aspect.

SPITZ: I will agree, but I will still argue that there is a difference between a church and a state; there is a difference between a university and a state.

DE GRAZIA: Why do you argue that position—because there should be a distinction or because you believe that the empirical division should be perpetuated in political science by our concentrating on the state as a required subject?

SPITZ: No, I would argue that in some cases there is an empirical distinction; in other cases there ought to be such a distinction. In any event, I would not limit political science to the study of the state because, for one thing, economic organizations also have political dimensions, and I would study economic organizations insofar as they pertain to either the process or the content of the state's decisions.

WATKINS: Is not the job of getting to be the head of a trade union just the same kind of job as getting to be the head of the country?

SPITZ: Not quite the same, there is a different constituency.

WATKINS: Is that not the same kind of problem?

SPITZ: Not necessarily, because it depends on the type of organization.

tative allocation of values." I want to know who decides whether I am to be saved or not. Is it the state?

DE GRAZIA: It is appropriate to study the *extent* to which the state authoritatively allocates values. By values he means "valuing behavior."

SPITZ: No, I am taking values in the sense which, of course, you meant, as simple desires, without judging the ethical content of the desires. There are people who want to be saved. My presumption has been that the state now says that that is the business of the church; therefore, we will not allocate it; we will let the churches do it.

GRIMES: You are making a play on words here.

SPITZ: No, I am not. The problem of the political scientist is to determine the relationship between the state and these other associations.

DE GRAZIA: We may want to compete with the state for allocation.

YOUNG: Does it help to clarify anything to refer to the state? Does it not exclude nine-tenths of the things we should be interested in, not only in this country but historically and in other areas? You do not find the state in other areas as you find it here.

SPITZ: Let me say first that I agree completely. I did not mean to imply that the business of government is limited to the state, which is a relatively modern term, even though the state is limited in the range and scope of its business. Government exists even in the family—there is a relationship of authority within the family, at least within certain families.

YOUNG: In this transit strike in New York, where is the state? You have Quill and you have Lindsay; you have the transport authorities and the New York government.

SPITZ: You will know where the state is when Quill goes on strike, provided of course that the state is willing to exercise its authority.

HARTZ: I think that perhaps at this point I could intrude an observation. One of the things that one notices when considering the definitions that have been advanced here is the focus on political behavior. In consequence, for each definition one can find large numbers of people who are not doing what they should be

of its scope, will be determined by what people are doing by way of research in the next ten or twenty years.

DE GRAZIA: It is my feeling, if I may comment on that in terms of a triad, that there should be more basic models in political science than the Platonic, the Machiavellian, and the Merriam-Lasswell. The first is society in search of justice—how you structure it. With the second, one does not assume very many virtuous activities in Machiavelli and Hobbes; the problem is how to get hold of power. Then there is the very modern model which sees politics everywhere and more or less explodes the total field of political science into all these associational, parapolitical areas which are found in the Chicago school.

Then there are other attempts at models. I must say that the physical task of trying to keep up with them is already enormous—the economic models, the attempts to set up models made in comparative fields, not to mention those in international relations where at least a dozen works—major works—purport to establish models that are to direct the profession. There are bound to be only one or two or three successful middle-level models coming out of it.

I do think that the work on legislatures is extraordinarily successful, partly because it deals with matters concerning real people that can be recognized by others who have to do with legislatures. That is something which cannot be said for some of the models of values, of input-output systems, and foreign-affairs policy.

And it is going to take a lot of work before some of the model-builders, who are perhaps most sophisticated in handling the tools of mathematics and the like, can get around to making their work meaningful. Meanwhile, we are in a kind of a confused state where some of us do not pay any attention to models at all because they can only serve to keep people from solving problems of fact and method.

VAN DYKE: If I may, I would like to revert to a statement that David Spitz made a while ago to the effect that he thought that the thing to do was to focus on problems, whether dramatic or perennial.

SPITZ: My interests are in problems. I am not denying the importance of focusing on structure.

PALMER: I see that it always seems to come around to the question of focus.

VAN DYKE: Well, music may have political significance, just as the Olympic Games sometimes have political significance. I am not saying that they are ruled out of the realm of politics, but I think that it would be an unusual circumstance in which you would consider the playing of a symphony to be a political act. I would argue, on the one hand, that there is a perfectly appropriate set of things for political scientists to do in the realm of international politics, and I say that international politics is a subarea of international relations. International relations can be musical or cultural. Art is by nature international, and when tourists travel abroad one has international relations of a sort. When Shakespeare is studied, an international relationship is involved.

EULAU: Let me make a very outrageous statement, one which I have always made in my "Scope and Methods" class. Even if we were to drop the whole profession—I think 8,000—of political scientists into the ocean, I think that the study of politics would go on. I think that political science is certainly not autonomous. It happens to be an organization which focuses on a subject matter. I think that political science has to be interdisciplinary in its own right. I think that it would be impossible to be a good political scientist without having had a good dose of what is called psychology, what is called sociology, what is called economics, and even, today, what is called mathematics.

DE GRAZIA: All this was a part of political science at one time.

EULAU: Yes, that is the point that I want to make, you see. It seems to me that if political science were abolished as an establishment, we could all find a comfortable role in the American Psychological Association or in the American Sociological Association. There are many other social scientists today who are concerned about politics.

GUETZKOW: But is that not true of every field, though, Heinz? Do you know of any field that has this kind of integrity that we eulogize here?

DE GRAZIA: I know of no field that has the theoretical integrity you are speaking of.