

**STATEMENT OF DR. ALFRED de GRAZIA, PROFESSOR OF
GOVERNMENT AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY**

Mr. DE GRAZIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Cochairman MONRONEY. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. DE GRAZIA. No, sir, Senator. Your introductory remarks of me were a bit lengthy. I appreciate it. I wonder whether it wasn't a little too lengthy.

Cochairman MONRONEY. No, indeed.

Mr. DE GRAZIA. And perhaps it might be dispensed with.

Cochairman MONRONEY. These hearings will be read by students of political science for at least the next 10 years, as were the copies of the hearings for outside readings in many classes of the 1946 effort, so we want to identify our witnesses properly.

Mr. DE GRAZIA. Thank you. I suppose it might have been said that like everybody else, I have written a book on Congress. It has not appeared yet, but I think that was what led me into your Halls today.

I am continuing my work in that area, and hope this summer to devote a considerable amount of time to problems more specifically within the ken of this committee. The book itself was a rather bold attempt to set up two models of government, one dominated by the executive force and the second dominated by what I call the republican force—small “r” in republican.

I felt that we might learn something about the future of Congress if we were to inquire of all proposals for reforms of Congress whether their ultimate bent, wittingly or unwittingly, would be to strengthen executive centralism, or whether the ultimate effect of some proposed reforms would be that of strengthening representative government in our democracy.

It has been said, I am sure, time and time again in these hearings that the United States has the world's strongest legislature, and that one of the purposes of these hearings is to continue that fortunate situation. Actually we do have some statistics on world legislatures that I thought I might recite to you, just to concretize the point.

If we were to take all of the legislatures in this world—and practically everywhere except Saudi Arabia we have a legislature—we would discover that we have fully effective legislatures in only 28 countries. By fully effective we mean that the legislature performs normal legislative functions as a reasonably coequal branch of the government with the executive.

The other governments of the world have only partially effective or largely ineffective or wholly ineffective legislatures. So that means that out of 100 legislatures or more only about a quarter can be considered to have some high degree of effectiveness. But yet when you examine those few you discover that there too the legislature is in serious trouble.

For example, in that category of fully effective legislatures, we have the mother of parliaments, the English legislature, which we know has come increasingly under executive dominance. So one could question whether what we mean by government by legislature would be the English case today. More likely we could say that the British Parliament today is run by the executive heads of government, and has only a kind of ultimate weapon of revolt.

There are other countries who are supposed to have strong legislatures in that one-quarter of the world's nations that I mentioned which would not even be on a par with England. That is we would question seriously would they belong in the same category with the American legislatures, the Congress and the various State legislatures.

Now, of course, our legislatures or Congress cannot enjoy this status indefinitely without difficulty. I think two major problems exist, an external problem on the one hand and an internal problem on the other.

Externally we have, of course, the Communist regimes of the world.

They threaten us in ways which we can read about in the newspapers every day. Internally I would say that government by legislature has to contend with the problem of executive centralism.

Unfortunately the two cannot be separated completely. We cannot take care on the one hand of the Communist threat abroad, and at the same time turn our attention separately to the problem of executive centralism, because one of the reasons for executive centralism in the United States has been the continuing Communist threat abroad. The Communists have succeeded in what one of our political scientists called "revolution by partial incorporation." In order to beat them, you have to be like them.

In the short run at least then, government by legislature has these difficulties with executive centralist tendencies. In the long run the prospects are better, particularly if we, meaning men such as those on this committee, can exert our imaginations to invent new devices for the control of the executive force.

That means in the first place, again talking of very broad principles, being alert to the meaning of all attempts at change. "Beware of the Greeks bearing gifts." Not everyone who wants to reform and strengthen Congress really wants to reform and strengthen Congress. Very often when they want to do it they don't know themselves but they are in effect weakening the Congress.

And then, of course, certainly, to foster vigorously those changes that build a powerful republic by representative government. Many of these desirable changes are yet to be invented. Certainly we can't talk about them all here. But any impetus toward imaginative invention of new devices for legislative government that this committee can inspire would I think last beyond the 10 years during which the chairman has suggested these hearings might be read.

Let me indicate one example of what I mean by the possibility of "Trojan horses" in our attempts at reforming the Congress. For example, one Senator introduced a bill for congressional reform a couple of years ago that listed a dozen specific problem areas. These are, one, the scheduling of measures for consideration and action. Now I wonder whether the scheduling of measures cannot stand also for the idea of forcing the Congress to act on the President's program. It is possible.

The second thing he wanted investigated was the structure, staffing, and operation of congressional committees. Again an innocuous and very necessary subject, but also from that subject can stem various proposals which in effect streamline Congress by taking away the independence of the Congressman in dealing with his constituents, taking away what I call the nuclear constituency of the Congressman, that is that group of people, ever growing smaller I am afraid, on which he depends for his knowledge, his tips, his ideas, his support, his hard work and all of that kind of backing in the constituency.

The workload of the Congress and the committees thereof is a third suggestion for study. We see here again the possibility of taking away the independence of the Member if his area is handled badly.

It is suggested that congressional rules and floor procedures be reformed, and all too often behind the reform of congressional rules and floor procedures lies hostility toward what is called the congressional

oligarchy. In other words, a revolution from within is intended by seemingly innocuous changes in floor procedures and congressional rules.

The area everyone talks about and the press is particularly fond of, conflicts of interest of the Members of Congress, is the fifth area chosen. Yet behind this we must realize often lurks the desire to sever connections between the Congressman and the world he represents. More and more it would be possible to discourage the Congressman from going to the sources of intelligence at home and abroad. And also it will be possible to discourage the Congressman from relating to the very interests for which the Congress or the legislature was created in the first place, to represent interests of a beneficial and bona fide kind.

The term of office of Members of the House of Representatives is again one of the suggested topics for study of the gentleman whose bill I am reporting here, and we know that there may be more than one side to the recommendation, for example, that the term of the Representative ought to be increased to 4 years. The timing of that election, you can appreciate, may on the one hand tie his election to the election of the President or, on the other hand, it may separate that election completely from the election time of the President. In either case we see a possibility either for strengthening the executive force in government or creating another check against the exercise of that executive force.

Communications, travel, other allowances of Members of Congress are asserted to be an important area of study. I repeat that the Congressman has to operate freely. He has to be given every opportunity to operate freely, and it is all too easy, given the propensities of the test, to take after any Congressman engaging in slightly extraordinary activities, and thus to build up a case against the Congress itself.

It would seem to me too that the political scientists, among whom I am numbered, have done less than they should do in reassuring the public on what may seem to be the eccentric behavior of Congressmen.

In so-called studies of the financing of congressional election campaigns, I have also seen too often the desire to restrict independent campaign funds and the desire to unite presidential and congressional elections, with, of course, power moving again into the hands of the executives and the national parties.

A ninth proposal of the gentleman is to study the duties of Members of Congress incident to the appointment of postmasters and the making of appointments to military service academies and other Government academies. I do not see here the great importance of this point as an area of study of the Congress, but at any rate we can see that the limitations on the control of certain kinds of appointments may have important consequences that we barely foresee. At least the public does not.

Certainly appointments to military service academies, insofar as those are controlled by the Congress, may be one reason why we have a military arm whose adherence to democratic standards of operation and thought, I think, is the greatest in the world.

The legislative oversight of the administration of laws is, of course, an area of investigation that we have no argument with, nor do we

contest the strengthening of the congressional power of access to the Executive. These two are good points, but we worry whether Congress' right to specific legislative oversight of administration may be threatened by proposals subsumed under these categories.

Finally, there is need to investigate lobbying activities, it is said. Here again, lobbying is always a problem, but much investigation of lobbying turns out to be a smear on worthwhile activities of Congress.

So we must watch out, I know you will agree, for the "Trojan horses" in these seemingly innocuous areas of the investigation of the powers and role of Congress.

Now again we turn from the need for alertness to the "Trojan horse" to the possibilities of constructive reform, and I would offer one example here of reform which goes along very much with that just ventured by Professor Elliott, and with suggestions that I have had a chance to note in the prior hearings of this committee.

Congress, it seems to me, must provide itself with an intelligent system second to none in the world. I try to think of a Congressman as another President, and I think it is helpful to think of him in that way, because you begin to realize what his needs are.

This intelligence system can be compared with the network of nerves in the body that transmit information to the brain. Without a continuous, reliable stream of communications, of correct signals as to what is happening in the remotest part of the organism, the human organism will become aimless, flabby, unresponsive, and finally collapse.

Unless Congress knows precisely and accurately what is happening in Washington, Alaska, California, Santa Domingo, and Vietnam, and in the Kremlin, it cannot guide the Nation and must hand over its powers, its prestige and its unique position in history to the civil service, the White House group, and the President. I think it is more important to the future of the Republic that one Congressman know what is happening in Cuba than that five generals have that knowledge.

This problem of the failure of intelligence is not in foreign affairs alone. We have to watch out for it in other spheres. It occurs time after time in domestic affairs. Professor Elliott brought up the recent poverty legislation. He couldn't have chosen a better example. Recent legislation on the freedom of opportunity, whatever may have been its motives, gives a fearful example of the resignation of congressional powers of intelligence. When that proposed legislation was offered Congress, it came like a thunderclap, and I suppose that when it had actually passed and become law, some Congressmen were still holding their ears.

The fact is that Congress lacked the research machinery to swing into action immediately, to let the Legislature and the public know what the underlying facts and issues in the poverty legislation were.

These are only two examples of two major difficulties confronting the Congress: the "Trojan horse" difficulty, the difficulty of being aware, that is, and the need for more facilities and equipment to calculate conditions and remedies.

There are at least a dozen areas which the present committee might well study in order to bring forward proposals to meet the needs of Congress. If need be, I might try to explain what I think those areas might be.

However, I would stress here only what I wanted to stress in the beginning, that Congress is the central institution of the American Republic. We should study not only the procedures of Congress, its internal governments, but its relations with key institutions in American society as a whole. I think this committee may very well devote some part of its energies—I know I shall this summer—to inquiring as to the means for providing permanently a limited executive establishment.

We should emphasize how a fully dominant free enterprise economy is related to a free and powerful legislature. It is interesting that none of the Communist countries, although they have fully empowered legislatures on paper, have in fact no legislatures that can be considered in the first, second, or third category of nations listed in order of the power of the national legislatures.

A strong federalism and local self-rule connect with legislative supremacy. What happens in the Federal system and local self-government determine, I think, the nature, stature, and image of Congress, and this committee should, to my way of thinking, take its opportunity to point out this dependence existing between federalism, local government, and representative government by a powerful legislature.

Finally, for congressional government of the highest order, a rule of law is needed, constitutionalism. I daresay I need only mention this. So long as all these institutions endure, Congress can function very well. Conversely, so long as the Congress can remain powerful and stand powerful, these institutions can prosper.

To conclude then, I have tried to suggest that reform of Congress is not a matter only of tinkering with the everyday machinery and operations of the Congress, but also a matter of insuring some kind of general relationship between the Congress and the Executive Establishment, and between the Congress and the other fundamental institutions of the American democracy. Therefore, what we should try to produce would be a systematic set of proposals reflecting our fundamental philosophy of government.

Cochairman MONRONEY. Thank you very much, Dr. de Grazia. On the lack of congressional intelligence information, how would you feel that it could be improved upon? By our intelligence agencies?

I mean we do find a very definite gap. There are very few Members of the Senate or the House who could give you today a very factual report on Santo Domingo. The only information I had on what actually was going on in Vietnam was when I was en route to Vietnam, and I had access to the high command in the Pacific briefings as to their part of the story there. It was classified, but still it gave me a feeling of knowledge that I had not been able to distill out of the newspapers or out of speeches or out of public utterances by our leaders.

Mr. DE GRAZIA. This committee has already heard several persons, I believe, advance the idea of automation as a possible aid to congressional intelligence. I would urge that a study be made of the possibilities of informing Congressmen individually through the very powerful electronic mechanisms that are available today.

To address myself more directly to your statement, I believe you should perhaps start right at the bottom. Say, what we want here is

a man who, like the President, is one of the 500 most informed men in the world, or at least he has that possibility. And you don't want to make that possibility dependent on his not having a headache when he is riding in an airplane and is supposed to be getting a briefing.

You want it to be something that you can depend on regularly. It shouldn't be a matter of luck and the good health and the mental stability of your Congressman. That would indicate then that each congressional office has to become some kind of a nerve center of the Republic in its own right. He should have equipment, and this equipment should be able to report to him on a huge number of questions.

Today there is experimentation going on with computer console systems whereby a central computer group can handle inquiries instantaneously through its programming from other parts of the country, where engineers, or in our case our Congressmen, will be able to have requests for information of all kinds sent in immediately, and from information automatically stored in the giant brain, to have available at a moment's notice the facts to bring him up to the moment on a given situation anywhere in the world that might affect Government policy.

This is just one means. But I think that we wouldn't be able to arrive at a complete description of the ideal intelligence system for the Congressmen in hearings such as this, as useful as they may be. This is a problem of considerable complexity and scope, and I would wish—I don't know whether we will have time to get into that this summer—I would wish that we might have some organized means for presenting to this committee some proposals on this larger scale.

Cochairman MONRONEY. We certainly appreciate your mention of it. We are very impressed with your diagnosis of the legislative branches of the Communist world and of other democracies, big "D" and little "d" democracies, that we have throughout the world. I share your belief that the Commie legislatures are merely window dressing for a dictatorship that the party council uses as merely an echo point of the party policy, without any right of deviation or selection of what the individual representative in the legislature can say or do.

They all parrot the same party line as though it was a criminal offense, which it probably is, or at least a severe political offense if they deviate. This applies to many of the developing countries as well, does it not?

Mr. DE GRAZIA. Yes, sir; practically all of the countries that have legislatures that really matter are well developed, you might say, economically. Only one or two of them have economies which are not fully developed.

Cochairman MONRONEY. It seems that only the well-developed countries can establish and maintain and perhaps support a right of difference of opinion that is resolved by legislative process; is that correct?

Mr. DE GRAZIA. It would seem so, although it might work the other way around. I am not an economic determinist. I would say that probably there is this sort of mutual interaction, and that having a good government, you have a good economy.

Cochairman MONRONEY. One point I wanted to clear up that you mentioned in your list, and I gathered from what you say, you didn't

take so seriously, as being one of the deficiencies that needed to be too heavily studied, is the duty of appointment of Academy students, or the postmasterships or the little leftover fringes of patronage that still exist as being too onerous a duty that would detract from the congressional time schedules; is that correct?

MR. DE GRAZIA. I am sure that the Congressmen will be the ones to make the last determination as to whether they want to be bothered by other appointments. My inclination would be to support a fair measure of congressional patronage. I think that if we strip the appointment power completely from legislators, individual legislators, you again cut into what I referred to before as the nuclear constituency. That is a certain number of people that a man needs to operate a going concern as a Congressman. The public just doesn't rise up out of the bushes, you might say.

It is a well-formed thing, as you so well know, and on the one hand you have a few very intensely occupied people, and you have less intensely occupied people, and so on and so on, until you get the apathetic, which constitutes about half the population.

Whenever you do anything in the name of efficiency or integration—these words are all dangerous when talking about Congress—when ever you do something in those terms, you take away the right or the ability of the Congressman to maintain a kind of group around himself that he can use and depend upon. Then I think you are diminishing his power, because simultaneously you have the Executive Establishment where people of the same kind are being put on payrolls and are devoting their lives to being involved and interested in those same interests which the Congressman is involved in.

COCHAIRMAN MONRONEY. Congressman Madden?

COCHAIRMAN MADDEN. I appreciate the part of your testimony that I have heard, and it is very constructive. But we have heard a number of opinions since these hearings started and we have also read comments in the newspaper frequently that the Congress, the legislative branch of our Government, is losing its prestige. Some editorials have called Congress a rubberstamp for the Executive. I do not share this view.

I have been in Congress 23 years, and during that time the Congress often did not provide the Executive the legislation that the Executive recommended. During those periods we heard nothing about the Congress being a mere rubberstamp.

In the 1940's the Congress often ignored the Executive's request. Today, however, the American public may be more sensitive to issues and in the last 8 or 10 years I have noticed the people go to the polls with the intention of electing Congressmen who will support the platform of their party.

I don't think it is fair to say that the Congress is a rubberstamp because the majority of the Congress may be following the platform that in 1960 and 1964 the people endorsed. They elected two Presidents on these platforms.

The Congress in supporting the recommendations of the President is doing nothing more than the President is doing, and that is carrying out what the people decided at the last couple or three elections.

Therefore the view that Congress is losing its prestige is nonsense.

Cochairman MONRONEY. Thank you very much, Chairman Madden. Congressman Hall?

Representative HALL. Again I have very little to contribute except appreciation for Mr. de Grazia's appearance. I will particularly compliment him on his delivery. He has obviously thought about this a lot. I would just like to ask one simple question.

In view of your obvious knowledge and perceptive belief in Greeks bearing gifts, will you consider that one of the best things this committee might do would be nothing other than increased administrative efficiency within the Congress?

Mr. DE GRAZIA. Well, I would prefer that the committee expand the scope considerably and study the whole role of Congress in the American system of government, and deal not only with the efficiency of administration internally, but also with the general problem of executive-legislative relations.

Representative HALL. Well, I appreciate that, and I assure the gentleman that we will do that. But in view of the gentleman's remarks about his disbelief in a rubberstamp Congress, and my disbelief in the 80th Congress, or whatever it was, being not a do-nothing Congress at both ends of the stick, it could well be that assuming we study, work, and have all available information and new computerized data collecting, processing, analyzing equipment available to all the Members, and so forth, that outside of modernization of techniques—I am thinking of business office or informational gathering technique—we might arrive at the conclusion that except for this nothing else might better be done lest we throw off balance the trilegged stool of the Founding Fathers' concept of a three-branch government, each independent and counterbalancing the other.

It has been said by some great man—I am sure he must have been great, though I can't quote him—that a man's intelligence is measured by the distance between information and insight. If that is true, we could arrive at this conclusion.

Mr. DE GRAZIA. Well, sir, I would not suggest that this mechanical operation would substitute for a fundamental set of attitudes about what Congress should do and how it should support itself. But I have discovered, working with computer technology myself, that if you have the right control over the machines and the right machines at your fingertips, that you can do a lot more. It makes a big man out of a little man, like the old Colt .45.

Representative HALL. The input still has to be controlled by the human brain, which is the only computer run by unskilled labor; is that your thesis? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Cochairman MONRONEY. Thank you very much, Congressman Hall. Dr. de Grazia, we do appreciate your courtesy in coming before our committee and helping us out in the study of the organization of the legislative bodies of our Government. It has been very helpful to have you and your very competent statement in this regard.

Mr. DE GRAZIA. Thank you, Senator.

Cochairman MONRONEY. Thank you very much.

Our next witness is Dr. E. Foster Dowell, who is currently a professor of public management and economics at Oklahoma City University. He has a B.A. and Ph. D. from Johns Hopkins University. Dr.

Dowell has written two books: "Federal-State Relations and Oklahoma's Constitution," 1948, and "A History of Syndicalism in the United States," 1936.

He has taught at the Collins College in Virginia, from 1936 to 1940, State Teachers' College at Towson Md., 1940 to 1943, Wellesley College in Massachusetts, assistant professor 1943-44, University of Georgia at Athens, assistant professor 1944 to 1946, Oklahoma State University, associate professor 1946 to 1953, Oklahoma City University, associate professor from 1959 to 1963, and professor and chairman of the economics department from 1963 until the present time.

He is a member of the school of business graduate faculty. He is Phi Beta Kappa, president of the Oklahoma Political Science Association, and a director of the Oklahoma chapter of the American Society of Public Administration in 1964. He has published many other books of reference on "Economics and Political Science."

We are very happy and appreciative of your coming up here from Oklahoma. I am personally indebted for the privilege of serving the State, and this allows me to participate in the important work of this committee.

Representative HALL. Mr. Chairman, before the doctor starts, may I apologize to you and to him? Unfortunately my committee, the Armed Services Committee, has the military construction bill coming up on the floor. I promised my chairman that I would be there. I think it is terrible that I have to leave you alone and the other gentlemen having withdrawn, and our worthy doctor of the Oklahoma Political Science Association has made this trip here, and to walk out on him just as he is beginning his testimony. I have no alternative. I shall return immediately if I can.

Cochairman MONRONEY. We appreciate your diligence to both your committee work and your dedication to House work. It is unavoidable with the schedule we are on. This will all be carried in full in the record.

You may proceed in your own way, Dr. Dowell.

STATEMENT OF DR. E. FOSTER DOWELL, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS, OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY

Mr. DOWELL. Thank you for those gracious remarks, Mr. Chairman. I wonder how the committee would care to have me proceed. Perhaps I should just read the statement.

Cochairman MONRONEY. You might read your statement. We apologize for the lateness of the hour, but these matters are uncontrollable.

Mr. DOWELL. These are the fortunes of war, Mr. Cochairman. I am extremely anxious to say this before I make my statement: I realize quite clearly that whereas I read about these things and hear about them from afar, you gentlemen are in the battle every day on these matters of legislative organization and procedure. To safeguard myself I certainly want to make that preliminary statement, Mr. Chairman.

The reason for my appearance here is the fact that the Oklahoma Political Science Association, at its meeting on May 1, passed unanimously a resolution endorsing the reorganization of the Congress and