Alfred de Grazia

The Science and Values of Administration—II

In the preceding issue the author confined his analysis of administration to statements of fact and relations. This approach defined the science of administration, which gives us an understanding of the variables and of the laws of their interaction. But the elements of this science, as represented by his original definition and conception of administrative action, lend themselves well to translation into the applied science of administration, with which the following essay is concerned.

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VI. THE APPLIED SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION

THE applied science of administration consists of general statements that tell a hypothetical actor who subscribes to certain value-postulates (a "policy") what to do in a class of situations. The purposive character of administration never so well reveals itself as when one attempts to set up an applied science. Such a science depends basically upon the postulation of a value and the deduction of preferable subsequent actions from that value. The hypothetical actor is assumed to accept the orginal value postulated and also all subsequent values resulting from the operation of new situations that grow out of the chain of deduced actions.

One can have an applied science of administration (or for that

matter, an applied science of any kind) only so long as those who are constructing it agree to assign a fixed preference of known variability to the actions. By implication, therefore, a neutral applied science of administration does not exist, if by neutral is meant a factual statement without valuational direction. All the neutrality that an applied science of any kind can possess is a neutrality that comes from making explicit the goals of the actors and agreeing to assign them weights, rank orders, and other measures of fixed quality for the duration of the scientific statement.

Sources of Values for Applied Science

There are various ways of introducing necessary values preliminary to the construction of an applied science of administration. One may survey a number of individuals, selected according to some criterion, to determine their values and then proceed to construct an applied science of administration to conform to their values. One may also scrutinize existing organizations in order to determine whether the values of the sponsors accepted as right are being effectively applied. Or one may induce from administrative behavior the values that are determining administrative practice, and these values may then be postulated *ab initio* and used to construct a revised applied science of administration. Or a scientist or observer may make his own values the basis of an applied science of administration, in which event the recommended successive steps or operations will also be a deduction from his postulates. None of these several modes can be chosen exclusively by scientific criteria.

Practicality of Applied Science

On the other hand, although no objective principle may be asserted to determine what values one wishes to postulate as the basis for an applied science of administration, statements derived from certain kinds of values are useless because the values postulated are frequently not encountered in the situations that are described, and hence in that sense cannot be applied. This use of the word "applied" has caused much confusion, in that some people have come to believe that "applied" means practical. The basic consideration, however, in determining if one is treating

with an applied science is whether it states a prescription for action; whether it leads to practical action is irrelevant.

The example of economics. To those who are somewhat perplexed by this point, we call attention to the study of economics, where some of the best scientific applied economics is based upon preconditions and postulates that are obviously unsuited to the practical world.[1] These achievements cannot be refuted as unscientific. They can only be shown, by the application of one of the tests of postulates previously listed, to be incapable of social realization.

The example of medicine. We may cite another example of a familiar applied science to which most people would readily accord practicality, the applied science of medicine. Here for almost all procedures men share the postulated value, namely, cure. The form in which the injunctions of the applied science appear is: "To cure ailment *B*, do *X*." Since almost everyone agrees on the goal for all cases of *B*, there is a ready acceptance of the practicality of the science. So practicality and application are joined.

Yet several features of the applied science of medicine reveal this joining to be one of two independent features of the science rather than of two synonymous terms. Even in our culture, doctors will sometimes complain of people "who do not want to be cured," and the history of medical practice in other cultures and other periods shows that the intensity of desire to be cured, be it called "respect for life" or "concern about the body," varies somewhat. Secondly, doctors today, and more so in other cultures and times, are sometimes frustrated by postulates contrary to what they would like to see called a basic value agreement on *B*. Thus, ought prisoners in war to be cured or allowed to expire from disease and wounds? Or, ought the poor and wretched to be given the same value as the rich and influential? Thirdly, there arise circumstances in which contradictory moral postulates reduce a doctor to as great an indefiniteness and confusion as befall a man who wishes to set up the postulates that will start him off in the construction of an applied science of administration. Among such questions would be the policy of artificial insemination of women, the problem of preferring the death either of the mother or of the

[1]For example see Henry Simons, *A Positive Program for Laissez-faire* (Public Policy Pamphlet Series; Chicago, 1937). This set of imaginative and valid applied propositions is exceedingly unlikely to occur.

unborn baby in a case where a choice must be made, or the problem of "mercy killings," euphemistically called euthanasia.

Applied Science Suffused by Evaluations

In effect, one cannot found an applied science of administration or any other applied science except upon an initial declaration of faith or valuational intention. (If the values are unconscious or silent, the structure of the science is logically invalidated even while it may actually be almost as useful.) Subsequently, one cannot announce principles of action without presuming the constancy of the initial postulates or some constant rate of change in them and without positing a stipulated kind and degree of any other value that is expected or declared to occur in the situations to which the principle is extended.

Lest it be thought that we may be driven into a hopeless position by a remorseless logic, we should call attention to some assured constancies of human value, upon which a useful applied science may, in part, rest. An example may be cited. Since very few persons will deny that their mother was a good person, an applied science of school administration, one of whose stated aims is to be practical, can use a factual statement about how people regard their mothers as a limitation and directive in a number of manipulative propositions about administration. So accepted is the value in this case that it is often an unconscious and silent assumption underlying actions. This obvious universal value could be supplemented by a number of others. It is the task of the person constructing the applied science of administration to understand human beings so well that, if he wishes to be practical, he may construct manipulative propositions on the basis of such knowledge. The clearer the understanding of the valuational basis of the principles of the applied science of administration, the better the chances, in the long run, for a true applied science.

Elements in Formula of Applied Science

Any manipulative proposition of a science, that is, as a proposition of applied science, may be fitted to the formula: To get A, do X. It does not matter whether this is an intellectual solution of a manipulative problem or an action solution, the same procedure is followed internally or externally. In any particular case of an action to be prescribed, this formula becomes: To get A_1, do X_1.

Here, A_1 is a precise goal that is accepted by the operator or actor and has, hence, a valuational quality equal to A. Also X_1 equals a precise and unique action in which the environment of the action X_1 is precisely equal to the environment of X.

Now, any deviation of $A_1, A_2 \ldots A_n$ from A and any deviation of $X_1, X_2, \ldots X_n$ from X must harm the formula, "To get A, do X," for, if the principle is to be valid and useful, it must apply to a number of instances of action, in which A_n does not deviate too far from A nor X_n from X. Sciences differ greatly in their ability to provide such principles. The chances of a science doing so, that is, the chances of its being an exact applied science, vary with the degree of stability of the goal and the environment of the action.

Certain conditons are helpful in constructing applied propositions: (1) a high degree of agreement on the preference or goal; (2) great precision in the operational meaning of A; (3) a highly precise meaning of X; (4) high stability of the environment of X, that is, a high typicality of $X_1, X_2, X_3, \ldots X_n$; and finally, (5) a high degree of evidence of causality (that is, A should follow X in a satisfying number of cases).

This last condition favorable to the creation of an applied proposition has been so exhaustively treated by writers and regarded as so important that it has impeded a fuller understanding of scientific principles in the light of the conditions preceding an applied proposition. This situation is at least partly owing to the constancy, consistency, and simplicity of A in the natural sciences, where applied propositions have been abundantly propagated.

Inevitable deviation of particular actions from formula. If it is clear that a measure of the success of the applied proposition, "To get A, do X," is the degree of deviation of A_1 and so forth and X_1 and so forth from A and X, then we may reason that an applied proposition of administration or of any other science can never approach a specific instruction for the unique case. It can be said empirically that a unique action is almost never capable of description by a proposition dealing with a class of actions. Applied propositions may, of course, be highly general or encompass only a very narrow band of actions. Both types of propositions are useful.

Art of administration as unique action. We might perhaps resurrect the much abused term "art" and say that the art of adminis-

tration consists of unique administrative actions. As expected, however, we find that we are only saying redundantly that the art of administration is essentially the response of the organism to the unique event. If it is a pleasing "uniqueness," it is "good" art as to its creative and habitual elements. It epitomizes the verbally ungovernable and verbally uncontrollable quality of the individual situation. Action itself is undeducible; it is beyond the limits of propositions. It consists of what cannot be described by the science and the applied science of administration. It signifies the unpredictable, that is, the inapplicable. As such, it comes close to what we called earlier creative action, although it should be kept separate from creativeness. All action is unique. Creative actions, though unique and though present in most administrative situations to some extent, are essentially antiadministrative and are unframed initially, by origin and descent. They are *ab initio* not governed by applied propositions or scientific generalizations.

Relations between Applied Science and Science Proper

Now that the character of the applied science of administration has been outlined, I shall compare applied science with the general science described earlier. An applied science is not a simple translation of the propositions of the science of administration, and a general science does not simply convert manipulative propositions to its uses. The two bodies of propositions are fundamentally related to each other, but their significant differences illuminate the character of both sets of principles and the relations between science and society.

Historical view of applied administration. In the first place, we see throughout history a great many instances of men commanding and organizing extensive forces to their ends. Vast empires were created. Seemingly eternal religions were established. Institutions proliferated in the hands of geniuses of administration. Are these not applications of the science of administration? They are, if there is such a thing as "unconscious applied science." These are the activities that many call the art of a science, be it the art of medicine, the art of politics, or some other so-called art. Having already confined art to the unique action in administration, however, we have rejected these concepts. What apparently happens in these impressive historical instances is "applied administration."

Yet we cannot make precise statements about them, because the reflections, memoirs, gospels, and the like of such men are frequently indecipherable and vague. Scientists who wish to construct an applied science of administration often greatly disapprove of such writings, but we shall have to admit these activities to the order of applied administrative science, even though they are incommunicado and fail to supply us with the propositions they reflect. The man who plays by ear must be called a musician, and the administrator who "plays by ear" must be regarded as an applied scientist.

The phenomenon of the extraordinarily successful but unself-conscious administrator shows that applied administrative science exists, but that we have hitherto lacked ways of abstracting the behavior in symbolic form. Many do not realize that, thus viewed, the history of social science shows a degree of success as an applied science that even the most astonishing discoveries of modern natural science cannot claim. Man may be instinctively adjusted to nature in some essential ways, but in general nature is not amenable to "playing by ear" and requires a fully self-conscious analysis and development of its possibilities. A man cannot play the role of a tree or rock, or subject it to his domination and authority. Human behavior, on the other hand, may be extensively analyzed and manipulated by man without great self-consciousness, and a conscious applied science of man can begin only following an extended historical accomplishment. Furthermore, man is not inhibited emotionally at taking a manipulative attitude toward nature, but is embarrassed at taking a "natural" view of mankind; from birth, his being humanized has been a training in avoiding objective, manipulative naturalism. In sum, both the general science of administration and the applied science of administration are only superstructures of the unconscious applied science of administration.

Problems of translating applied and pure science. There are three other problems of transferring the self-conscious propositions from science to applied science and back. One is the difficulty of translating analytic propositions into synthetic ones. Any of the successful generalizations of the science of administration are analytic, that is, abstract. Since the situations to which an applied

proposition refer are complicated and involved, a practical situation requires a reconstruction that is synthetic and total. For example, a relationship in science may be stated as a reciprocal inverse dependence, such as: as *A* increases, *B* decreases. An applied principle does not necessarily emerge from this, however, since one may want to decrease part of *A* and part of *B, D, E,* and *F,* whereas others may wish no *A* at all and parts of *D* and *F*. Thus an applied principle directly translated from the scientific principle may be useful only to a few or perhaps to no one at all. It often happens that the theoretical proposition is validated, agreed to be important, and applauded, but that no one finds it worth while to undertake the difficult task of making it synthetic.

Another interesting feature of science as contrasted with applied science is that a general law of natural or human behavior covers impractical as well as practical situations of applied science. For example, the law of gravitation that governs the position of the planets cannot be used to change their positions although it has many other practical applications. By the same token, many laws of political behavior, though they can be converted to manipulative prescriptions, with agreement on the goal and situation, cannot be put to practice. The impossible cannot be asked, or, if asked, should be regarded as facetious or heuristic, as when Archimedes declared, "Give me a lever long enough, and I can move the world." The science of administration can state principles generalizing about behaviors whose control might be postulated as impossible, yet control might be possible for the applied science. A simple example would be some of the principles dealing with the long-range history of administration, pointing out how developments such as war, technological change, or depressions affect administrative conditions. One cannot very well apply such propositions to bring about the total change of an administrative system; they are lamed by impracticability. He can, however, apply certain portions of those principles in guiding immediate conduct, such as the application of counter-measures to forestall the known effects of war upon an organization.

Usefulness not always associated with specificity. It may be necessary to comment on the variability of the term "usefulness." Somewhat blinded by natural science procedures, many commonly

regard that statement as the most useful which is most specific with reference to a given case. It is possible that for many people the most useful statements of the science of administration may be at a high level of abstraction. The general but abstract propositions may orient one very well and tell one what to watch for in a large number of situations. If one wishes, of course, he may regard such propositions as examples of applied principle. If so, we would have no difficulty with the term "usefulness," except to remind ourselves that the criterion of usefulness here is not the same as the criterion of usefulness in many of the natural sciences, especially if they are mathematically formulated, where "useful" refers to the critical place a proposition holds in a system of propositions and to the number of propositions to which it relates.

At the same time, the most useful generalizations of the *applied* science of administration, taking the term "applied" in a narrow and precise sense, may be on a low level of generality, where agreement on values is present with respect to the goal and where the situation is exceedingly well defined. In terms of administration, this would mean that culture-bound, even shop-bound, or job-bound applied principles are the most useful because in such cases the postulated goals are in accord with the superficial axiology of all concerned in the situation described. Men who otherwise disagree about anything can agree on the principle that a hammer is the best tool for driving nails. Or they may agree, whatever their moral disagreements, that keeping people at work together in the same physical structure is the best way for them to accomplish their task.

Perhaps we may give another example. For all who agree that reports that have a high chance of being added to subsequently should be kept and filed, one may safely declare: "Reports should be bound in loose-leaf form before filing." Or, to use other phraseology: "If a report will be needed again, keep it"; "If it is desired to find a report easily later on, file it by some coding procedure"; or "If a report will be added to, do not bind it, but keep it in loose-leaf form to accommodate later additions." Of course, the "objectivity" of this principle vanishes as soon as one individual decides reports should not be kept, filed, or added to. Then the applied proposition would have to take on a more qualified (and

we should say, suitable) form, such as: "If you wish to keep on file reports that will probably be added to, and you are sure others will agree with this, put them in loose-leaf folders."

This is beginning to seem silly, but the applied science of administration has often been criticized by practitioners precisely because its propositions have been dogmatic and unconcerned with the many possible value problems in any administrative situation. The critics are right, too, because they are aware of the intensely evaluative nature of the administrative process.

Unconscious Seeking of Value Accord

Propositions that involve valuational concord are received joyfully because these principles may be stated simply. This is one reason why textbooks on administration and American government are so Pollyannish. One need not put in all the valuational qualifications, for the good reason that no one is likely to disagree with the goals, and the situation is well circumscribed. As soon as people disagree with the goals of an applied proposition, its phrasing becomes internally complicated. Then the practitioner of applied science finds his behavior to be as absurd as that of a scientist in scrupulously stating an applied proposition. Take the following example: In an army camp it has apparently been difficult to prevent people from smoking in bed. The "barracks lawyers" have perhaps been finding loopholes in the applied proposition in terms of which the commandant probably has been operating, that is, "In order to forestall loss of property, injuries, and loss of life from smoking in bed, forbid smoking in bed and inflict sanctions upon violators of the rule."

5. Smoking in Bed Violations

The following is quoted from DB #269, SWC, 17 Nov. 52 for information and compliance of all concerned.

As a result of inquiries pertaining to a definition of "smoking in bed," the following definition is offered as one definition for the assistance of those who are in doubt as to the meaning of the term: when an individual assumes any position on or in any bed, canvas cot, steel cot, etc., with or without bedding, and then proceeds to smoke, he is "smoking in bed," except that when a person has both feet upon the floor or the ground he cannot be considered as being "in bed". In the event a person reclines upon a bed with one or both

feet off the floor or the ground, and that by the further act of smoking he should cause the bed to catch fire, he should be considered as being in bed because he is using the bed as a bed and not as a chair as he is doing when he sits upon the bed with both feet upon the floor or the ground.

By order of Colonel———:

———

Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

This administrator is striving valiantly for an operational definition of the situation, in order that he may say essentially: "To get A_1, do X_1," but he is finding X_1 exceedingly difficult to define.

Impossibility of Absolute Applied Science

One must conclude, therefore, that the basic nature of administration as a valuational process precludes applied principles of an absolute character. Only a stable goal and environment will permit applied propositions whose utility and validity will be manifested in most of the class of situations to which they refer.

It is of little avail to appeal to the concept of "administration scientifically conducted," as a way out of this characteristic dilemma. That is, one cannot say: "If you conduct administration scientifically, an applied science of administration is possible." This is the fallacy of most writers; they employ valuational, practical fictions using the myth value of science. The fact that an action corresponds to a correct means-end relationship does not make it less an evaluation and selection. Administration scientifically conducted is no more neutral than administration nonscientifically conducted; it is only more scientific. One can only say: "If you desire *A*, then do *X*," meaning by this, "If you desire *A*, but do *Y*, you are probably not going to get *A*, although you are not morally wrong in doing *Y*, nor are the consequences of doing *Y* bad." The point should be clear if one admits that is is quite possible for a third person to abhor administration scientifically conducted, on grounds of preferring different values, or different means, or the failure rather than the success of a certain Mr. Smith in achieving *A*. That is, except by prior agreement or postulation, one is not entitled to prefer what is here termed administration scientifically conducted to administration unscientifically conducted.

VII. IDEOLOGIES OF APPLIED SCIENCES OF ADMINISTRATION

An absolute and singular applied science of administration may be impossible, but this does not prevent people from asserting one, and as soon as we are confronted with assertions of the impossible we approach myth and ideology. The universal claim of ideologies is the objectivity of *their view* of reality. Values are reduced to facts. This is abundantly displayed by writers on administration. Striking among the twists by which ideality is made reality is the elimination of the distinction between applied and pure science. For instance, an advertisement of the *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives* announces that one of its features "is an indispensable guide for those who strive to incorporate the principles of scientific administration into their daily practice." In another instance, W. F. Willoughby, writing in his *Principles of Public Administration,* declares that "in administration, there are fundamental principles of general application, analogous to those characterizing any science, which must be observed if the end of administration, efficiency in operation, is to be secured."[2]

Moreover, since practically all writing on administrative science has been done in the past century, we should expect that most of it would mirror the dominant ideology of the age, which is that of science. Evidence of this is seen in the process of illustrating the claim of objectivity. Every school of applied administrative science has its own way of asserting that its principles flow from the fount of science; every school, that is, is pseudoscientific.

Thereafter, the several schools begin to assume their distinctive ideological shape and color. Each consists of a cluster of interrelated principles aimed at producing in administrative situations certain favored values. Our times are complicated, pluralistic, unclear, as our diverse architectures, literary forms, political movements, and belief systems testify. Accordingly, there exist side by side not one, but several, dominant approaches to the applied science of administration. And each, far from being sharp and distinct, knowing itself from its opponents, tends to have a diffuse structure. Some of its attitudes and recommended practices over-

[2]New York, 1927, ix.

lap those of other approaches. In some cases, some of a man's writings may belong in a body of doctrine other than the one in which he is placed. In any event, a voluminous literature will be available to the scholar of the future who may wish to test the validity of the categories of administrative ideology that we are suggesting here. They include executive centralism, authoritative legalism, *Realpolitik,* and participantism. Finally, we would recommend, as being value-free and self-conscious, a postulative-analytic approach.

Executive Centralism

Executive centralism is the most pervasive ideology of the applied science of administration. Generally a working out of the potent dream, "If I were boss," it has great appeal because it is a universal sentiment and re-enacts the continuous drama of thousands of years of history. What matters it that other common sentiments reflect as much actual history, to wit, "Who is boss around here anyway?" and "A word of command from me, and everyone does as he pleases." President Truman, contemplating the problems that would beset Eisenhower if elected President, said "He'll sit here (tapping his desk for emphasis), and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen."[3]

Often the dream of executive power is limned over by many kinds of ethical justification as well as pseudoscientific language. It is left to the *realpolitik* approach to "expose" the absence of motives other than power. We cannot undertake a rigorous content analysis here, but would merely indicate how a few writers bring questions of executive control into focus.

Thus in the first pages of his *Governmental Administration,* James Charlesworth declares that administration is the "science of realizing the intent of legislation and policy-making executives."[4] In his *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration,* L. D. White writes that "public administration consists of all those operations having for their purpose the fulfillment or enforcement of public policy."[5] Henri Fayol says, "By administrative knowledge we mean planning, organization, command, coordination,

[3]Richard S. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York, 1960), p. 9.

[4]New York, 1951.

[5]Third edition (New York, 1950), p. 3.

and control."[6] Charles Beard declares, "The State in the Great Society, like the private corporation, rests upon administration. . . .Administration—not the sword—is the key to enduring power in the Great Society."[7] So Brooks Adams, so James Burnham, and so W. Brooke Graves, who writes, in his *Public Administration in a Democratic Society,* "Good management is characterized by clearly defined objectives; lines of authority previously defined and reduced to writing in such a manner as to indicate definite limits of authority and responsibility; authority commensurate with responsibility; delegation of authority and responsibility to the maximum degree; simple but effective controls through budgetary procedures, reports, reviews; proper distribution of the workload; and effective supervision at all levels."[8] We might also cite most of the reports of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government of 1949. Luther Gulick views organization as "interrelating the subdivisions of work by allotting them to men who are placed in a structure of authority, so that the work may be co-ordinated by orders of superiors to subordinates, reaching from the top to the bottom of the entire enterprise."[9]

Given the necessity of choosing values of one kind or another in constructing an applied science of administration, one may be allowed whatever values he wishes to inject into the situation. One's values may, however, be used as postulates in a hidden way. Administrative writers often give this kind of activity an objective and neutral aspect and deceive themselves as well as others. For example, as there is consensus regarding the value of actions resulting from a given public office—for example, the presidency—then an applied science of administration may be constructed with this value as central to the principles. The other applied propositions then constitute deductive principles intended and destined to increase the effects of this value through many other areas, as the power, "efficiency," and other aspects of the presidency's role are changed and extended throughout the administrative branch of the government.

[6] *Industrial and General Administration,* quoted on page 5 of Albert Lepawsky, *Administration.* (New York, 1949).

[7] Lepawsky, *op. cit.,* p. 17. [8] (Boston, 1950), p. 550.

[9] *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York, 1937).

Let me illustrate by quoting several passages from an essay entitled "The Future of Administrative Management."[10]

By administrative management, as used in this essay, is meant the functions of the chief executive and his staff and the corresponding activities of all executive and administrative officials who plan, coordinate, direct, and control the work of the government. [p.164]

There will be great advances in administrative management in the future, but they will not come without opposition from timid souls or the privileged few who seek to maintain the *status quo* by keeping government weak and ineffective. [p. 165]

The prime function of executive management is to establish the responsibility of administrative agencies for the faithful and efficient administration of the tasks assigned them. [p. 174]

We may expect that administrative organization in the future will be more symmetrical, unified and integrated, with few independent agencies standing apart. [p. 184]

A great expansion of government in the field of business enterprises may be anticipated as an alternative to governmental regulation and for other reasons. [p. 181]

The development of administrative management will not defeat but, on the contrary, will enhance the ultimate responsibility of executive officers and agencies to the legislature. [p. 191]

But, of course, this kind of administrative theory is not Professor Harris' alone. He received it from other distinguished teachers and in turn has helped to pass it on. Academics, politicians of clashing persuasions, and the efficiency engineers and survey agencies vie with each other in their expression of such views.[11]

In the *Elements of Political Science,* I asserted that the major *principles* of administration are representations of the instrumental goal of authority. The hierarchical pyramid, delegations of work, staff and line organizations, and command responsibilities are all institutionalizations of administration according to the

[10]By Joseph P. Harris, in L. D. White, ed., *The Future of Government in the United States* (Univ. of Chicago Press, copyright 1942 by Univ. of Chicago), ch. ix.

[11]"Ten Commandments of Good Organization," prepared by the American Management Association affords another good example of applied administrative principles aimed at increasing executive control and assuming an accord on values that is surely wanting in many concrete situations. They are quoted, together with similar principles ventured by other authors, by John D. Millett, "Working Concepts of Organization," in Fritz Morstein Marx, ed., *Elements of Public Administration* (New York, 1946), pp. 154–156.

principle of maximizing the sponsors' power. This is not to say that they are not at the same time ways of getting work done, and ways universally to be found of doing work, but it should be emphasized, however sadly, that the deviations from the administrative model that maximizes sponsors' internal power are few in number and not too significant in the total historical picture. Most often administration is a co-ordination of powers by a controlling few, and the applied science of administration is normally a manual of instructions to the power elite.

Evaluative meaning of efficiency. Just as the concepts of public administration can be shown to be closely related to traditional executive-centered administration, so the concept of "efficiency" can be shown, under practically all circumstances, to be similarly related. The essential meaning of efficiency is evaluative: efficiency, in human or natural engineering, is always measured by a goal-achievement index. As an instrumental objective in administration, efficiency means that a given method of performing a task is most "pleasing" to those controlling the method. Often "pleasing" has to do with material values such as input–output ratios of machines and clerks, but frequently the most "efficient" way of performing a task is conditioned on a clear triumph of executives' interests over the interests of others. In general, just as most administrative theory is founded on the maximization of executive control, "efficiency" is defined by executives' values.

It was something of this impatience with the academic idea of efficiency that occurred to Alexis de Tocqueville, when he contrasted the continental democratic and American democratic administration. The centralized executive power of the former differed markedly from the clientele power of America. He makes such comparisons as this: "That uniformity or permanence of design, the minute arrangement of details, and the perfection of administrative system must not be sought for in the United States; what we find there is the presence of a power which, if it is somewhat wild, is at least robust, and an existence checkered with accidents, indeed, but full of animation and effort." He ridicules the evaluation of administration according to the excellence of accounting practice and bids us observe "the activity, the informa-

tion, and the spirit of enterprise in those American townships whose budgets are neither methodical or uniform."[12]

Human Relations Engineering

Many of the newer researches in administration have been incorporated in a school of "human relations engineering." One should not be deceived into believing this to be a fundamental moral reform of the traditional body of administrative principle. The basic model usually is the same: How does one organize to maximize executives' control and accomplish the substantive tasks set by the executives? The new human relations is more "efficient" than the old "authoritarian" school of "Orders are orders!" It discovers the social, ideological, and behavioral peculiarities of participants and clientele and tells the sponsors: You can more easily accomplish your objectives by treating employees and public as equals, superiors, or collaborators, or by recognizing the true sources of their resistance to authority.

The extent to which most of the new "human relations engineering" has camouflaged the essence of administration is astonishing. Part of the explanation for this is the high reputation of science, in the social sciences as well as the natural sciences. If human beings are placed in a position where they seem to act voluntarily in accredited ways, the problem of conflict of wills is submerged. Another factor that helps explain the new administrative theory is the strong preference found in "democratic" societies for psychological control rather than open authoritative control.

Still a third factor is the prestige that "human relations" methods give the intelligentsia, who write on administrative theory, applied psychology, and related subjects. If their methods are used, their staff powers are enhanced; it would be unlikely that they would allow parallels to be drawn between their methods and the old discredited ones. One would even expect the new human relations to be presented as true democracy. As described here, however, such practices are to be regarded essentially as a means of extending the executives' power.

Authoritative Legalism

The concept of "administration as law" is a common way of

[12]*Democracy in America* (New York, 1946), I, 91–92.

constructing an applied science of administration. Writers who pride themselves on their realism or their behaviorism have made too narrow an analysis of its meaning. They usually dismiss it as a form of pedantry or traditional vocationalism. Administration as law holds that the determination of the correctness of administrative action depends upon whether the action can be reasonably deduced to be lawful. The science of administration is then defined as the legal principles describing administrative establishments and governing their internal or external relations. The applied science of administration then consists of a system of prescriptions for lawful behavior, as deduced from the systematic legal framework that envelops the establishments. The great utility of this approach rests upon its assumptions of the "goodness" of control and upon the efficacy of controls. That is, the validity of the juridical approach in administration is a fiction, or rather two fictions that come close enough to both conventional morality and actual behavior ("there is a law covering every action") to be able to stand usefully for the realities.

Given an ideological milieu in which administrators and academic students of administration are closely bound up (such as existed in pre-Nazi Germany between the high bureaucracy and the universities, and between both and the society as a whole), the defects of this approach to administration are not easily apparent. In view of what has already been said, however, the juridical theory of administration turns out to be *(a)* a justification of the basic laws and establishments, *(b)* a preference for the instrumental values of control, *(c)* a vote of confidence for established legal procedures, and *(d)* a blindness to the deviations of many administrative situations from the law.[18]

In short, the model of administration as law is an impossible one for a scientist, as it is badly circumscribed by its limited evaluative position. It is doubly deceptive because it involves authoritarian premises, and nothing quite threatens objectivity in social analysis as much as authority. Authority in all its manifestations, including antiauthoritarianism, is so universal, so insidious, and so intricate that it inspires an "objectivistic" subjectivity.

[18]Cf. the author's Law and Behavior: A Unified Approach to their Study, *Political Research: Organization and Design*, 3 (1960), 3–7.

So, although "administration as law" embraces and explains a great many actions that are administrative, it provides a pseudo-scientific body of principles and should be isolated from the general science and applied science of administration. Administration as law emerges from the essential nature of administration as action. The law is a proof of administrative practice. It is likely to be a deductive system of authority and control, and can be an applied science of administration granted its premises, but its relativity to all such postulates must be made explicit. It is a possible subsystem of the applied science of administration, related strikingly, like one of its greatest critics, the *realpolitik* or "power" theory of administration, to the executive-centered ideology.

Supposed Contrast Afforded by the Realpolitik *Theory*

Whereas the juridical theorists state principles of applied administration deductively from "the law," such as "The law indicates personnel should be reprimanded before more formal action is brought against them," the *realpolitik* theorists declare: "Do not reprimand a man unless you are ready to fire him." While the former says, "Authority should be undivided," the latter may say, "No man can serve two masters." Both ordinarily aim at maximizing executive control, the one more formally, the other more realistically.

I mentioned earlier that a work by Alexander Leighton and *The Prince* of Machiavelli were similar in general goals and strategy, even while they differ in specific values and sanctions. One is called administration, the other politics. Let us see now why the basic approach of the two works may be similar, because, if this is so, we shall gain insight into the nature of applied administration and the *realpolitik* model of applied administration.

Leighton's theoretical work is organized into a number of postulates about human behavior and a number of recommendations to would-be administrators. They are generalizations of "lessons" from a desert relocation center for Japanese-Americans during World War II. They deal with cultural similarities and differences, social organizations, human stresses and reaction to stress, human motives, and the motives, stresses, and organizations of executive and participant administrators (as distinguished from the internees or clientele). The law is only a shadowy structure embracing the

important action. As soon as Leighton transfers his interest from the postulates or their derivatives to their application, he, of course, resorts to manipulative statements in the form of: To get *A*, do *X*.

In his own words:

> The Principles [postulates] are thought to have validity which is independent of any political theory or design for living. The *Recommendations* are based on the supposition that any administration will aim at the successful accomplishment of its assigned task, whether that be relief, rehabilitation, resettlement, or outright government, and will aim at operation with a minimum cost of men, materials, money and time.[14]

Now it will be noted that the recommendations (applied science of administration) must have goals. In this case, the substantive goals are "relief, rehabilitation, resettlement or outright government." The instrumental goal is "a minimum cost of men, materials, money and time." It is clear that here is a new Machiavelli. The "prince" wants to rule a domain. The main differences are not fundamental but rather minor differences of exactly who does what to whom with what intention.

We are interested here primarily in the extent to which *power* is an instrumental objective for the achievement of Leighton's goals. In scrutinizing each of the almost one hundred recommendations in the work, we noted that almost all recommendations had to do with increasing the executives' power, particularly over the clientele. Although some were concerned with the participants, they had to do with how to increase one's control over the staff's anxieties, beliefs, and organization. About fifteen recommendations seemed to be "power" recommendations, but, unlike the vast majority, these were "democratic" principles, intended to increase the power of the clientele. (How these would accord with the original statement of directives is not clear; we suspect that Leighton was basically prointernee and pro-Japanese and felt the true enemy was the militaristic or "bureaucratic" elite, with its "old-fashioned," "harsh," and ineffective methods of rule.)

Certainly his treatment of the problems of administration would reinforce the theory that the basic model of administration is one of instrumental power or control. Certain features of this study

[14] *The Governing of Men* (Princeton, 1945), p. 85.

provide additional evidence. The study is anthropological and psychiatric in tone and approach. One finds little of the traditional problems of text writers in administration. Yet the substance of this model of administration is clearly revealed; it is executive-valued and executive-implemented through applied principles of maximizing power. In his work one sees the bridge between Machiavellism and "human relations engineering" that has disturbed sensitive critics of both in the name of humanism and democracy.

Participantism

There is, however, a different kind of "human relations in management," essentially, an endeavor to maximize control for participants. In its model of administration, a different instrumental motive prevails. Its advocates seek to distribute both controls and work happiness more equally.

The writings of Mary Parker Follett belong here.[15] So do those of Ordway Tead. For example, Tead writes:

> Democratic administration is...that over-all direction of an organization which assures that purposes and policies are shared in the making, that methods are understood and agreed to, that individual potentialities are being enhanced, that corporate or group ends are being realized with a maximum of release in shared creative power and a minimum of human friction....In these respective administrative areas (industries and agencies) we are to create and operate under constitutional forms not merely as a measure of prudence, expediency, or efficiency at the level of material gain—but because to develop citizenship in our economic and administrative substate is *the* condition of assuring that the conduct of these states-within-the-state will work approximately in the public interest of personality fulfillment, in the interest of democratic aspiration and method consistently flowering in *all* branches of our common life.[16]

John Gaus reduces somewhat the impact of the executive centralism view by introducing the idea of satisfaction of employees (participants) as equal in importance to the satisfaction of the

[15]For an annotated list of titles on this approach to applied administration, see my *Human Relations in Public Administration* (Chicago, 1949); also William J. Gore and Fred S. Silander, A Bibliographical Essay on Decision Making, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 4 (1959) 97–121.

[16]*Democratic Administration* (New York: Association Press, 1945), pp. 71–73.

aggressively...showing envy towards another's contribution by trying to take credit for it."

The authors follow each "problem" with a "remedy." "*Conference leader's remedy*. Place Donald Duck at your left (the blind spot). Fail to hear his objections, or if you do, misunderstand them. If possible, recognize a legitimate objection and side with him. Object is to get him to feel that he 'belongs.' "

In its summary, the booklet recommends "democracy in action" if a conference is to be a "problem solver." "The group reaches the maximum effectiveness when all the members feel personally responsible for the success of the meeting; and this feeling of personal responsibility starts with the determination to find a common ground."

Now, of course, this is applied science. I have no quarrel with its moral premises,[25] or its validity. We are interested mainly in pointing to the essential participant orientation of this type of applied administration. It is genuine and shows that a number of reputable scholars and administrators actually visualize a model of administration in which power is shared. In fact, power sharing is here viewed as the most important single instrumental goal of administration.

Participant rule by constitutional form. Attention may be called to another pamphlet of the same type, *How to Conduct a Union Meeting,* published by the UAW-CIO Education Department (no date) when R. J. Thomas was International President. The definition of purpose is quite similar to that of the Navy pamphlet: Democracy means "members of the Unions meeting together to find answers to their problems, and working together to solve them." Then the pamphlet goes on to describe plainly the rules of legislative procedure, with words to encourage the timid to participate. Here the applied administration is based upon a preferred and integrated hierarchy of rules originating outside of the meeting in time and space. Assuming the presence of informal

[25]For example, one might raise strenuous objections to the major value of the pamphlet, that postulates the goal of getting a group decision out of all committees. What of the postulate, often equally defensible, that the goal shall be to prevent a committee action? What would happen to the common practice of calling a committee *in order* to do nothing about an issue. Cf. M. Kriesberg and H. Guetzkow, The Use of Conferences in the Administrative Process, *Public Administration Review,* 10 (1950), 93–98.

sanctions (mores) and formal ones (as enforced by sergeants-at-arms), the scientific prescription for action follows the rules closely. There is a benign air about the statement, however, that belies the original motive of participant equality—something that was not always present at UAW meetings or at many others.

The rules here are designed to serve all participants equally up to the moment of voting, when the majority is treated unequally and favorably. There are literally thousands of situations administered formally by such means, and, whether we go back to the great studies by Sidney and Beatrice Webb of the history of trade union democracy in England and those of Robert Michels on European unions and parties, or whether we read the files of the McClellan Committee to investigate trade union practices in the United States, we must include such situations in the study of administration.

But a bewildering variety of works and materials, hitherto considered trivial or peripheral to the study of administration, should be taken into account. Church government, moving from the Quakers through the diverse Protestant and Catholic groupings, within Christianity alone, supplies abundant material for the theorist. Each grouping is within our scope and has besides made some attempt to tell its people how to act in the organization and upon their clientele. The same is true of business organizations, of welfare groups, of interest-group associations, of political party organizations, and of universities. The science of administration will come of age when it speaks distinctly of all these administered situations and can create for each of them such applied sciences as are desired.

Postulative-analytic View

One may conclude that it is possible, even if difficult, to study and describe all administration in ways that would truly give equal value to participants and to executives with respect to the instrumental value of power in administration. This would only be a self-conscious, rigorous, systematic applied science of administration, in accord wtih the values of participants, of clients, or of whatever group or type of ideal is postulated. Concepts of "consumer," "the public," and "the customer" come to mind in this connection. Much of the discussion of representative-constituent,

state-individual, government-people, agency-public relationships would become centrally relevant to such works of administration. The sponsor-centered works would retire to better perspective in the variegated scope of social values. Some indications of the possibilities of this kind of administration are to be found in scattered writings about the use of public polls in administration and in the literature of interest representation. (In the latter case, however, the mistake is often made of identifying clientele with a partial-clientele group, such as the railroads before the ICC, when such a group might even better be considered as a participant.)

Other Deviations from Executive-Centered Model

But this kind of argument has governed neither the political preferences nor the scientific interests of most American or European theorists. Charles Hyneman's *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* is a lonely treatise on administration, postulating legislative supremacy.[26] Other works, such as those of Dimock and Tead referred to earlier, elevate the creative individual; in the ideal form they describe him as the person before whose interests institutions must give way. The "case study method" met with nowadays in the teaching of educational, industrial, and public administration, is a notable attempt (mostly unconscious) to reduce the posturings of traditional applied and general theory to value anarchy in order at least to convey the complexity of fact-value situations. Each case demands a unique fact-value approach.

If we were to direct any negative criticism at that valiant and remarkable text on public administration by Herbert Simon, Donald Smithburg, and Victor Thompson,[27] it would probably be aimed at the intellectual environment, for it seems to me that they have had to advance with an enormous baggage of traditional categories and problems that prevent them from clearly and sharply reorganizing administrative study to conform to their underlying theories. They would have enhanced the already great value of their work if they had abandoned this baggage and systematically exploited their objective and pluralistic fact-value position. They have presented a general sociology of administration, fragmented into pieces holding some attraction to contemporary

[26]New York, 1950.

[27]*Public Administration,* New York, 1950.

teachers. They avoided systematic applied science, perhaps because it would have hopelessly confused an already intricate rationalization of traditional themes.

And yet, many of these same themes are labeled in applied form (for instance, staffing the organization), thus lending the work the appearance of dealing in applied administration.

To a certain extent, the compromises of textbooks have been shaken off in a recent work by James G. March and Herbert A. Simon called *Organizations.*[28] This work, in the style of Lasswell and Kaplan's *Power and Society,* provides many propositions whose objectivity is scarcely open to question and that reflect very well the recent literature of social-psychological approaches to administration. Encumbered by a mass of purely empirical studies, however, the theory of the book only begins to emerge, and its larger implications must await a later clarification.

CONCLUSION

I conclude that the science of administration should be vast in scope and should progress according to an objective autonomous momentum. It should father as many applied sciences of administration as there are important sets of values (including anarchistic or null-values) to be carried into administered situations.

Training people to *study* administration is difficult; training them to *be* administrators is even more difficult. Whereas the former may be managed by opening the whole administrative world of yesterday and today to objective examination, the latter may be achieved only by setting up elaborate models based upon key value premises. We believe that, if applied administration is to be taught at all without destructive effects upon creativity, it must be taught as an exercise in the postulation of alternative values (often of opposites), in the systematic assessment of conditions affecting a given value system, and in the prescription of preferred action for those who accept the values. The subjective and relative nature of the pedagogy should be constantly indicated in order to prevent indoctrination and "scientism." Taught in this way, administrative science could be regarded as a worthy part of education in "the liberal arts."

[28]New York, 1958.