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Alfred de Grazia

The Science and Values of Administration—I

In the first of two parts the author, asserting that all action is purposive, calls group-performed habitual actions "administration." The task of administrative science is to generalize about all administrative situations. How the science selects and abstracts data and chooses and phrases propositions is described. An administered situation has actors (sponsors or executives, participants, and clientele), targets (goals), and effects. Goals are substantive and instrumental, and include especially power, wealth, and prestige. Power and control constitute the core value, reflected in the preponderance of deductive operations. Organizations formed around wealth and prestige tend to become executive-power centered. The wealth value is especially compatible with clientele-centered organizations, the prestige value with participant-centered groups.

Alfred de Grazia is professor of government, New York University, and publisher of The American Behavioral Scientist.

ADMINISTRATION as action, science, and applied science is the subject of this study. I shall try to explain why the science of administration needs reform and how it can be improved: this entails a logic of science and an essay on the differences between the pure and applied science of administration. Within this main theme we shall offer some basic propositions of administration which deal with the relation between administered and other action, with the relation between administrative science and socie-

ty, with the growth of administration, and with the relation between administration and important values, particularly power.

A general theory of administration can account for much of human action. Action may be divided into creative action and habitual action. Administrative action may profitably be viewed as a subcategory of habitual action. Administrative *thought* itself is viewed as action that is internalized, for administrative action, like other forms of action, may be internalized in the mind as well as externalized in behavior. (John Dewey's instrumentalism is especially useful to support the parallelism of internal and external thought-action processes.)

The broadness of this view of administration will not, we believe, detract from its utility. The subcategories thereupon evolved will have a firmer base in theory and in references to reality. Also, the broad scope may expose new theoretical problems to analysis. We wish to present an objective discussion of administration, and we believe that some surprises will result when various traditional theories are subjected to analysis in terms of their explicit or implicit evaluations of administrative action.

Another aim is to distinguish the science of administration (scientifically or unscientifically conducted) from the applied science of administration. This not only is necessary for the general theory but will be useful in analyzing much confused theory that is limiting or misleading. It is our intention, too, to frame a theory that is operational rather than simply authoritative or aesthetic.

I. ADMINISTRATION AS ACTION

Administration is a kind of action, or, better, may be *viewed* from our perspective as a kind of action. By this we mean that administration manifests the salient characteristics of human action, so that the orders of a general, the rules of a school superintendent, the routines of a filing clerk, the discipline of a political boss, and many other human activities possess the characteristics of action as well as of administration.

Action Purposive

Several traits of action require emphasis for studying administration. All action is in a profound sense purposive. Human behavior is distinctive in its preoccupation with ends or goals.

More precisely, human behavior can only be distinguished by understanding its ends or goals. Whether these ends or goals are deduced from behavior or studied directly by inquiry or introspection, they present an indispensable subject for the methodology of social science. In the words of Aristotle, "Every act and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good." This thesis is, if only *de facto,* accepted by most students of human behavior. Even the behaviorist school of psychology, in its learning theory and in such utopian political writings as Skinner's *Walden II,* finds itself occupied with motives. For how can science find a role to play unless it connects with human desires? The father of modern methodology in the natural sciences, Francis Bacon, declared in the *Novum Organum* that Aristotle's fourth type of cause—final or goal cause—"corrupts the sciences except in the intercourse of man with man."[1] In all action, and in administrative action by inference, one cannot act without venting a preference, conscious or unconscious, and without advancing some moral viewpoint and impeding another. As John Stuart Mill said, "the rules of action. . . must take their whole character and color from the end to which they are subservient."

Action as a purposive human event is the predicate of an actor. It assumes a process that involves a goal. Using an instrumentalist theory, we say that the goals of action are more or less contained in and coterminal with the action process itself. Hence the goals in any action stretch out from beginning to end with infinite subdivisions, like the tortoise's route in Zeno's fable. With our present techniques, however, the goal element in action cannot be subdivided mathematically, but must be imagined as an infinite number of irregular modifications extending from the goal, when the action first commenced, to the probably different goal, when the action may be said to have been terminated. It is perhaps sufficient at this point to declare that there are frequently important changes to be observed in the character of human goals as action progresses.

Uniqueness of Action

Action is also unique. No two actions are alike in every respect,

[1]We would amend Bacon, however, so far as to say that "final cause" does not corrupt the other sciences either; rather, it is so difficult to work with that until the twentieth century man has preferred to evade it.

although they may share general characteristics and be categorized by science. Such diverse social philosophers as Tocqueville, William James, and Max Weber have commented on the uniqueness of action. Actions are unique in that the number of variables that enter into human behavior, internal and environmental, are incapable of a priori description and are so many as to defy replication. Though we may inject into the analysis or prediction of an action every scientific dimension, including the changes of perspectives of the observer, we cannot attain the fullness of reality. No commentary is equal to its cause.

Action Internalized or Externalized

Action may be internalized or externalized. The psychology of action, while still indefinite on this point, is at least sufficiently clear to justify some statement. The human organism frequently operates in two worlds, which may be called ego and other. But the evolution of the ego and the other as psychological dimensions of the personality exhibits an essential unity of personal universe. What one does to others and to things is essentially what one does to himself and within himself. One's actions are like streams that flow sometimes underground, sometimes above ground. Many human actions represent choices of behavior that may be demonstrated overtly to the outside world or may be conducted entirely through the nervous system and internalized relationships. Without this conception, systematic theory—such as decision theory and communication theory—would not be able to cope with external actions, which would appear as spasmodic and unintelligible eruptions of personality dynamics.

Action, therefore, is purposive, unique, and may be an internal or external human operation. It is the basic unit by which we may understand human dynamics. Given action, we may isolate an actor with a goal and observe his conduct in consummating the goal, realizing that the goal itself often is transformed in the course of the action.

Action Creative or Habitual

Actions may be termed creative or habitual. Creative action is the essence of poetry and anarchy. It is action uninstructed and uncontrolled. It arises from the complexity of man's nature, which

allows unlimited and indeterminate values. Creative action is peculiarly at home in man. Its essential nature does not arise from uniqueness, for we have said that all action is unique, but from its incompatibility with its environment, with expectation. It is neither good nor bad in itself; external criteria are necessary to judge its value.

Some environments of human action are congenial to creative action, even structured for creative action. Thus we have literature, painting, and other humanistic disciplines, in which, no matter how ineffectually, men labor to provide something new. But no human activity is free from creative action. The administered fields of human action are the most notable in discriminating against creative action, but even here creative action plays an important part and cannot be dissociated from the realities of administrative activity.

Creative action is distinct from what is usually termed habit, of which administrative action forms a part, for the essential meaning of habit or habitual action is that the act be reflective of preceding actions, with or without self-awareness. Creative action tends to be inductive in character, whereas habitual action tends to be deductive, and again either may be quite without self-awareness.

A creative act becomes repetitive according to laws of physiological and psychological development that cannot be elaborated here. Rather conventional theories of human development are adequate to describe in general the conditions under which novel action springs forth, is evaluatively and physiologically framed, and continues as habit. John Dewey speaks for us when he says:

> The word habit may seem twisted somewhat from its customary use when employed as we have been using it. But we need a word to express that kind of activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity. Habit, even in its ordinary usage comes nearer to denoting these facts than any other word.[2]

[2] *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1930), p. 40.

And in turn habit is the basis for new evaluative and behavioral actions.

Administration as Institutionalized Habitual Action

Like other action, administration is always purposive, unique, internally or externally performed. Like habitual action, administration has a quality reflective of preceding actions. It is essentially a deduction from precedent action and purpose. It is repetitive.

The actor, his action, and the situation are generally recognized as categories by the members of a society. The action is not regarded as *sui generis*. Many actions associated with administration are creative. They are highly important, especially when one concerns himself with the goals and values of administration, but their creativity is—according to our model of administration—anti-administrative; if there are too many creative actions in the milieu, we must move into the realm of poetic action, anarchy, or politics.

To the basic categories of action and of habit must be added another feature of an action if it is to be termed administration. Administration is institutionalized action. It is deducible from a group's operational code, performed within a group milieu, and is surrounded by a pattern of related practices. The institutionalization of action patterns precipitates a new frame of reference that participants give some identity to. Institutionalization in fact provides for many actors a supraindividual purposiveness that allows the actors to become unconscious and yet directed and purposeful. (It may be seen here how closely habit on the individual level is related to institutionalization on the group level.) Functions, forms, purposes, and other dimensions of thought and behavior are transferred in various ways from individual to group and back. It is the task of the science of administration to determine the principles governing these transfers of operations and affects.

II. ADMINISTRATION AS SCIENCE

Since we have defined a vast sphere of human action as administration, the question may properly be raised: "How can one define administration so broadly and expect to achieve principles that are meaningful to those who wish to study administration

scientifically?" In reply I would say that it is ill-advised to waive the existence of many special areas of habitual institutionalized actions. We have defined administration broadly, and moved the concept into most social sciences and most human institutions, in the hope that the subsequent theory may be useful in all areas.

We would insist that all mechanical and technical skills applied in institutions qualify for the term administration. Even scientific procedure, insofar as it is a repetition of modes of testing, validating, and standardizing experience, based upon certain premises of a philosophical kind, qualifies as a kind of administration. A general theory of administration, it is hoped, will embrace some essential modes of the behavior of scientists, as well as the behavior of clubs and fraternal societies, workshops and trading companies, youth leagues and church groups, and armies and government agencies.

It is true that in each of these types of institutions practices are determined to a great extent by the skills of participating individuals, by the goals of the group with reference to the inner or outer effects of the group and by the inherited rules of operation within the group, and by the rules relating to the group's environment. There is nothing unadministrative about these goals, rules, and skills. They are simply special forms of administrative action. It is not the scope of a general theory of administration to say how the church is organized or ought to be organized, except within very broad limits. Nor is it the task of a theory of general administration to declare the skill operations, the goal selection, or the rules by which these organizations operate. A general theory of administration cannot, for example, describe the modes of biblical exegesis peculiar to certain types of religious organization; if men are promoted within a group according to their expertness in interpreting the Bible, this behavior should not be contradicted by some principle of the science of administration; it should be possible to describe it as a special case of some general principle of administration. The same may be said of the organization of special literary accomplishments within the prerepublican Chinese bureaucracy, the literati. The use of tests of classical education in recruiting the British administrative service in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is an illustration of the same kind. Similarly

in the United States a knowledge of laws and constitutions was for a long time held to be the substance of education for administrative posts.

Consequently, one might be tempted to declare that the science of administration with respect to a particular group is a science whose principles consist of the knowledge necessary to succeed in such a group. Again, we would not argue that the special sciences of administration are not concerned with particular institutional practices. In fact, administrative actions occurring in particular institutions form the data for the special science of administration in each case. However, the general theory of administration must set its own criteria for categorizing administrative actions, and an administrative action may be a datum for a special science of administration and at the same time a datum for the general science of administration.

Bureaucracy Not Sole Model for Administrative Theory

Somewhat analogous to the preceding problem is the problem of employing a single model of administrative action as exclusively entitled to the total scope of administrative study. Perhaps the most interesting case of this problem is Max Weber's special theory of bureaucracy.[3] Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy comes so close to describing the essential general traits of administrative action in most twentieth-century large-scale organizations, that many writers and students use the model as a measuring rod for large-scale organizations of all kinds. Somehow it has been presumed that familial, patrimonial, and feudal orders, or charismatic movements, to use several of Weber's other categories of human organization, are not administrative or are not instructive for the science of administration. Actually, the science of administration, properly construed, would embrace the actions occurring in all kinds of institutions, though the internal and external operating arrangements of such institutions might be differently defined, justified, or legitimized, and result in differing types of productivity. Even a charismatic movement, though it may be based on the fictions of

[3]Weber's general theories of organization and bureaucracy are contained in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* ed. by H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York, 1946), and T. Parsons, ed., *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York, 1957).

antibureaucracy, anti-institutionalization, and antitraditionalism, is still an administrative order, masquerading as creative action.

Science of Administration Selective

The examples just cited may help to explain the definition of the science of administration that follows. It should be apparent that the science of administration is first of all selective. It chooses for study the careers and patterns of administrative actions wherever they may occur, and its language consequently is composed of terms not necessarily most useful or most used in the special sciences of administration. Since any human situation contains a body of actions possessing the character of administration, there can be a science of administration concerning government, or business, or education, or voluntary associations.

Science of Administration Abstractive

Besides being selective of events or data, the science of administration is abstractive and treats specified aspects of the selected data rather than other aspects. Any vignette in the domain of administrative action illustrates what is meant by abstraction. For example, we set up a case: a man wearing an armband saying "foreman" declares to a second man, "Pick up that long-handled shovel and dig here." A second man picks up the shovel indicated and digs for one hour until he has a large hole. An industrial engineer who is concerned with administrative action viewed as the allocation and employment of available material and techniques over a period of time will describe the actions in terms of the capabilities of different shovels, the resistances of earth, the time elapsed, and the specificity of communication. A general administrative scientist will abstract data on the giving of orders by skilled supervisors to workers, followed by a response. Both are approaches to administrative action. The latter follows the general theory of administration; the former a special theory of administration. Both theories create scientific propositions about reality by abstracting certain types of events.

Each kind of abstraction is justified by the particular demands of its master science. Whether someone prefers the one or the other analysis of the event in question is not to any great extent dependent upon the greater correspondence of the one or the other to the reality viewed, but depends upon some other prin-

ciple for the abstraction of events. (We cannot deny, however, the greater difficulties of holding meanings constant in the second, general type of theory, but that difficulty merely exalts general theory to its devotees.)

Fallacy of "Practical" Criticisms of Administrative Abstractions

The failure of most writers to understand what they mean by the term administration is the chief cause of interminable arguments over the "most useful" and "true" abstractions of reality. It is here, too, that so many "hardheaded" criers of "gobbledygook" fall into error, for they fail to realize that the criticized description orpropositions very often do not happen to be related to the kind of general propositions they wish to make about the same data. Such persons would do better to ask always the correct methodological question: what kinds of data is the *writer* trying to abstract and what kinds of propositions does *he* ultimately seek? Then, if he wishes, he may argue over the instrumental utility of such abstractions or even ethically over the importance or relevance of having a general body of propositions of the kind the writers seek.

Criteria for Choice of Generalizations

Perhaps an effective way of clarifying what is meant by general propositions of administration would be to cite examples of such propositions. This is done in section III, below. There may be laid down here, however, certain criteria according to which the science of administration chooses areas of generalization for construction of propositions.

Unconscious values. One can discover in the history of generalization in any natural or social science a conditioning by unconscious fundamental values. This conditioning ranges from profound character structuring to mere unself-awareness. We would therefore expect that the ideology of the workers in any scientific field would provide the primary and most important initial source of generalizations. Administrative researchers tend to seek general principles regarding the several common social situations and major values of their cultures; and some of these workers will move from the single social situation, or value predisposition that constitutes a kind of specialized interest, toward generalization of the communization of life situations and values typical of the

society as a whole. Thus the automobile producer sees the federal government as a giant automobile plant, while the constitutional lawyer sees it as a huge commentary on the Constitution. Karl Mannheim has shown how men's minds settle upon particular intellectual locales for proposition making. A well-known example is the predilection of medieval theologians for propositions regarding the hereafter and of modern theologians for propositions dealing with the social role of religion.

Conscious choice of issues. Most selection of the locales of propositions occurs unconsciously, but sometimes there is a conscious choice of areas of burning issues about which propositions are needed. One may range from the ancient Sophists to many modern social scientists, such as Robert Lynd, to find examples of men who insist that what is regarded as crucial to a generation's happiness should be the source of authority for constructing propositions of a scientific kind regarding man. "Man is the measure of all things."

According to this theory, the criterion for regarding a proposition as important, and therefore certifying it as useful, is the urgency of the social problem to which the proposition is relevant. Very often this criterion overlaps the criteria of an unconscious ideology. The clamor about the "organization man" is an example. What men are excited about tends to become part of the warp and woof of their existence. So the cycle of mutual causation occurs.

Creative and imaginative values. Creative or imaginative values may also be the source of scientific work. Many historians, for example, defend their interest in certain esoteric and apparently irrelevant problems of the past on grounds that they are simply "curious" about such problems. Or they may say that such problems represent elegant manifestations of the possibilities of the human character. While we may or may not accept these problems as valuable or relevant, the work done in such areas may be fully as scientific as the work done in any "more relevant" or more valuable fields. On the other hand those who write of history as "it should have been" or write of society as "it ought to be," cannot be said to be scientists at all even though their interests are deemed relevant or important. Their activities are properly to be studied as creative action, good or bad as the case may be.

Instrumental criteria. Finally, the criterion for selecting the area

of propositions may be instrumental, that is the joining of the several criteria mentioned—ideological, politically crucial, and imaginative—create a need for certain propositions that relate the several concerns and bridge the several subfields. The social sciences, and especially political science, are full of propositions of equivalences of meanings. Thus one frequently hears that "by such a proposition in area *A* is meant proposition *X* or some modification of *X* in area *B*." Or "Jones, when he says this or that, means the same as Smith, when he says this or that." This kind of self-consciousness breeds a great deal of historiography, speculation, and introspection in science.

Criteria of fit into established science. Many propositions carry out deductive lines of thought preparatory to organizing new hypotheses. From this kind of scientific instrumentalism propositions are generated that evolve in many directions and induce a kind of creative or imaginative exercise that is related to pure curiosity but is actually under the control of the master propositions that have originated from primary sources. Thus a worker may ask himself "whether the proposition he is testing is relevant to a proposition already regarded by science as important." If the answer is affirmative, no further inquiry is made into the importance of the proposition.

In some cases, this sociological and intellectual process of science leads to a field so far away from the original sources of the criteria of importance that the field becomes hopelessly specialized. It can no longer be called to account even when some of the original criteria are generally recognized to have changed. The curricula of the world's universities are composed of specializations defined by the criteria of the past, a past that may be twenty-five or two thousand years ago. In some instances, the logical and practical basis for their existence is gone, but they live on as esoteric "sciences." This is a problem for the science of administration incidentally, and bears basic resemblance to a major concern of the study of administration, that is, the social separatism and goal autonomy of institutions.

Determining What to Generalize

Who can say what is the preferable degree of generality to be sought? As previously mentioned, a general science and its several

subsciences can abstract different aspects from the same events or actions. Both the more and the less "realistic" abstractors can claim "truth." And perhaps, in the light of our present limited understanding of scientific theory, each must be allowed to claim the greater "goodness" of his abstractions. Similarly, when one talks of the degree of generality of propositions about data that have been abstracted, it cannot be "proven" that a less general proposition is less desirable than a more general one. If it can be shown that a more general statement carries the same validity and reliability as a less general statement that may be deduced from it, then the defender of the latter will usually prefer to know and to teach the more general statement. But because the multiplicity of variables, the difficulty of operational definitions, and the unstable communications system in the social sciences are foes of increasing generality, the less general proposition is more frequently the most useful. The more general proposition is developed more or less as an investment for some dim future when a number of associated developments may increase its utility.[4]

This is true for other sciences in varying degrees, although in some of them the general statements can, by logical or mathematical deduction, often help to link and make intelligible separate statements of lesser generality. In view of the bewildering assortment of actions that press upon us in our highly administered lives, one may well hope for a general theory of administration with propositions encompassing more time, more space, and a greater variety of administrative action, and with the less general propositions capable of being formulated as deductions from the more general propositions, either before or after inductive research.

Confusion of Science of Administration with "Scientoid" Administration

These statements about the procedure of administrative science point up a grave and perhaps peculiar difficulty of the science in the face of its data. Administrative actions, unfortunately for the science of administration, are frequently highly "scientoid" in character; that is, men operating in administrative situations often

[4]See, for instance, Mason Haire, ed., *Modern Organization Theory* (New York, 1959), where the heroic efforts of the editor to join together the writers' theories in a preliminary chapter merely underline the theoretical egoism of the writings.

behave like logicians and scientists in setting up deductive systems from moral postulates.[5] These valuing postulates can easily assume the guise of scientific hypotheses and actually are logically deduced from initial postulates of great generality. Then again, just as in science itself, the actors in administration may use inductive checks as guides to their own behavior, so as to determine the validity and reliability of certain behaviors according to the postulates set down initially. Since frequently in large organizations the actors are monopolized by their setting and the chain of deduction from the initial postulates is very extensive, the valuing element, that is, the nonscientific element, in a series of actions is forgotten and the actors come to behave like scientists.

Fortunately, the science of administration can describe administrative actions whether they are scientoid or scientific. There can be a science of administration, whether administration is scientifically conducted or otherwise. Administration that is scientifically conducted is a separate body of data. It is independent of a science of administration, at least in theory, and may exist even when a science of administration is not developed. To say that a certain administration is scientoid is a generalization that, as relatively true or false, is one of the factual statements contained in the science of administration, as in the statement, "Administration is conducted in area *X* in time period *T* according to certain rational or scientific procedures, *A, B, C, D. . . .*" Indeed, a possible principle of the science of administration when applied may consist of an injunction not to behave scientifically in a given institution. This might come about as follows: *(a)* A set of institutions in society *A* are unscientifically conducted with the exception of institution *A7*. *(b)* Sanctions are employed against scientism in all save the stipulated institution, *A7*. *(c)* The following principle of applied science is offered: Those who desire to be recruited into institutions of society *A* are, with the exception noted, discriminated against if they are scientific, and hence might be advised to be "nonscientific." If an individual wishes to be recruited into

[5]Cf. Brooks Adams: "Administration or generalization is not only the faculty upon which social stability rests, but is possibly the highest faculty of the human mind" (*Theory of Social Revolutions* [New York, 1913], p. 216); also Dwight Waldo's words that administrators are "specialists in generalizations," (*The Administrative State* [New York, 1948] p. 102).

institution *A2,* which is, let us say, religious in nature, he may be enjoined perhaps to acquire skills in making decisions by revelation.

III. ELEMENTARY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT ADMINISTRATION

A number of primary generalizations of administrative science can now be put forward. They are intended to delimit the scope and data of the field, to describe the major relationships among the actors of administration, and to state the important evolutionary forces that change these relationships over time.

An appropriate test of an administrative situation might be one in which the proportion of administrative actions in any selected situation is "high." These action collections fall along a continuum of administration, from the nonadministrative to the almost completely administered. For the administrative part of the continuum, we may use the term "administration," and subsequent propositions about administration pertain only to those situations.

Dimensions of Administrative Actions

Certain descriptive dimensions to administrative situations may be added. We may classify them according to the orientation of the actor, targets (scope and domain), and effects (effective force) of administrative actions performed in them. Thus an administrative situation contains *N* number of actions that have individually three objective dimensions: *(a)* the orientation, role, or reference of the actor; *(b)* the targets—the degree of generality of actions accomplished: how many, how different, and for how long—and the number of individuals affected by the action; and *(c)* the effects —degree of change brought about among other actions in the situation by an observed action. Generalizations about administrative situations (that is, establishments or groups of establishments or organizations) begin as statements of modal, mean, and median behaviors in the three major dimensions. (Other more sophisticated quantifications of the situation may be devised as the need arises.)

To illustrate the dimensions of a particular act, let us suppose that a school superintendent, in the course of a day's observed actions, tells his secretary to prepare a notice to all teachers to

disengage themselves from formal affiliation with UNESCO or its affiliated agencies. A man acting in his occupational role (superintendent) performs an action of certified scope (UNESCO affiliations), domain (all teachers in the system), and intended effect (all affiliations abolished). The goal of this action is somewhat obvious, but long experience with administrative actions will tell us that other tests of the true goal are required. Furthermore, this goal is goal number 1, inasmuch as the teachers' subsequent behavior may not be presumed from the directive, nor may it even be presumed that the secretary will prepare the notice.

The stipulation that the goal is important is already part of our definition of administration, so this aspect of the problem should not concern us. We may be concerned, however, with the question of whether any single unit of action can possibly have a goal that can stand by itself and be recorded. Somewhat the same problem occurs in content analysis when one must judge a given statement out of its context. There is no easy way out of this dilemma. The main requirement is that we broaden our survey of the action to include surrounding actions and associated actions. A single human action is unlikely to carry its full meaning on its face. A single action is a useful basic unit for theory, for research orientation, and for some specific operational research procedures; but the action itself cannot be judged objectively without observing its external conditions, such as other people, the time dimension, the space dimension, and the like.

This is a *practical* objection to the action theory, in our view, rather than a theoretical one. We theorize that an action occurs in "reality" in its full and necessary context; if one could open up and describe fully the goal and precise direction of a single act, he would find it to include all of its appropriate meanings and its goals. Otherwise, it could not happen, for the organism in action *is* all its history and its projection of history. Likewise we say that an external historical event is caused by all that has ever happened before to limit or otherwise condition it, though we know that we can never hope to describe the complete antecedents of the event.

Administration's Organizational Context

We may also propose as an elementary description of adminis-

trative situations that they are parts of an organization. The situation, as a more or less technically useful selection of a congeries of actions, is part of an organization, establishment, or institution that is isolated by the following criteria: *(a)* More interaction occurs among members of the organization in respect to the types of action chosen as important than occurs between them and others; and *(b)* action of the chosen types in respect to others is conscious, that is, realized as treating with an "outside."

Effects of Degree of Administrativeness

To conclude these primary descriptive statements about administration, we may comment again on the further consequences of the proportion of administrative action a given organization embraces. The greater the proportion of administrative, rather than other actions, within an organization, i.e., the greater the isolation of the organization from external influences, the greater its self-consciousness (as tested among its participants), and the greater its acquisition of the traits of the "ideal type" of organizations in its cultural epoch. In a given cultural epoch, there may be two or more such "ideal types." For example, one may think of a religious cult, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, whose structure does not resemble the pure bureaucratic form, assuming bureaucracy to be the prevalent type. On the contrary, it is structured strikingly like a chiliastic organization or movement, such as Karl Mannheim has described, a type of movement not typical of the present epoch. The isolation and the self-consciousness of the Witnesses are well known, as are the punctiliousness and, one may say, almost compulsiveness of procedures and actions within the cult. This brief example should make us attend more carefully to the mean, modal, or median positions of types of actions and administrative situations. Too often the "science of administration" or the teaching of "applied administration" ignores the simplest and grossest quantitative thinking in describing the elementary data of the field. We would be greatly assisted by an inventory and classification by quantitative and structural criteria of the administered groups of society today.

Actors of Administration

The actors of administration are termed executives, participants, and clientele. The *executives* are the administrative leaders

charged with, or controlling the deductions of policy in an organization.[6] *Participants* are those occupationally concerned with the operations of an organization. They include the employees in a formal bureaucracy, the politically active and professional partisans in a political grouping, or the rank and file in an army. The *clientele* are people definitely, noticeably, and usually directly affected by the operations of the establishment, but who are often not members of it. They would include, for example, the constituents of a politician, the public served by an army, the passengers served by a public transit authority, the customers of an automobile manufacturing firm, and the audience of an acting troupe.

These three categories are essential to administrative theory because they interact with each other in the struggle over substantive and instrumental goals.[7]

Subjective perspectives of actors. A goal to one group is not a goal to another. Furthermore, administrative groups have quite different contacts and relations with clienteles. Some of the most interesting problems of administrative theory concern the extent to which the clientele is part of the organization. For example, an important branch of democratic doctrine embraces the clientele as rulers, that is, as executives and participants. The clientele of other groups (e.g. armies, many private enterprises, stage companies) is quite dissociated from the administration, though operations are [illegible] for the people." And, as if to confirm that these extremes are not entirely separate analytic problems, we have these examples reversed in some instances: in the doctrine that the clientele of a state are spectators and recipients, not participants

[6]These include legislators wherever they are involved in administrative situations. They are then considered as co-elite with the administration hierarchy, with different origins, recruitment, power, perspectives, and relationships to participants and clientele. This is not only methodologically useful, but historically pertinent, as can be revealed by consideration of the origins of representative government. Cf. the author's *Public and Republic* (New York, 1951), pp. 13–21; certain theories of legislative function (*ibid.*, p. 183); and the activities of elected assemblymen.

[7]Mosca, Bryce, and others, including this writer in his *Elements of Political Science* (New York, 1952), have emphasized a threefold, broad classification of (1) active leaders, (2) less active and less powerful, and (3) the relatively apathetic mass, as the most meaningful broad division of political actors. Cf. R. MacIver: "Power is never a subordination of the many to the one. It is, always, a hierarchy" (quoted in H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, concurring, *Power and Society* [New Haven, 1950], p. 205).

or rulers; in the citizen armies; in the co-operative enterprise owned and operated by the clientele; and even in the theatre company that is established with the clientele as owners, audience, and participants.

The organization goal is envisaged as the patterning of purposive activities toward an apparent goal. Ordinarily this is the executives' goal, for they work primarily at influencing members toward their ends. It is notable that Henri Fayol and many others before and since his time assert that administrative leadership consists of supervising administrative actions so as to make them conform to the leaders' ends. Proexecutive goals characterize not only the bureaucratic model that Fayol describes but most organizations, no matter how bizarre their operations may be and how unintelligible to the modern time-and-motion study expert.

Perhaps we may pass on merely with a warning that the science of administration must preserve by the *precision* of its generalizations the distinctions between the goals of all who are organizationally involved—executives (sponsors), participants, and clientele. Many important propositions depend upon this precision, as, for example, propositions about internal conflicts in an organization, "efficiency," resource allocations, or relations with outside organizations and clientele.

Substantive and Instrumental Goals

Every organization has more than one goal. This plurality may be usefully divided into *substantive* goals, insofar as they concern the doctrinal justification of the administration, or *instrumental* goals, insofar as they are means to the achievement of the substantive goals. The substantive goals of organizations are as varied as the desires of men or, more strictly, as varied as those desires that men have discovered can be extended and accomplished through administrative practices. Substantive goals would include education in educational administration, disposal of garbage in the administration of sanitation, combat in military administration, and so on, to innumerable other ultimately satisfying conclusions or outputs of administrative actions.

General administrative theory concerns both types of goals. Contrary to at least one branch of thought, the general science of administration does not reject these special subfields of administra-

tion as irrelevant, nor does it try to isolate administrative practice from the practice of particular skills. In this sense, we would modify the claims of men such as Louis Meriam, who say that administration is the practice of a special skill and the principles regarding such practice, and the claims of generalists, such as L. D. White, who declare that administration is the generalized action with the special skill subtracted. The science of administration does not occupy itself exclusively with either the special substance of administration or the instrumental goals common to all administrative situations.

It seems to us that general administration tries to generalize all of these skilled practices by abstraction. It goes all the way up and all the way down in the world of administrative data. It speaks of a substantive goal rather than of sanitation, combat, education, conservation, transportation, and so on. It talks of leadership skills, policies, and ideologies in summary form, realizing it can never hope to be able to generalize about administration in particular substantive fields.

Use of Abstract Values in Classifying Goals

The question still remains though: If we are not to ignore substantive goals, how are we to study them? It is not enough to say merely that a substantive goal exists. We ought further to subdivide the substantive goal into its basic analytic components, on the a priori theory that many enriching propositions may be evolved from distinctions among substantive goals, even though the distinctions are not the concrete ones of building dams, cleaning streets, teaching children, and so forth. Perhaps we may fruitfully employ Harold D. Lasswell's classification of base values—power, respect, rectitude, affection, well-being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment—and inquire whether important behavioral differences manifest themselves in administration as actions that are directed toward one or more of these values.[8] Or we may accept some other classification of values, say that of Charles W. Morris, which deductively describes thirteen ways of life.[9] This kind of problem deserves, and will receive, further attention. At the

[8]See H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *op. cit.*

[9]"Comparative Strength of Life Ideals in Eastern and Western Cultures," in C. W. Moore, ed., *Essays in East and West Philosophy* (Honolulu, 1953).

moment we wish only to call attention to the existence of these substantive goals in organizations.

We have also said that organizations are characterized by instrumental goals. Both deduction and experience suggest that administrative establishments are permeated by certain objectives that are regarded by the sponsors of the organization and, to a varying extent, by the participants in it, by its clientele, and by the outside world as necessary for the achievement of substantive goals. Again, these instrumental goals may be classified in various ways. Thus we may once more employ Lasswell's scope values, this time as means values (what he calls "base") that is, objectives considered as desirable in order to implement a more fundamental substantive objective. Then we should expect administration to be characterized by a great many instrumental activities, the values of which are weighed in relation to their contribution to a more remote and basic substantive value.

Power as an Instrumental Value

Of these instrumental values perhaps the most common and most pervasive is power. The ability to participate in the making of decisions that affect the values of others is the frequent second thought of a person who wishes to accomplish a substantive objective by means of administration. It is through power, exercised both in reference to the outside world and also in internal relations, that actions can be directed toward the aims of the sponsor. If power is cut off, the organization loses its moorings in the external world and disintegrates internally.

Internal Administrative Power Is Control

Power within administrative situations, however, has a rather special character, distinguishing it from power in external operations or nonadministrative circumstances. Power within administration is translated into control. Administration is directed toward substantive goals, collective energies have to be harnessed to those ends, and the organization leaders must establish a pattern of behavior that can be guaranteed to work toward those ends. Control is the ability to influence decisions relating to the values of others in an organization. Control is lent a deductive cast. The substantive goals of sponsors must be subdivided among a number

of people. In order to avoid losing or changing the goals, the deductions must be made logically. Furthermore, they must be controlled. So the typical administration sees substantive goals deduced into component tasks which constitute the contributions of individual actors or participants. The ability to control, therefore, lies in the first instance in the ability to set directives to participants, and then in the ability to supervise the operations that follow.

Omnipresence of Deduction in Administration

Deduction supplies logic to control in administration. It ties the instrumental activities of divided labor to the substantive goals of an organization. Thus it is that the individual actions in an administrative organization can be rationalized. The organization need not be of the ideal bureaucratic type to allow such rationalization. No matter what the substantive goals and no matter what the ideological and cultural determinants of the character of administration, the deductive stamp presses heavily upon the organizational process.[10]

Weakness of Induction

Inductive thinking is at a disadvantage not only in the modern large-scale government or corporate organizations, but in all kinds of organizations. The pervasiveness of control as a major instrumental objective, along wtih its concomitant deduction, is the chief reason why so few administrative establishments can be "scientifically" conducted. That is, few organizations employ inductive checks of the validity of actual behavior in the organization in terms of its substantive goals, even though to the scientist or observer the utility of such a procedure would be apparent in terms of the executives' goals. The executives and participants are themselves so involved in the observance of deductive rationalization in judging the operations of the organization that they find it difficult to assume an empirical or inductive frame of mind with

[10]Cf. *From Max Weber,* pp. 204–205, where Weber emphasizes the dependence of rationalistic bureaucracy upon the development of a money system. From our point of view, money and similar conditions he describes are technical instruments for implementing deduction. The use of money allows measurability of performance, increased control over persons within the organization, and other assurances of greater deducibility of action.

regard to their own operations and so check them. This condition may be the basic reason why staffs have developed as free-floating advisory agencies, since, being free of the hard-and-fast control and deductive pressure that are exerted on line groups, they may become more "objective."

Formality and Co-ordination Related to Control

The universality of the control objective brings to prominence two other aspects of control: the formalization of action, and co-ordination. Formalization of an administration means giving to actions a ritual rehearsing their authoritative origin. Actions, though admittedly unique, must bear a deductive stamp upon their face. This accounts for laws, policies, rules, and formal commands in administration. Again, whatever the essential ideology of administrative action in a given organization, directives of the lowliest origin are allegedly made "in the name of the law," "in the name of the king," "by the will of the people," "by order of the commanding officer," or "in the words of the master." Much of so-called red tape consists of this kind of demonstration of an action's derivation from the organization's leaders.

Increases in Co-ordination

As the whole body of action grows larger, co-ordinating activities increase in proportion to the total, first because there are increased chances for a discrepancy between the values of the executives and the values of the participants or clientele, and second because the instrumental goals generally become more complex and difficult to supervise. The whole body of administration can increase only by increases in the targets and effects of administrative action. An increase in any one of these targets will call into play more deductive control activities, unless the substantive goal of the organization is changed by liberating or decentralizing certain suborganization divisions.

Interactive Effects of the Goals and Actors

Every action tends to have effects and incite reactions. We may expect, therefore, that every change in substantive goal (or the derivations from it internally and externally) or in instrumental objectives will produce a chain of consequences that will, in turn,

react upon the participants in an organization and produce other kinds of administrative actions. The substantive goals of given executives often work against the goals of executives or other actors in larger or at least related spheres of social action; this produces some confusion in the establishment as the actors attempt to adjust to a new equilibrium. The instrumental goals of executives are subject to the same process, which produces other kinds of confusion. The substantive goals of the executives may move against their instrumental goals to produce another kind of confusion. Finally, the instrumental goals may move against the substantive goals and cause still more confusion.

In general, any organization, whatever its substantive goals, can be structured, at least doctrinally, according to any arrangement of executive, participant, and clientele relationships. Even an army created to win wars may be a monolith or an anarchy. While this clarifies many confusions of logic and theory about administration, it also reveals the great complexity of administrative behavior.

IV. POWER, INCOME, AND PRESTIGE AS GOALS IN ADMINISTRATION

The most important instrumental objective is power, specially defined within administrative situations as control. Since the actions of many are involved and the actions must be co-ordinated so as to present a deduced quality from the sponsored substantive goals, executives strive for control, by whatever means they have of influencing the decisions of others. It is because of this that administration which is primarily repetitive, purposive, and organized action forever presents a system of power relations. The achievement of administrative, substantive goals with respect to a population or to material effects requires the patterning of actions according to deductive subcategories of the goal. Control is the means of maintaining the deductive process. It may be granted externally to the participants by the symbols of authority and the sanctions of power; internally, control is dependent upon morale.

Power as a Dominant External and Internal Value

Whatever the pace or degree of power that dominates the substantive policies of the organization and its internal rule, there

can be no doubt of its formidable role in absolute terms. If power is defined as the ability to make or influence decisions, every social situation becomes an opportunity for its appearance. The orientation of individuals to action—the basic "function" of administration—requires docility and repetitiveness of action among the actors. As soon as orientation occurs, power occurs with it, whether power be thought of in broad terms as unconscious norm construction, social suggestibility or conformism, or conscious direction of the actions of others.[11]

In the case of unconscious power, we are speaking of a phenomenon not peculiarly administrative, for it embraces habit. It is not inconsistent with the definition of power to extend it even to these cases, if it is now thought of as distributed in small amounts among those oriented to the group and as unconsciously wielded. How much there is in any group of this kind of power as compared with the power exercised by individuals consciously is, of course, an important question, and is the basis of recent studies aimed at showing the limits and origins of leadership.

Power as a conscious direction of the actions of others is a more useful concept for discussing the goals of "rational" organizations which are so abundant in modern times. Here it is clear that deliberate orientation of actions within a small or large group requires some definition of the external or substantive tasks of the group and of the means of organizing members to those ends.

Of course, if one were to survey the obvious administrative creations of man, one would find exceedingly few that are overtly dedicated to maximizing the power of one group. A list of hundreds of public agencies and thousands of private ones will reveal no more than a handful that justify themselves in terms of acquiring power. Even the political party, a voluntary association for propaganda and agitation aimed at capturing state offices, usually declares that its objective is to increase the real income of the whole nation, according to a program or party platform. Yet a cursory examination of the activities of party executives or sponsors will reveal a greater proportion of time spent on getting into office

[11]Cf. R. Lippitt, N. Polansky, and S. Rosen, The Dynamics of Power, *Human Relations,* 5 (1952), 37–64, on *(a)* tendency of orientation of newly organized groups to be accompanied by clarifications (determinations) in power perspectives, and *(b)* correlations between power contagion and power direction.

than in any substantive occupation with issues, ideals, and the like. What is true of the political party is not so true of other organizations; forest conservation, for example, seems to be purely income motivated with respect to the outer world, i.e., bringing services or distributing benefits to a clientele.

Still, the struggle to direct the group largely characterizes committees, agencies, and associations of all kinds. The desire for power is so heartfelt that substantive objections are submerged in active ("Give me the men and tools") and passive ("Let's not rock the boat") argumentation and activities aimed at increasing power. The men in an organization who complain most of the loss of objectives ("A craftsman can't work in this shop"; "Being an engineer means nothing to this crowd") are bitter over their lack of control or have primary objectives to which power is foreign and which result only in their relative isolation.

Jakob Burckhardt, speaking of the West, and Karl Wittfogel, discussing the East, agree on the ultimate power interests of organizations and states.[12] We should, perhaps, add the brooding voices of Henry and Brooks Adams, of Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto, of Mises and Hayek. In essence, these and many others agree that administration is first and foremost an activity aimed at increasing the organization's external power and internal controls.

Treated in purely economic, status, or "happiness" terms, an organization may possess strong behaviors of a nonpower kind. No objection, certainly, may be raised to general and systematic comparisons of the economic productivity of two organizations, differently constructed, and the prestige they tender their members or outsiders can be compared. However, these comparisons too often lack the conditional statement that power is being treated as a constant.

On the other hand, in assessing the absolute extent to which power determines administration, one may say that, regardless of other motives, the search for internal and external aggrandizement of power is highly significant. It determines the universal modes of administrative structure; it further explains many of the rela-

[12]J. Burckhardt, *Force and Freedom* (New York, 1943), and K. Wittfogel, The Ruling Bureaucracy of Oriental Despotism, *Review of Politics,* 15 (1953), 350–359.

tions between the administration and the outside world that would be riddles if the presumed or alleged substantive goals were taken at face value to explain them.

The overwhelming fact about administration is that substantive goals are accomplished only by influencing the external world, and this influence is accomplished principally through power. The path to external accomplishment is political in a broad sense, even if we refer to the program of a parent-teachers' association or the construction of a new post office.

Power of administration may be distributed more or less inequitably among sponsors, participants, and clientele. In thinking of the clientele, of course, we visualize people getting what they wanted and tend therefore to dismiss the power problem as irrelevant or inoperative. On the contrary, the science of administration is especially preoccupied with these cases of seeming equality of power.[13] When a majority of a population itself determines how it is substantively served (this is a leading view of democratic administration), it must constantly strain every effort to maintain the equal-power situation to guarantee the substantive service. Here there should be no question whether power is a substantive goal of administration. Anyone who has studied or experienced the anxieties and activities of groups attempting to ensure the equal distribution to themselves of substantive products will recognize that clientele are exerting themselves to become participants

[13]Lasswell has stated the axioms of clientele power sharing well:

"1. Power is shared when the political myth favors the pattern of general participation in the making of decisions.

"2. Power is shared when in fact there is general participation in decision-making.

"3. Shared power means that it is assumed that office holders can be criticized without fear of serious retaliation.

"4. Shared power means that the shaping of decisions depends upon values to which access can be had on the basis of merit.

"5. Shared power includes the freedom to challenge the lawfulness of applying general rules to concrete cases.

"6. Power is shared when there is an effective presumption against the politicizing of human relations.

"7. Power is shared when there is a presumption against the use of power in great concentration, particularly in the form of regimentation, centralization, and militarization." *The World Revolution of Our Time* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951], p. 41; (quoted by permission). When these relations exist in an organization, we can speak of administrative power sharing.

and to control the distribution of power as much or more than they are exerting themselves to effect a substantive result. It is common experience to see co-operative associations, veterans' organizations, clubs, and party factions exhaust themselves in the struggle to make certain that the power exercised in internal rule is equally distributed within the group, and then have little energy for providing benefits (their postulated substantive goals) to themselves or to others.

We are already forewarned against a strict dichotomy of outside and inside in treating of administration. These distinctions are primarily useful in studying crystallization of references and memberships. Other reasons why the distinction persists help explain the ideology of administrative theorists. Thus one can do one's will on the "inside" if it is "isolated" from the outside, whence we hear talk of "purely domestic questions," "Keep government out of business," "The public be damned," "Eisenhower is not a *real* Republican," "The civil service is out of politics," and so on. When the distinction is made or alleged stoutly, a new vocabulary arises for describing the administrative process. Thus Machiavelli's Prince is about "politics": How a Prince manages his realm to get power and hold it. But Alexander Leighton's *Governing of Men* is "administration"; he has the same problems and quotes Machiavelli liberally, but the subjects of his concern are in a concentration camp.

Income as the Dominant Administrative Goal

Two additional notes may be added on the kind of problem one faces in studying administration where the substantive goals of income and prestige are paramount. The part that power plays here is often underestimated.[14] Yet a type of organization can be conceived that would maximize substantively the production of goods and prestige.

The most common stipulated substantive goals of administration are economic, in the broad sense of that term. Men say that they administer in order to reward themselves, their participant colleagues or employees, and their clientele with goods, and debate goes on continuously over the relative distribution of income

[14]Cf. also Sebastian de Grazia, Status as a Political and Religious Motive, *Journal of Liberal Religion*, 28 (1947), 91–101.

among the three groups. Since monetary income takes many forms, and since the forms of such income are only the equivalents of other equally material goods of life, it is well for administrative science to include the many varieties of such benefits in considering to what extent organizations may be molded by this general purpose. Therefore, not only money, but its equivalent in other forms of reward—food and lodging, health and social services, public and private buildings, education, leisure and travel, and amusement—should be considered as income.

Perhaps the most striking example of an organization devoted to income is the entrepreneurial prototype of capitalism. As pictured by Adam Smith and its later devotees, it is a well-known model of human activity. The executives or entrepreneurs seek only to maximize personal profits, but owing to the operation of certain behavioral laws as they pursue this substantive goal, an ultimate increase in income is afforded the clientele, and to a more limited extent, the participants in the enterprise. We note that the model seeks the predominance of the income goal over power (and prestige) by providing anarchy through the stern injunction to governments: *laissez faire*. Then, or simultaneously, it makes much of the significant role allowed to invention and innovation, confirming the rightness of our identification of creativity with anarchy and of administration with power.

The striking feature of this model, as historically developed, was its denial of power as a substantive and instrumental goal. Power was atomized to the point of insignificance. Rational marketing was to substitute for control relationships. Yet its actual acceptance of power (control) was the most important instrumental goal. Although bargaining was to reign within as without, the great captains of industry, as Michels has indicated, ran their establishments like well-disciplined armies. Internally, however, they favored economic sanctions over coercive and psychological sanctions. Moreover, externally, the administration of prices often occurred.[15]

[15]An alternative and equally abstract model is provided in the form of socialism, in which income is maximized for the clientele, with regulated stipends to the executives and participants. However, socialism presumes by its plan an integrated structure of controls over society; it promises an organization that is systematically

It seems that little in the substantive motive of greater organizational income itself acts against the predominance of the power motive *within* the establishment, but that the laissez-faire system stems the tide of power from within moving out, or at least breaks it up into smaller units. Equalizing income, in order more to indulge the participants and clientele, is supposed by laissez-faire writers to increase agitation concerning power. It may be questioned, however, whether the equalizing process inescapably produces a substitution of power for income as the preponderant active motive, or whether, historically, the equalization has itself been the corollary to a disturbance and redefinition of demands and expectations that are the inescapable producers of heightened power-consciousness and conflict. A band of hunters, who customarily distribute the spoils of the chase equally, have very small power problems, but the attempt on the part of one hunter to turn the hunt into an entrepreneurial expedition would immediately convert the operation into a power struggle, with the hunters eyeing one another so carefully perhaps that they fail to see the animals they hunt.

So we would surmise not only that a preponderant substantive income motive in an organization is made difficult if participants or clientele are to share with executive sponsors, but also that it is vulnerable to the power preoccupations excited by changes in demands and expectations, whether from sponsors to participants, participants to clients, clients to sponsors, and so on.

Prestige the Dominant Goal

Turning from income to prestige as a focal value for the construction of administrative models, one senses a preoccupation of participants with prestige. It almost seems that participants, consigning power to their sponsors and goods to their clientele, seek prestige beyond all. For example, Henry Gantt's brief but influential essay of 1919 on administration, called *Organizing for Work,* reveals that he seems to desire sponsors' power maximized in order to give participants prestige and clientele income. Perhaps the chief hierarchs must, in every kind of organization, be preoccupied

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dedicated to many forms of influencing the population in return for sharing income with its clientele: so what it gives with one hand it takes with the other.

with power, even if their organization be essentially one for the command and bestowal of prestige. Perhaps clienteles are too imperfectly assimilated to the operations of the organization to recognize and accord prestige. The holder of a Medal of Honor is entitled to a salute from the general he obeys but not from the civilian he serves. Perhaps power is the premium, prestige the consolation prize, and income the booby prize in the mysterious combinings and orderings of different motives in administrative situations.

Again, the science of administration should not hesitate to describe the universe of administrative action as ordered according to prestige. We speak not only of fraternal orders and ceremonial cults, whose substantive goals are to obtain prestige for the actors (members), but also of groups such as powerless nobilities, where prestige, although not the ostensible substantive goal, in effect becomes so through the atrophy of goals such as power and income.

V. DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATION

The values of administration are apparently not stable and seem to shift among the actors and between points of time. The evolution of administrative situations is a response to a number of ideological, material, and fortuitous events.

The degree to which a society is administrative varies. Organizations increase or decrease in number over a period of time, and individually their dimensions vary. Administration occurs at the instance of sponsors (leading actors) who expect to maximize their interest by harnessing human energies through collective behavior that is co-ordinated by deductions from their preferred interests and that takes the form of instrumental or means actions directed at the expansion of human energies in favor of the sponsors' goals.

Thus an administrative establishment develops as an innovation in human engineering. It contrasts with creative, anarchic actions and with other habitual actions by setting an external framework and "objectivity of goals" upon action. Administration cannot exist without communication, and without influencing. There can be no organization without a definable influence structure, which relates to the external society and also describes relationships among the participants in the organization. The

meaningful question is not whether human engineering exists, but rather what kind of influence it exerts, and what its goals and means are.

It is no restriction of the concept of an organization to say that it may be pictured as an influence structure. The same may be said of an individual organism and the relations among its parts, as well as nonadministrative habits that provide social interaction without organization. We are tempted to use the term communication structure rather than influence structure, except that the term communication has acquired a neutral meaning that belies the facts about communication, that is, that it is always valuational and purposive.

Indices of degrees of administrativeness rise as the degree of division of labor in the society increases. However, the *number* of organizations in a society does not necessarily vary with the degree of division of labor in a society, for a single far-reaching organization may direct a great part of the division of labor. Rather the number of organizations in a society depends upon the division of labor and also upon the heterogeneity of a society, that is, the spectrum of values and value systems among the population. Where there are many values and no compulsion to unitary organization, the number of organizations will increase. When a society loses its heterogeneity of values, the number of organizations diminishes, although the degree of division of labor in a society may remain constant.

An increasing part of modern life throughout the world is falling within the area of administration. This follows from the heightened development of applied administration. Knowledge of how to organize collective behavior has spread, and such innovations have, after the manner of mechanical innovations, become cumulative. It has been discovered that administrative practices can be applied to more and more human situations.

In addition, new moral developments are causing an increase in administration. As the spectrum of creative activity enlarges in a heterogeneous world, demands increase for consensus to be brought about by administrative means. There is an increasing refusal to accept individualistic or supernatural solutions to social problems. There are increasing demands for power, and power agencies are being assigned more targets and greater force than

was customary in preceding ages. Furthermore, previously unconnected areas of life, for which administrative action has provided little co-ordination, are seen to be ready for administrative organization. Functions, people, areas, and problems that had previously been out of the perspective of administration are now believed to be accessible to it. Management, like public relations, is awe-struck at its own possibilities, delighted and amazed at how easily human behavior falls prey to its techniques in the most diverse and unexpected fields of life.

Relation of Increase in Creativity to Increased Administration

Strategically situated central organizations, possessed of superior resources, are expanding outwards and increasing the total proportion of administration by centralizing less administered jurisdictions and organizations. Defensive reactions are elicited among the sponsors of administration in threatened areas, and administration then increases therein.

Increased administration does not always bring a net loss of creative action. It brings a decrease in creative action when it controls the value and subvalue spectra (defined as spheres of creative action). Also, the longer increased administration persists, the more likely that it will bring lapses of memory among those who previously held more varied values in the administered sphere. But increased administration can increase creative action if it brings satisfaction in a spectrum that is limited but has occupied the attention of persons potentially productive in more varied value spectra. A simple example would be the invariant demand for food, its fulfillment, and the release of individuals into spheres of more creative action. In addition, increased administration may increase creative action if it is value efficient. This happens when its sponsors can achieve their aims technically with less than the accustomed intervention in those value spectra that are relevant and conditioned but not necessarily directly involved in the instrumentation of the aims.

Values in Origin and Development of Administration

In general, it may be said that organizations originate for income, are perpetuated by considerations of prestige, and suc-

cumb to power. One tends to study new organizations to determine the material wants they intend to fulfill, established organizations as prestige and status systems, and the history of organizations as struggles for power. In brief, organizations tend to shift their major internal and external goals from income to prestige to power.

At the same time, as one observes organizational behavior, he finds the rule of administrative groups shifting from the clientele (to whom income was promised), to the participants (for whom status is of primary importance), to the executives (for whom power is paramount). Thus administration ends as power-motivated and elite-dominated (see Table 1).

The final organizational equilibrium consists, then, of *power,* which rests internally in the hands of a few and is masked externally by the substantive motive ascribed to the organization's actions of *prestige,* internally in the hands of participants and externally with reference to participants as well, and of *income,* such as it may be, assigned to the clientele. Both income and prestige, of course, are disproportionately provided to the power-elite. The analogy with Plato's trilogy of the philosopher kings (power), the warriors (honor), and the artisans (income) is suggested and is more than superficial. He was trying to describe an eternally stable organizational equilibrium.

The "exceptions" to these tendencies are many. We think a good many of them are produced by ambiguities of definition, by interplay of several values at the same time, by difficulties of observation, by transitory reversals of the process owing to local factors, by propaganda and myths denying the obvious, and by changes in the character of the reference groups or orientations of all concerned. These last changes transform the group by changing its definition and delimitation rather than allowing the group as delimited to exhibit the designated transformations.

Various conditions determine the initial character of administration as income motivated and client managed. By far the greatest part of the administration arises to satisfy needs for goods. Honorary or power groups, that are initiated for nonmaterial goals, are often the result of pre-existing income organizations.

A group is usually organized by those who have a material need. Rarely do the clientele relinquish power unless they have

Table 1. Forms of administration under conditions of maximization of selected values for selected beneficiaries.

	Executives	*Participants*	*Clientele*
Power	Bureaucracy (all groups provide examples)	Democracy (some political parties, governments, churches, work groups, other voluntary associations)	Rule by interests (some political organs and govt. agencies, voluntary associations)
Prestige	Aristocracy (cliques, 1st estate or class)	Cohonoring (fraternal orders)	Honorary (knighting, medal-giving, man-of-year, mother-of-year, Carnegie hero medal)
Income	Plutocracy (monopolists, cartels)	Profit-sharing, guilds, old-trade-unionism	Service (social functionalism, division of labor, public enterprise)
	Phases (shift of dominant values)		Phases (shift of principal beneficiaries)

Note: Changes occur: (1) by internal transformation (e.g. individual enterprise to profit-sharing participant, [public] decision-making to bureaucratic decision making), (2) by external co-ordination (e.g. profit-sharing enterprise to cartelism, nobility to king).

The dynamic principles are: differential activity, differential leadership, instrumentalism, simplism, and uncertainty. These factors cause the horizontal and vertical slippage diagramed above.

to; usually it just slips away. (This would agree with Hobbes's interpretation of the social contract as an escape from a hopeless condition, but would go beyond him, following Michels, and

include apathy.) The precondition to control is co-operation (hence the eternally perplexing problem posed by despotisms founded upon consensus, which has plagued rationalistic writers on democracy from the eighteenth century on).

Conditions that determine the transformation of a group from client-managed income to participant-managed status include: the demand for maximizing benefits to be derived from a strategic situation (Lasswell and Kaplan speak of the "agglutinizing" effects of the possession of a value), the routinization of operations and development of occupational personality that puts procedure above income, and a tendency to exclude low-sharers from status (including participation) as well as from income.

Among the conditions that determine the transformations of a group from status to power and from participant-managed to executive-managed are: the sanctions required to maintain the status system of participant sharing, the development of "scientoid" (rationalistic) administration as a technique of power among administrative leaders, and the struggles with alienated clientele and competing administrators in the larger environment.

The conditions that determine the ultimate fate of a group as a power-oriented and executive-managed organization include: the balance of power in the larger environment and the degree of isolation of the managing group from its participants and clientele that has resulted from the preceding events. A wide degree of freedom is evident in the behaviors of administration in this stage of development. The logic of the process may be inevitable, but its consummation is by no means certain.