

The Infinity of Social Sciences
and the practical implications of this Condition
(1950)

A has value V when A chooses V as a future state over one or more alternatives of which he is conscious and which can be substituted for X

V then has reference to A. It is V_A .

It has a time relating to A, called T_A and a geometry corresponding to A (called Space and S_A). These are merely two aspects of V, and are selected for carrying along the argument.

$$V_A = V_{TS_A}$$

Let E be an event

An event = an action to which a human being is related.

Maybe A, maybe B, C, D, or etc.

"A" perceives E when A relates to E. But to relate E requires that E become E_A . Again here Time and Space are aspects of E.

$$E_{TS_A} = f(V_{TS_A}).$$

But how does E_{TS} differ from TS_A . The definition of Value must be the same as the definition of Event or else Event must be different from Value. In what respect can E be different from V?

a. In a process that occurs in V but not in E?

No. Same process occurs. (ef. the Boring, Brumer, et al studies in value.)

b. In a definition of E that differs from V.

Yes. E. is defined as "objective" in that a mode or mean of all observers credit and describe its occurrence in the same terms and acc. to measurements of S and T that they accept.

Objection to (b).

1. The definition of event becomes a postulate - i.e. its sole difference from V is that it is V mean of X cases, rather than V_A .

REPLY: BUT IT IS STILL V. That is, its S and T are part of a group of observers who set up its coordinates from a vote of agreement.

2. If $E = V_{\text{mean}}$, then, according to above objection, $E_A = \text{some relationship to } V_{\text{mean}}$.

(and)

$V_A = \text{the same relationship to E or to } V_{\text{mean}}$.

Then it is simpler to discard either E or V and say

either, $E_A = \text{relation (E)}$,

or $V_A = \text{relation (} V_{\text{mean}} \text{)}$.

where $E_A = V_A$

and $V_{\text{mean}} = E$

Now let us consider the meaning of relation. We speak of a V_0 (or E_0) as having S_0 and T_0 . $S_{01..n}$ and $T_{01..n}$ = Events viewed and taken account of by V_0 . They are plotted according to S_0

and to which in turn are plotted according to V_0 .

The relation of V_A to V_{mean} can be described by the coordinates system of V_{mean} or V_A . The deduction of all V 's referring to V_A , if done according to V_{mean} , will have no essential validity to V_A unless V_A is a product of V_{mean} , in which case the deductions will be truisms. If V_A is not a product of V_{mean} , then deductions from V_{mean} will have no meaning to V_A .

This scylla and charybdis of "truism - meaninglessness" is avoided by partial dependency and partial independence. So the total V_S of A can be considered a system of individual norms or averages (personality) and it will be discovered that there are numbers of somewhat meaningful relations between V_{AS} and V_{means} .

II.

Now what occurs when a proposition of social science is presented:

e.g.

"When A is threatened with a fine for not voting, A will vote."

Event 1 = threat vs. $\frac{A \text{ by } G}{\text{Time}}$	Gov't	A	vote
Event 2 = vote by A		space	time

threat of fine = V_1 of Government and A

vote by A = V_2 of Government and A .

Both events depend upon V_{mean} which includes G and A .

e.g. "Wars in the 20th century cost more lives than wars in the 19th century."

Agreement on this proposition requires besides (1)

conventional accord on definitions of war, century, lives, cost, etc.:

- (2) sense of space
- (3) sense of time
- (4) logical agreement on laws of inference, i.e. nature of documentary proof.

Apart from these denotative matters, it is doubtful if any 2 people have exactly the same imagery regarding this statement. One thinks of gore, another of glory, another of peacefulness, another of Armistice Day, etc.

The Proposition, then, as a description of events, is highly vague.

For the analysis of events, it depends upon the V_{mean} versus the propositions of all individuals or the V_A who gives his unique meaning to the events described, and visualizes it as useful for his own purposes (which may or may not relate strongly to V_{mean}).

What good would come of making statement more precise? Matters might be worsened. For then you would give new meaning to the proposition that would be closer to $V_{\text{mean}} = y$ than to V_{mean} . Or if it is closer to V_A it will be farther from V_B perhaps.

It would seem then that the worse precise the expression, the more evaluative. That is, conventionally speaking, (not as we defined them) the more precise is proposition, X, the more V and the less E will be in it.

III.

Can there be a contemplative proposition that is not manipulative?

Can there be vice-versa?

Is a contemplative proposition the precedent or the consequence of a manipulative?

If the precedent, then "objective" science of event is more possible. If consequence then then there is a great deal of subjectivity - perhaps, then, event is nothing but wish.

If contemplative propositions come only from manipulative propositions, and every manipulative proposition is adequate (i.e. scientific) only to the author of the proposition or an assignee of him, then there are infinite social sciences.

IV.

There is also an infinite number of social sciences in a technical sense:

1. If the exact calculation of the succession of interacting events is the aim of science, then a descriptive social science is impossible save in a statistical sense. If social science is statistical, then it is useless for individual behavior (cf. molecular behavior in gases, etc.). Since V_A is the measure of the E_A and both are individual, A can never be satisfied by science.
2. If the stability of a science depends upon the stability of perception, then social sciences are infinite for perception changes continuously.
3. If the prescription of applied social science requires a value constant, and that constant never exists, then social science is impossible.

4. If value constant exists, but is different for every man, then one social science is impossible so far as every single man is concerned and an infinite number of social sciences have to be constructed for all units.

Typist
Order the
inventions
numbers

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I. V as future state ^{or more} alternatives of

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space

① A has value V when A chooses V over alternatives of which he is conscious and which can be substituted for x

② V then has reference to A . It is V_A .
It has a time relating to A , called T_A and a geometry corresponding to A (called Space S_A).
 ~~$V_A = T_A + S_A$~~ These are merely two aspects of V , and S_A are selected for carrying along the argument.
③ $V_A = V_{TSA}$

Let E be an event

④ An event = an action to which a human being is related.
Maybe A , maybe B , C , D , or etc.

1. "A" perceives E when A relates to E . But to relate to E requires that E become E_A . Again here Time and Space are aspects of the E .
③ ~~$E_A = T_A + S_A + V_A$~~ $E_{TSA} = f(V_{TSA})$
But how do ~~E_{TSA}~~ differ from V_{TSA} ? The definition of Value must be the same as the definition of Event or else respect Event must be different from Value. In what case E be different from V ?

2. a. In a process that occurs in V but not in E ?
③ NO. Same process occurs. (of the Bremen, at all values)
b. In a definition of E that differs from V ?
③ YES. E is defined as "objective" in that all observers credit and describe its occurrence in the same terms and acc. to measurements of S and T that they accept.

(2) Objection to (b)

(3) 1. The definition of event becomes a postulate - i.e. its sole difference from V is that it is V_{mean} of x cases, rather than V_A . ^{REPLY:} BUT IT IS STILL V . That is, its S and T are part of a group of observers who set up its coordinates from a vote of agreement.

(3) 2. If $E = V_{\text{mean}}$, then, acc. to above objection, $E_A = \text{some relationship to } V_{\text{mean}}$ (and)

$V_A = \text{the same relationship to } E \text{ or to } V_{\text{mean}}$

(3) Then it is simpler to discard either E or V and say either, $E_A = \text{Relation}(E)$, or $V_A = \text{relation}(V_{\text{mean}})$.

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2. If the stability of a science depends upon the stability of perception, then soc. sci. are infinite for perception changes continuously.
3. If the prescription of applied soc. sci. requires a value constant, and that constant never exists, then soc. sci. is impossible. If it exists, but is different for every man, then soc. sci. is impossible so far as every man is concerned & one soc. sci. is impossible for all units.
4. an infinite # of soc. sciences have to be constructed for all units.