~~Scientific~~ Difficulties in the Concept of the Majority

~~in Political Science~~ (April, 1948) U. of Minnesota guest lecture to students

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Despite the awesome title which I have selected for this lecture, the problem which we will set for ourselves today is quite simple. We propose to do two things. We propose to show first that a proper appreciation of the majority principle is essential if we are to continue to use that idea in building a science of politics for a democratic community. We propose to show secondly some of the difficulties which face attempts to make precise the concept of the majority as well as other phases of the field of political science.

Both of these purposes run along together in our lecture today. For in the process of trying to pin down the elusive concept of the majority, we shall have occasion to examine several attempts to study aspects of the majority by precise or quantitative methods. The partial failure or success of these studies represent the practical difficulties which handicap the political studies generally -- whether the field be attitude formation, representation, legislation, the judicial process or international affairs.

Such be our general objectives.

I.

In reaching them, we will stop over at three points. Each point representa a major category of attitudes found over different periods of time with respect to the nature of the majority. First, there is the belief that the majority must be understood and followed.

Secondly, there is the belief that the majority must be ignored or coerced to make it follow an elite. And thirdly, there is the belief that the majority does not exist and that substitute ways of conducting the affairs of government must be found.

The first theory, that the majority must be understood and followed is of several varieties. In early modern times, Western European political theorists, most of them jurists, inherited the majority principle from the practice followed in corporations under the law of the late Roman Empire. The period was still one of close relations between the Catholic Church and the late feudal states, and when the clergy began to employ the majority principle as a means of resolving disputed questions in certain orders and convocations, men in which we now consider the secular, political sphere picked up the idea that the principle had a function that might be useful in the realm of the political as well. Medieval theorists would not allow the majority clear sailing. Marsiglio, for example, perhaps the greatest of them, referred not to the "larger part" but to the "prevailing part" as the voice of the Community. That is to say, eminence and worth were to be valued along with numbers. He mentioned numbers. That was his concession to the majority principle, and a radical one in those days.

It is noetworthy in the writings of these men, and in the theorists that went before them -- in fact, it was characteristic of most medieval political theory -- that the worthwhile values of the community were the values of the state. The law was declared custom. The forerunner of the modern jury was a group of neighbors, a sample of the community, which was convoked to declare what the common law of the community was in order to inform the king's courts. What we have here, what is characteristic of the medieval theory, and what is never to be denied in our own time is that the majority

may be the sense of the community. The majority will is the passive will of the people which is to be extracted and which is to be the basis, or better still, the boundaries within which the laws are to be made.

Another variety of this concept of the majority declares that the majority is omnicompetant. It is the right and can do what it wills. There is a great reluctance to condemn it on any grounds. And the community is supposed to acquiesce gladly in the majority verdict. This is the extreme democratic notion and is found in the more unguarded utterances of Jefferson, the aggressive politics of Jackson, and beneath the devious subtleties of Karl Marx. Jeremy Bentham, in his exuberance for a grant rational principle of legislation was seduced by it when he demanded that the greatest number be the judge of what the happiness of the greatest number be.

Two more variations of this idea of the omnipotence of the majority shade off into the idea that the majority of the society is the court of last resort on basic matters affecting society, and the idea that the majority has only some say in the selection of officers. John Locke in his Second Essay on Government declared that the right of property and revolution was not to be taken from the total community. Otherwise he felt that the legislative body might operate independently. He did not adore the common people. Modern writers, like Lindsay, justify the majority idea with the slogan, "Only the wearer knows when the shoe pinches." This is a watered-down version of the Locke theory and gives the people a sort of liberum veto on the actions of government. On the other hand, Edmund Burke would not allow that basic rights were reserved to the people. However, he would allow that some modest voice in

the selection of representatives be granted to the electorate and that some element of popular responsiveness would be beneficial in the government.

All of these beliefs may be grouped into the first of our Three basic attitudes toward the majority, that the majority must be understood and followed. Inherent in the ideas that the customs of the greater part of the community should be followed, in the idea that the majority is all-powerful, in the idea that the majority is a last resort on basic matters, and in the idea that the majority has some voice in creating the organic legislative body of the state is the attitude that the majority has a sense, a reason, a voice or a capacity for specific activity. The Leveller movement in 17th Century England, the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the English Radical Movement of Bentham, Thomas Paine, and James Mill all contributed to this idea, and the first part of the 19th Century in America shows the highest level ever attained for the pure working out in practice of the attitude.

Now we come to the place of scientific study. Science receives its objectives from the values men have. Men build cathedrals and the science of engineering advances correspondingly when they worship of God is the primary value of the society. Men build airplanes when material values including the vorocious demand for speed focus men's attention on the possibilities of air travel. When modern democracy was born, men turned to the basic principle of the rule of the majority, and sought to determine what the majority wanted and how those wants could be translated into law.

Jefferson's recipe for republican government is interesting in this respect:

> "Were I to assign this term a precise and definite idea, I would say, purely and simply, it means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority.... The further the departure from direct and constant control by the citizens, the less has the government of the ingredient of republicanism."

In modern times, the public opinion polls are designed to discover the will of the majority; the basic reason behind the growth of the public opinion poll is the modern idea that the will of the majority must be understood in democratic societies. Jefferson and other revolutionaries had no doubts on the subject. They felt the will would express itself clearly under election campaign conditions. In the late 19th Century and still today, doubts began to be cast on the ease with which the majority might be known. Whereupon, newly developed sampling and statistical techniques were brought over from mathematics and economics and applied to the task presented in politics. Worries and insecurities over the fate of the majority will are the moving force behind the polls.

The other large contribution of the scientists of democracy who were under the influence of this basic desire to understand and follow the majority came in the field of elections. It was in the election process that a quantitative science of politics began! Granting that the majority will could be understood, it remained to implement the will. Means had to be devised to translate the majority into law. Ordinary elections were not enough; parties and

factions and privilege had to be abolished. Men even examined the traditional mode of electing representatives and presented new schemes.

Perhaps the earliest attempt to use a precise technique to implement the majority will was that of Jean Charles de Borda, a French mathematician of the Enlightenment, who in the year 1770 delivered a lecture before the French Academy of Sciences in Paris. The title of the lecture was Memoire on Elections by Ballot. Declared de Borda at the very beginning of his lecture: "It is an opinion generally held, and I know not whether it has ever been objected to, that in an election by ballot the plurality of voices indicates the will of the electors, that is to say, that the candidate who obtains such a plurality, is necessarily he whom the lectors prefer to his competitors. But I am going to make it plain that this opinion, which is true in the case where the election is conducted between two candidates only, may lead to error in all other cases."

After stating this purpose, he demonstrates mathematically that, when more that two candidates run for office, one candidate may win by having a simple plurality over all the other candidates. Yet, he states, given three candidates, the two losers may have enough votes between them to give a majority against the so-called winning candidate. For the voters who have backed the second and third candidates might possibly unite on each other's behalf against the winning candidate if they had a chance. This, says de Borda, would be the true majority which it is the object of the election system to provide.

In order to accomplish this true result, two methods are possible. So he proceeds to outline first the method which has come down to our day in modified form as the single preferential vote, and the method which in principle has come down to us as the run-off election. The single preferential vote he calls election by order of merit. In this method, he supposes three candidates. Each voter markes his ballot for each of the three in order of his perferences.

In tallying the votes, the third choice is given a single vote, the second choice a double value, and a first choice a triple value. Then the total value of all the votes of a candidate will be three times the number of first choices, plus two times the number of second choices he receives, plus the number of third choices. The candidate with the highest number of values is declared elected, and this result, says de Borda, is really a true majority.

To give a brief example of the de Borda method in American experience, we might take the presidential election of 1912 when Theodore Roosevelt and Taft, both Republicans, were running against Woodrow Wilson. If the majority method of de Borda had been used, probably most of those who voted first choice for Taft would have given their second choice to Roosevelt. As a result the total value of Roosevelt's suffrages would have been larger probably than that of Wilson and he would have become President. A similar situation may well occur this year in the presidential elections for no matter how much Truman may feel himself dissociated from Henry Wallace, all indications are that the Wallace vote will be largely a dissident Democratic vote. If the de Borda method were used and the Wallace second choices would be given a value, the Truman candidacy would have a much better chance.

De Borda's second true method of attaining a majority, which reminds us of our run-off elections in the Southern states, or closer still, the ballotage system in France, he calls the method of successive elections. By this, each candidate runs against every other candidate and the total votes of each candidate in each of the elections is added up. The one with the largest number wins. You are probably familiar with this form of contest in sports, say a basketball round robin, where each team plays every other team and total voctories determine the final winner. Well, De Borda's system of successive elections is this kind of arrangement. However, as he himself admits, this method is very cumbersome, especially when there are more than three candidates.

Without considerably more time, we cannot go into the involved algebraic formulae which De Borda uses in explaining his theories. His two methods of attaining the majority are the highlights of his lecture, and constitute a hitherto unheralded contribution to the traditional theory of majority rule.

However, there are several points at which De Borda failed to account for influential factors in the election process. Condorcet, one of the great names in the mathematics of probability theory, revealed in an essay a generation later certain of the mathematical difficulties inherent in De Borda's method when a wide variety of cases were to be tested by the method. We will not go into his criticisms. But other weaknesses in De Borda's approach to the implementation of the majority are more important for our purposes today, for they shed light on the dangers which must be avoided in trying to make precise the ordering of social data preparatory to making that data usable in conducting a democratic government.

First of all, De Borda views the vote mathematically, One man one vote, and each vote equal to every other vote. This is highly unrealistic. Votes differ in the intensity with which they are cast and in the reaction of the voter to victory or defeat. De Borda gives an artificial ordering to the first, second and third choices, assuming an interval of one unit between each choice. Yet, probably with equal justification, one might weight the first choice with an extra unit on the theory that those who know their minds completely the first time ought to be given extra credit, especially since that probably means they are indifferent to the other candidates and very strong for their first choice.

In the second place, De Borda, working in the very beginning of modern scientific methodology was not fully aware of what in social psychology of a later time has come to be known as the circular or indirect reaction. This is the phenomenon which will always give great difficulty to those scholars who are creating a social science. For people act in relation to a certain set of facts, and when that set of facts is changed, they no longer act the same. Now, mice in a cage will become very discouraged by a piece of electrified cheese and will get to the point that they will refuse to bite at the cheese even though the elctrical charge is removed. But people are not mice; their minds are much more flexible and there are always a few outstandingly imaginative people to find new ways of approaching problems. So if the De Borda method were applied to the traditional majority election, and there were still the same three candidates, people would make a supreme effort not to waste their second choice votes on a candidate they didn't like; they would begin making deals for second choice votes. Probably each party would be sure to have two candidates in the

field in order to reap itself the benefits of the second vote. In other words, De Borda's statement of his methods left little to be asked in the way of preciseness, but he overstrained the simplicity of the situation; in fact, the electoral situation was very complicated, and a wide variety of precautions, laws, etc., are necessary in order to see that a new election idea will work as it is supposed to work.

I meationed "party." The modern political party was as yet unknown. Early modern democratic theorists condemned factions and parties. They could not foresee where the majority principle in action would lead ultimately. Condorcet, who had many of the same ideas as De Borda, committeed the same mistake in his systems. Men see all too often what they want to see, and they did not yet believe that groups, factions, or parties were inevitable.

The problems which De Borda got into in trying to make the majority principle work in the political sphere as if the political sphere could be made a vacuum have caused many writers through history to deny that the majority could have any role in politics. Our second basic attitude towards the majority, therefore, is that the majority must either be ignored or coerced. This either takes the form that the majority exists but should have nothing to say, or that the majority exists but must be continually coerced or managed by the political elite, for it can do nothing by itself but only can act through the activity of aggressive leaders. The belief that the majority should have nothing to say is the old absolutistic monarchical notion or the aristocratic notion which persists to the present time. Examples of this fear of the majority and the hope that it can be politically ignored are found in the writings of Europeans like Faguet, author of the anti-Democratic

work, The Cult of Incompetance, and Ortega y Gassett's Revolt of the Masses. We have our own representatives of this belief, which is ordinarily not violent or aggressive, in Henry Adams and James Fenimore Cooper, whom you probably better remember as author of The Last of the Mohicans.

On the more affirmative side, arguing that the majority exists only so far as it is a tool in the hands of the ruling elite, may be found writers such as Roberto Michels, Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto. The majority in non-rational, cannot act of its own accord, and must be manipulated through propaganda and violence. When this basic attitude is translated into scientific interest in the behavior of the majority, it becomes two questions. How can majority systems of politics be manipulated? And how are propaganda and violence used as political instruments?

Now, just as the first interest of democratic science lay in finding what the majority thought, and devising means of implementing the majority will, the later period of democracy, the stage we are in now, is fully impressed and frightened by the thought that the majority is most often a force for evil in the hands of a few. Their interest shifts with almost an obsessional intensity to the problems of politics as the science of who get what, when, and how. Although early democratic theorists hardly conceived of a science of propaganda, for they were content with the way the majority will was expressing itself and not aware that all sorts of difficulties lay hidden in the workings of the so-called majority, later political scientists became acutely aware that a few might manipulate the minds of the mass of people and artificially create a majority will to correspond to their interests. It is no coincidence, that the country most adulatory of the majority, the United States of America,

should then by leaps and bounds create a science of public opinion far ahead of any other nation. While American writers were still bemused by love of the majority, the writers of Europe, including those just mentioned, were already aware of its problems. Within the space of a few years, the American writers have caught up and even gone ahead. The studies of Lazarsfeld, Merton, Pollock, and Gosnell are uniquely American. Gosnell, for example, in his various studies of the voting behavior of particular states, no longer takes political devices at their face value. He is no longer interested in what political parties are presumed to represent, or what majority election systems presume to call the majority will.

Let us take as our example here a study of Huey Long's career in Louisiana. In this case, we had as our objectives to discover what kind of a dictatorship, if any, was that of Long, and to discover how the majority formed itself and acted in Louisiana during this period. We used fairly simple statistical techniques to compare the voting figures from the various election years and added to them various indices of a more general social nature, such as figures on religious affiliation, crime, and industrial concentration. To gain a rounded perspective and insights, the available literature on Louisiana was read and analysed.

A combination of statistical evidence and previously reported materials on Louisiana evidenced in the beginning that in many ways the state could fall into the unenvied category of social disorganization. In addition, there were numerous evidences of apathy on the part of the electorate and the non-voting population. An analysis of slogans and symbols used in the various campaigns showed that they varied from one campaign to another and were as often as not self-contradictory. Moreover, the important campaign

in Louisiana, as in the rest of the solid South, was the primary campaign which was usually free of national issues, and therefore public opinion in the state was little influenced by the national excitement and acarried on in comparative isolation. All of these things made it possible to say on the basis of statistical and other evidence that no crystallized public opinion existed in Louisiana. The majority was for most practical purposes only a voting figure. It was not a consensus of the community, or the voice of the public. This is a very important fact in the theory of the majority for it was further evidence of the hypothesis that a numerical majority may often fallaciously be used to stand for a majority of the public which in fact existed not at all. The public must never be identified with a voting figure, nor must the community, nor must the consensus. This point is beautifully described in John Dewey's little book, The Public and Its Problems. If the Louisiana case were invariable and inevitable, we could indeed declare, as Pareto said it: "We will not linger on the fiction of popular representation -- poppycock grinds no flour."

Our help from quantitative methods did not stop with the analysis of the content of the majority. Comparison of the voting behavior of the Louisiana parishes in the elections from 1924 to 1936 showed an absence of class issues in the voting, no matter how Huey may have declaimed against the corporations and on behalf of the common man. There were erratic shifts in the voting figures of the same county from election to election. Cameron and Evangeline parishes which had given Long 14 and 13 per cent of their votes respectively in 1924, gave him 74 and 73 per cent respectively in 1928. And whereas in the election of 1924, Long's vote for governor

showed only three parishes near the mean of the distribution of the vote, 17 parishes were below 15 per cent and 12 above 65 per cent. Ordinarily the greatest cluster of parish or county votes in a state centers around the median point. The case here, however, is characteristic of machine rule. Where the parish machine is against a man, he is snowed under; when for him, he gets a very high proportion of the votes. It was proof of Long's organizing genius that as time went on, he gained control over more and more of the parishes. But to the day he was assassinated, his strength was a combination of personal/and self-interested elements. He did not lead a social movement of the kind that has kept Europe in crisis since the beginning of the 20th Century. His role was not to symbolize and lead a basic revolution. He ought not to be compared to Western European dictators or to Stalin. He resembles more the dictator types that used to be characteristic of certain South American countries. Huey Long was almost the perfect banana dictator. The words we use to describe him can be traced through the figures, and we can say with a little greater conviction that an apathetic public and irresponsible business interests may create conditions under which a non-ideological, personal leader of the type of Huey Long may ride to victory. A highly aroused public and fanatical business interests may crease conditions under which an ideological personal leader of the type of Hitler may triumph. Quantitative methods, carefully protected by all available sociological materials, can establish and verify the presence of such a condition.

III.

There is a third basic attitude towards the majority, in a manner of speaking. That is the attitude that the majority does not even exist; related to this basic belief is the attitude that the majority doesn't exist but there is a myth of the majority which is powerful, and must be taken into consideration in studying democratic societies. The belief that the majority is non-existent is founded on the apathy, ignorance, and disorganization of the electorate. It is not necessarily an anti-democratic theory. In America it has grown to such proportions that it may almost be called the practical politicians' theory of politics, or as I have labelled it, the free-market theory of politics. T. V. Smith is its best exponent in American today. We can let his words describe the belief for us. "We have here the moral function of the legislator: it is to preserve the peace by constructing a justice against the joint recalcitrance of equally good citizens." The representative is a broker, not the mouthpiece of the majority. The majority, for the purpose of politics doesn't exist, but rather a club of brokers compromising with each other; buying low and selling high is their aim.

This attitude towards the majority leads to a focussing of attention on professes of government other than the electoral processes. The legislature, the administration, the role of the executive become the objects of study, so that today we find an increasing amount of attention given by political scientists to these operations of government. The Merriam, Brownlow, Gulick studies of national administrative machinery, the growth of various public administration services, the attention given in the last several years to the field of administrative loaw, and the studies of legislative personnel of persons like Charles Hyneman and Harold

Laski are indirectly attributable to the decline of the belief that the operations of the majority constitute the most important facts of democratic political life.

Our choice of a quantitative study to illustrate this trend of attention among political scientists is an article by Garland Routt, entitled "Interpersonal Relationships and the Legislative Process." By way of introduction, he states, much in the manner of T. V. Smith, that legislatures are able to perform their democratic functions, not in spite of the mere humanness of their members, but because of it. Faultless men convinced of the infallible righteousness of their beliefs could not be organized into an effective legislature." In other words, the majority doesn't count for all practical purposes. The election process can send men to the assembly, but from there on the men are on their own. They must provide their own solutions to political problems. Routt devised a simple quantitative framework to measure the personal relations among the members of the Illinois State Senate. The interpersonal contacts of 11 representative senators were selected for counting. Contacts were recorded during the first 15 minutes of each hour the senate was in session. Eighty-six such sample periods were chosen. Only contacts between two senators were registered, not those among a group of more than two. Of the 371 recorded contacts, it would found that 242 contacts or 65.2 per cent were between the six Democrats in the sample 11. Less than 10 per cent were between the five Republican members of the group, and the remaining 25 per cent were between members of different parties. In order words, there was a substantial amount of interpersonal relations among members of opposing parties, leading to the suggestion that, faced with the immediate problems of governing

in everyday politics, members of one party or the other could not take any holier than thou attitude but, whatever the majority sentiment back home, cooperated in the legislative process.

By arranging the data in new orders, Routt found two other characteristics of the interpersonal relationships which were interesting to note. The strong upstate-downstate section barrier in Illinois was continually being broken by contacts between Cook County Senators and downstate senators. In addition, it would found that the longer the tenure of legislators in the Senate, the greater the number of contacts which they made with members of opposing parties.

Studies of this type have great possibilities if properly supplemented with other data detailed descriptive materials such as reports of interviews. For example, one might make this sort of record for successive sessions at different periods of economic or external crisis to test such an hypothesis as: In external crises, interpersonal relations between members of opposing parties increase while in internal economic crises, interpersonal contacts decrease. Another test might be made between American legislatures based on the Democratic-Republican parties and one on say the English House of Commons where the split between Conservative and Labor Parties is more fundamental and economic in character. In each of these cases, the problems of quantifying the data and achieving comparability would multiply enormously, perhaps hopelessly, because of the divergency in conditions over a period of time or between two different countries. Still there is much to be learned from comparing Hyneman's studies of the vocations of American legislators with the studies of Laska and Thomas on the vocations of Members of Parliament.

IV.

We come now to sum up our lecture. In the beginning, we declared that we were out to break down the various meanings given to the majority and show the relationship of such meanings to the science of politics. We also stated that we would display some of the difficulties which face attempts to employ the precision of quantitative methods in politics.

The many roles assigned to the majority in the writings of political theorists break down into three major, basic attitudes. That the majority must be understood and followed was the first one. The reaction to this general opinion in the study of political science was to promote interest in answering these questions: What does the majority think? and How can the majority will be implemented? The DeBorda lecture was examined as an early attempt to arrange quantitatively an answer to the problem of implementing the majority will.

The second basic attitude toward the majority received stimulation from predemocratic times but was revived by the reaction against democracy. It held that the majority exists but it must be ignored or coerced into agreement with the elite. The reaction of this general attitude on the part of political scientists is a rush of interest in two more questions: How can majority systems be manipulated? and How are propaganda and violence used to coerce or persuade majorities? In connection with this general attitude, we showed how measurable data about the political processes in a single state could throw light on the process by wh ch an unstable and disorganized public was converted into an artificial majority.

The third basic attitude toward the majority is essentially negative. It holds that the majority doesn't exist in reality, and

substitute means of managing the public interest must be the focus of scientific interest and attention. Part of the new interest was a devotion to the legislative process, and we examined briefly a study of interpersonal relationships in an American state legislature which showed the existence of social interaction tending towards the formation of an esprit des corps different from the esprit of the majority and campaign-time party politics.

Taking all three general attitudes together, we can realize that there are elements of truth in all of them. Each is a distorted but partially true manner of presenting reality. We certainly have all sorts of evidence -- in careful narration and measurable data alike -- to show that the extreme theory of majrity competence would prevent indefinitely a solution of the problems of political science. At the opposing extreme, we have equally good evidence -- in opinion surveys and in close studies of operating situations -- to warn us that something like a majority principle is operating in many communities, whether in fact or in potent myth.

Perhaps one of the most complete attempts to banish the majority principle is the complete guild, syndicalist, or corporate state idea. Gabriele d'Annunzio, fiery poet, passionate novelist, and the problem boy of Fiume in the First World War, drew up in 1919 a blueprint for the perfect corporate state which influenced the Fascist idea. For his guilds, he took from the ancient Greeks the nine muses. Nine great corporations were to be named for them -- a corporation of salaried workers, technical and administrative employees, commercial employees, all employers, civil servants, free professions, consumers' cooperatives, and seafarers. The tenth muse of the Greeks was nameless. And so d'Annunzio declared that there would be a tenth nameless corporation which would gather up

the loose ends that evaded the other corporations. It was, he said, to direct the mysterious forces inherent in a people in labor and ascendancy. The analogy was startling, and the meaning of the nameless muse, unrecognized by most, even more startling. For the life of the total community could not be so neatly divided. There was a sentiment somewhere, an interest somewhere, that could not be categorized. That interest, I beg to suggest, would be the majority interest, which could never be syllogized out of existence.

At its least, the majority idea adds a flexibility to the structure of society which is vitally necessary. William James once said that no relationship between two objects or a person and the outside world ever includes everything or dominates over everything. There is always the word "and" trailing off after every descriptive sentence. So it is with the tenth muse, that gathers no specialized craft, but rather the echoes of the total concert of society.

Throughout our discussion of these materials, it has been apparent that there is a direct connection between what men believe makes politics work and what they turn their scientific attention to. The majority, nay, democracy even, in the old sense of the word, is losing status as the object of scientific attention. The political process is today considered to run much deeper into the social process and permeate much more meaningfully the whole fabric of society. In a book which he has just published, Harold Lasswell has written: "Democratic leaders need to think configuratively and to apply all the skills (I have outlined). For maximum rationality it is necessary to use each tool, with no excessive reliance upon one. Each tool is part of the total process by which the mind can seek and perhaps find correct orientation in the entire manifold of events

that are important for progressive democratization."

There was a time when things were rather more simple. Today we are faced with a bewildering array of theory on the majority idea, as on every other aspect of politics. And along with the confusion of theory and desire have burgeoned forth a variety of methods in the social sciences designed to answer the questions posed. We are in the fortunate yet unhappy position of the fisherman who happens on a school of fish and must tend several lines at the same time. But provided the times do not become too unstable, and provided that additional resources in hard dollars are put at the disposal of social science, the development of a coordinated, more complete and more interrelated scientific method may not be far off. Then it may happen that students will get more than a short glimpses of paradise, more than bits and patches of studies as I have outlined them here today. Then it may happen that they will be properly presented with a coherent body of materials which will accurately define, not only the nature and possibilities of the majority process, but the nature and possibilities of democratic society as a whole.